

103

A
TREATISE
OF
PARADISE.

AND THE PRINCIPALL
contents thereof:

Especially

Of the greatnesse, situation, beautie,
and other properties of that place : of
the trees of life, good and euill ; of the Ser-
pent, Cherubin, fiery Sword, Mans creation, im-
mortalitie, propagation, stature, age, knowledge,
temptation, fall, and exclusion out of Para-
dise ; and consequently of his and our
originall sin: with many other
difficulties touching
these points.

Collected out of the holy Scriptures,
ancient Fathers, and other both anci-
ent and moderne Writers.

by Salkeld
L O N D O N

Printed by EDWARD GRIFFIN for
NATHANIEL BUTTER.

1617.

A
TREATISE
OF
PARADISE.

AND THE PRINCIPALS
CONCERNING THE


ESSENTIALS

OF THE NATURE OF THE
HUMAN MIND, AND THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS,
AND THE ARTS AND SCIENCES,
AND THE HISTORY OF THE
HUMAN RACE, FROM THE
BEGINNING OF THE WORLD
TO THE PRESENT TIME.

Collected by J. B. B. B. B.
and J. B. B. B. B. B. B.

Printed by J. B. B. B. B.
and J. B. B. B. B. B. B.

/u/
to
H
/ai



TO THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE, SIR
FRANCIS BACON Knight, Lord
Keeper of the great Seale of EN-
GLAND, and one of his Ma-
iesties most honorable
Priuy Councell.

HIS Maiestie hauing
deigned to patronize the
first fruits of my labors,
to whom (if I may pre-
sume) ought I rather (for many titles)
to second with the second, then to your
Honour ? who (as Siluerius
saith of Cæsar) hath honoured lear-

*Siluerius in
Augusto.*

A 2 ning

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ning by his owne labours, so all the learned labour to honour you with their labours? Seeing therefore his Maiestie vouchsafed to accept of my Treatise of Angels, deigne likewise (most worthy Peere) to patronize this of Paradise; not for the worth of the worke, that I deeme it worthy so worthy a Patron; but that for want of its due lustre and worth, it may receiue both by the reflecting beames of your Honour, which the Lord increase with all iust titles of grace and honor, with our Prince on earth, with the King of Heauen, *εις ουρανου τω ανωτατω*, that as your wisdom and other heroicall vertues are iustly admired here vpon earth, so they may be with double poize rewarded in the kingdome of heauen: Which is faithfully praied for by

Your Honors humbly deuoted,

JOHN SALKELD.



The Argument of the Treatise ensuing.



S knowledge is the perfection of our blessednesse in the life to come ; so I deeme it to be the beginning, in this : there, of God, as it is in perfection ; here, of our selues, as in the first steppe to perfection : so that here wee knowing our selues to be nothing but sinne and corruption, may come to the knowledge of him, who is all in all, goodnesse and perfection : here, onely possessed in part ; there, wholly enioyed in full measure : but how here in part, there in full measure, *hoc opus, hic labor est*, this shall bee the subiect of our labour, and end of this present Treatise : by which wee pre-

A 3

tend

*Quamuis
Aureolus
apud Capre-
olum in 4.
d. 49. q. 1.
et Scotus in
d. d. 49. q. 1.
teneant for-
malem bea-
titudinem
in velatione,
imo & Ca-
iet. 1. p. q.
27. ar. 2.
Fer. contra
gent. c. 53.
cap. 1. d. 27.
q. 2. lauel.
9 met. q. 16.
Torres de
Trinitate,
q. 27. ar. 7.
Conimb. 3.
de anima,
c. 8 teneant
esse actionē
formaliter.*

THE ARGUMENT.

*Dur. quocumque
q. 4. sine di-
stinctione
affirmat be-
atitudinem
esse in ag-
gregatione
omnium bo-
norum, in in-
tellectu, vo-
luntate &
corpore, sicut
& Hugo de
S. Vict. in c.
7. l. de coele-
sti Hierar-
chia. Ric.
4. dist. 49.
& Gab. ib.
& Cordub.
lib. 1. que-
stionarij q.
4. in frui-
tione.*

*Mars. q. ult.
& Argent.*

*q. 3 in delectatione de Deo viso. Bonavent. similiter esse visionem fidei
respondentem, dilectionem charitati via, delectationem spei Communis
autem opinio Aquinatis & aliorum in actu solus intellectus formalem no-
stram beatitudinem consistere autumat.*

tend to shew what we lost by the diso-
bedience of *Adam*, and what we got by
the obedience of Christ; how in Para-
dise wee possessed God in part, and by
what sinne wee fell from him wholly;
what were our pleasures in Paradise,
and what miseries did follow our fall:
how wee are raised againe after our
fall, and are to be placed in those glo-
rious thrones, from which the wicked
Angels fell. Lastly, what is our bles-
sednesse in the life to come, and by
what meanes it is wrought in vs here.
In which points if I doe erre (as of my
selfe I can no lesse) it shall bee both
with all subiection vnto the learned,
and with no lesse desire to
be corrected.

THE

THE TABLE
and order of the
Chapters.

CHAP. I.



*Hether there was ever
any such place as Para-
dise? or rather the de-
scription of Paradise is
to be understood allego-
rically, and so to be referred unto the
minde only?*

CHAP. II.

The description and situation of Paradise.

CHAP. III.

*The compasse and greatnesse of Paradise,
and why it was so beautified, seeing
God foreknew for how short a time it
was to serue the use of man?*

CHAP. IV.

*What may be the reason why Paradise
was neuer found as yet?*

THE TABLE.

CHAP. V.

Whether there be as yet any Paradise or no? or rather it was destroyed in Noes floud?

CHAP. VI.

Of the trees of Paradise, whether all were fruitfull, or rather some only beautifull, though vnfruitfull?

CHAP. VII.

Of the tree of life, why it was so called? and whether it was corporall, as other trees be, or rather spirituall and food of the soule, not of the body? or finally appertaining to both?

CHAP. VIII.

The allegoricall interpretation of the tree of life.

CHAP. IX.

Why the tree of life was so called, and whether it had truly the propertie of making a man immortall.

CHAP. X.

Whether the vertue of the tree of life to preserve man immortall was naturall vnto it, or supernaturall.

CHAP. XI.

Of the tree of the knowledge of good and euill,

THE TABLE.

euill, to wit, whether it was a true and naturall tree, like vnto others. And why it was so called.

CHAP. XII.

Of the creation of man.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the manner of mans creation.

CHAP. XIII.

How man was made to the image and likeness of God.

CHAP. XV.

What is the difference betweene the image and the similitude of God, according to which man is said to be created.

CHAP. XVI.

Whether the woman be made to the image of God, or no.

CHAP. XVII.

Whether man be made like vnto God according to his corporall substance, proportion, and lineaments; or doth in any wise represent the diuine maiestie?

CHAP. XVIII.

Whether the image of God may be wholly lost, and blotted out of the soule of man.

CHAP. XIX.

Why God made man to his image and similitude?

CHAP.

THE TABLE.

CHAP. XX.

Whether the dominion ouer all liuing creatures was giuen vnto man, and what power that was?

CHAP. XXI.

Whether in the state of innocencie one man should haue beene subiect to another, or rather all should haue beene of equall authoritie and power?

CHAP. XXII.

Whether the Angels did concurre to the production of man, or no?

CHAP. XXIII.

Whether Adam was created in his perfect stature and age?

CHAP. XXIV.

Whether the soule and the body were created in the same instant, or no?

CHAP. XXV.

Whether the immortalitie of the soule may be demonstrated out of the Scriptures, or no.

CHAP. XXVI.

Whether the soule of Adam was immortal by its owne nature, or only by grace?

CHAP. XXVII.

That Adam was not created in Paradise, and

THE TABLE.

and why not, and by what means hee came thither after his creation?

CHAP. XXVIII.

To what end was Adam placed in Paradise?

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether the commandement of not eating of the tree of knowledge of good and euill, was giuen aswell to Eue, as to Adam, and how that was?

CHAP. XXX.

Why God commanded that Adam should not eate of the tree of knowledge of good and euill?

CHAP. XXXI.

In which the matter of the precedent chapter is more largely discussed.

CHAP. XXXII.

What death that was which God threatned to inflict upon Adam for his transgression.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the creation of the woman, and to what end she was created.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What sleepe that was which God caused to fall upon Adam for the creation of Eue,

THE TABLE.

*Eue, and whether it was a true sleepe
or no?*

CHAP. XXXV.

*Why Eue was created of Adams ribbe,
and not immediately of the earth, and
how that could be without any grieffe to
Adam?*

CHAP. XXXVI.

*Why and how Eue was made of the ribbe
of Adam?*

CHAP. XXXVII.

*Whether the ribbe of which Eue was crea-
ted, was requisite to the perfection of
Adams body or no.*

CHAP. XXXVIII.

*How mankinde should haue beene multi-
plied if Adam had persisted in Para-
dise?*

CHAP. XXXIX.

*Whether there should haue beene more
men or women in the state of innocen-
cie, or rather an equalitie of both sexes:
and how there could haue beene any
women, seeing they are said to proceed
out of the defect of nature.*

CHAP. XL.

*Of the prerogatiues and excellent gifts
where-*

THE TABLE.

wherewith Adam was endued in the state of innocencie: and first as touching his knowledge and naturall wisdom of naturall things.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the knowledge which Adam had of things aboue nature.

CHAP. XLII.

Whether Adam was created in the grace of God, or no.

CHAP. XLIII.

Whether if Adam had not fallen, all his posteritie should haue beene borne in the grace and fauour of God, and confirmed in the same.

CHAP. XLIV.

Whether Adam before his sinne was mortall or immortall.

CHAP. XLV.

What kinde of Serpent that was which tempted Eue.

CHAP. XLVI.

Whether that which Moses saith, that the Serpent was craftier then all beasts of the earth, is to be understood of the true Serpent, or of the Deuill?

CHAP.

THE TABLE.

CHAP. XLVII.

What was the reason why the woman was not afraid to speake with the Serpent.

CHAP. XLVIII.

Why the Dewill tooke the shape of a serpent rather then of any other creature : and why Moses made no mention of the Dewill, seeing he was the chiefe tempter.

CHAP. XLIX.

Whether when God cursed the serpent, it is to be understood of the true serpent, or of the Dewill.

CHAP. L.

Whether Adam was cast out of Paradise the same day he was created.

CHAP. LI.

Of the Cherubin and Sword which were put at the entrance of Paradise.

CHAP. LII.

What was the cause why Adam and his posteritie were banished Paradise : wherein two ancient errours are refuted as touching originall sinne.

CHAP. LIII.

In which diuers other opinions touching originall sinne are refuted.

CHAP.

THE TABLE.

CHAP. LIV.

Whether originall sinne consist in any priuation, or no?

CHAP. LV.

In which the last opinion of the precedent Chapter is disscussed and reiected, and the true doctrine of originall sinne set downe.

CHAP. LVI.

In which the matter of the precedent chapter is more largely discussed.

CHAP. LVII.

Wherein diuers difficulties are solued against the former doctrine.

CHAP. LVIII.

Of the manner how originall sinne doth descend from Adam to his posteritie.

CHAP. LIX.

Whether it was necessary there should be made any couenant betweene God and man, that so originall sinne might descend to the posteritie of Adam.

CHAP. LX.

How the soule is said to be infected by the body in the posteritie of Adam by his originall sinne.

CHAP.

THE TABLE.

CHAP. LXI.

Whether there should haue beene any originall sinne in vs, if either Adam only, or Eue onely had eaten of the forbidden tree.

CHAP. LXII.

What punishments bee due to originall sinne in this life.

CHAP. LXIII.

What punishment is due to originall sinne in the other life.

CHAP. LXIV.

The obiections of Simon Magus against the aforesaid doctrine of the creation of man, and his being in Paradise.

CHAP. LXV.


*In which the obiections of Manes are as-
soiled.*

CHAP. LXVI.

The obiections of Theodorus and Nestorius against originall sinne are solued.

A Treatise of Paradise.

I



CHAP. I.

*Whether there was euer any such place
as Paradise, or rather the description
of Moses is to be understood Allegori-
callie, and so to be referred vnto the
minde onely.*



AS there is nothing in
nature so plain which
may not be contradi-
cted, neyther any
thing so pure which
may not be defiled, so
nothing so euident in Gods Worde,
which hath not beene opposed. Such
is our nature after our fall, and such
our daily most lamentable lapses, af-
ter our first lapse, and originall Fall.
Insonmuch, that ignoring the cause of

B

our

our infinite misery, we become desperately sicke, and of our selues and nature, without remedy. Wherefore my intent beeing chiefly to shew vs our end, and eternall felicity, I will first shew the place, and demonstrate the grace from which we fell; that thereby knowing the infelicity of our fall, and place from which we fel, we may be more thankfull vnto God for that felicity, place, and grace, vnto which we are exalted after our fall; and so come to a more perfect blessednes after our fall, then that which wee possessed before we fell, or should haue possessed in Paradise if wee had not falne. Now therefore as touching this place of our first happinesse, and from whence our misery was first deriued, I will begin with a worthy Prelate, who though hee was one of the chiefeſt Doctors of the Church of God, yet being to explicate theſe very difficulties of Paradise, was not ashamed to acknowledge his ignorance. *De Paradiso adoriendus sermo, non mediocrem nobis æſtum videtur incutere,*

*Ambrosius
de Par idy-
ſo, in prin-
cipio capitis
primi.*

A Treatise of Paradise.

3

cutere, quid nam sit Paradyſus, et ubi ſit, qualiſue ſit inueſtigare & explanare cupientibus: maxime cum Apoſtolus ſive in corpore, ſive extra corpus nesciat, raptū ſe tamen dicat uſq; ad tertiū cælū; idemque teſtetur ſe ibi audiriſſe arcana verba, qua non licet homini loqui. Being to ſpeake (ſaith this Father) of Paradise, it doth not a litle trouble me to ſearch out and explaine what Paradise is; where it is; & what manner of place it is; eſpecially ſeeing the Apoſtle ſaith, that he was rapt thither into the third heauen, where hee heard ſuch things as bee not lawfull for any mortall man to vtter.

2. Cor. 12.

By which words he ſignifieth two things; the firſt, that, that place was Paradise, vnto which S. Paul was carried (the which opinion in what ſenſe it may bee verified, it ſhall afterward be explicated) the ſecond thing there to be noted is, that it is impoſſible for man to declare, what kinde of place that was, vnto which the Apoſtle was carried, vnleſſe peraduenture it might haue been by him, who had that ſpe-

ciall priuiledge, to be carried thither.

Hence peraduenture it is that *Ori- genes*, *Philo*, the *Hermetians* and *Seleu- cians* were of opinion, that there was neuer any such place as Paradise, but rather that the scripture where it maketh mention of Paradise, is to be vnderstood Metaphorically, Spiritually, or Allegorically.

First, because in other places of Scripture, where there is mention of Paradise, that word cannot be vnderstood of any terrene place: therefore if one place of Scripture must bee the interpreter of the other, according to the common consent of the Fathers, it may not seem improbable, but that the like may be admitted in this history of Paradise.

Secondly, because those things which are said to haue beene in Paradise, cannot be vnderstood literally: as that in the midst of Paradise there was a tree of knowledge of good and euill (a property not due vnto nature, much lesse agreeable or consequent to the nature of a tree). Secondly, that

Adam

Adam heard the voyce of G O D, where as spirits of their owne nature haue no voyce, or sound, much lesse the purest of spirits. Thirdly, that hee heard God walking towards the South, whereas indeed God neither walketh, nor moueth, but is alwaies replenishing, working, and filling euery place, yea in euery place equally present, in essence equall, in power equall, in all his other infinit attributes equall.

Againe, how can it be vnderstood literally, that after the transgression, and expulsion of *Adam* out of Paradise, there was placed a Cherub or Angell with a fiery sword, as necessary for the custody of the said place: as though eyther the commaundement of God had not beene sufficient, or his will resistible without the assistance of the Angelicall power; or the Angell not sufficiently powerfull for the restraining of *Adam*, without the vse of a fiery sword; as though againe God in power were not omnipotent, neyther the Angell spirituall, but ei-

ther that the creator had neede of his creature, or that which is a pure spirit had need in his operation of an impure, imperfect and corruptible bodie.

*Moses Bar-
sephas tra-
statu de
Paradyso.*

Moses Barsephas in his Treatise of Paradise saith, that there be two parts of Paradise, one corporall, another spirituall, one created for the pleasure of the body, another for to delight the soule: so that, as man is composed of two parts, the one spirituall, the other corporall, and yet but one onely man: so (saith hee) was Paradise partly corporall, and partly spirituall, yet one onely Paradise: his arguments bee these.

If Paradise were onely corporall (saith hee) then the body onely of *Adam* was delighted there: because no corporall thing can delight the soule: wherefore if God had not created another part of Paradise spirituall, hee might seem to haue dealt fraudulently with man (which were blasphemous) who promised a Paradise for the whole man; and yet created such
a one

a one as could not delight the whole man.

Againe, that Paradise is not onely spirituall, he proueth with these arguments: For then it could not haue delighted the body, but onely the spirit. Yea all those things which *Moses* writeth as touching Paradise, might bee deemed false; seeing that hee so euidently insinuateth, that man was created in Paradise, as in some materiall place; and that God had planted Paradise in Eden from the beginning: that he put man there whom hee had created, that he created for him there all trees, hearbs, beasts, and all other things necessary, both for the delight and vse of man: That our first Fathers fell from Gods grace, by eating of the forbidden fruite; that they hid themselves amongst the trees of Paradise, after their fall; and many other things which cannot be vnderstood, but of a reall and corporall place.

Thirdly, if Paradise were not a reall and corporall place, how could there flow out of it those foure riuers, which

(as the Scripture witnesseth) compass the whole earth? How should *Enoch* and *Elias* be translated thither, and (as many writers affirme) be conserued there both in body and soule? yea otherwise how should *Adam* and *Eue* haue liued there?

Which things, though all of them bee not so certaine, yet most of them are so euidently expressed in the scripture, that they manifestly prooue the Garden of Paradise to haue beene a reall and corporall place, and therefore *S. Chrysostome* in his 13. Homily vpon *Genesis* saith, *Ideo Moyses descripsisse Paradisum*, That *Moses* did therefore so manifestly describe Paradise, the riuers, the trees, the fruites, and all other things thereto appertaining, that the simple and ignorant should not be deceiued, by the fabulous Allegories, and doting dreames, which some would pretend to diuulge for sole truth, hidden in the figuratiue and materiall description of Paradise.

The like also may be seene in *Saint Augustine* in his eight booke vpon *Genesis* cap. 1. & seq. and the 13. booke
de

Chrysostom.
hom. 13. in
genesis.

August. in
gen. l. 8. c. 1.
& sequenti-
b. & lib.

13. de ciuit.
dei c. 21. &
q. 27. in gen.
Basil. hom.

exameron.
hom. 11. Hi-
er epist. ad

Pamachii.
Epiphanius.

Damasceus.
Isidorus.

Nicenus.
Cyrillus.

Naz.

de ciuitate dei, cap. 21. & questione vigesima septima in Gen. Basil. Hom. 11. vpon the Exameron. Likewise Hierome in his Epistle to Pamachius; Epiphanius epist. ad Iohannem Hieros. Damascenus in his fourth booke, de Orthodoxa fide, cap. 13. Isodorus libro quarto Etymologiarum cap. 3. Gregorius Nicenus oratione quinta in orationem dominicam. Cyrill, Naz. Ephren, and others.

Lastly, S. Augustine in his 27. question vpon Genesis giueth this reason as an euident demonstration, that Paradise was a true corporall place; because the land of the Sodomites, and Gomorrhæans before the destruction thereof, was compared in the thirteenth chapter of Genesis, to this pleasant place of Paradise, in these words: *Before the Lord destroyed Sodome, and Gomorrah, it was as the garden of the Lord, like the Land of Egypt, as thou goest vnto Zoar, Wherefore saith Saint Augustine in the place aboue alleadged) if by the fruitfull trees described in Paradise, there were nothing else to be understood, but onely the vertues of the minde,*

Aug. quest. 27. in Gen.

Genes. c. 13.

Hieronimus
in Danie-
lem cap. 10.

minde, as some do hold, and if there were no true corporal Paradiſe, beautified with all kinde of trees, it would not haue beene ſaid of that place, that it was as the Paradiſe of God. *Conticeſcant igitur* (as Saint Hierome commenteth vpon Daniel, cap. 10.) *eorum deliramenta qui umbras & imagines in veritate ſequentes ipſam conantur euertere veritatem: ut Paradyſum & flumina & arbores putent Allegoria legibus ſe debere ſubnere.* Because the aforeſaid Allegories rather ſeeme *deliramenta*, dottages and dreames (as this Father termeth them) then expositions of learned Doctours, let them therefore in no wiſe be mentioned or vttered: not that there may not bee good uſe of theſe and other the like Allegoricall expositions, but that they are not ſo to be vſed, that they be a meanes to ouerthrow the truth, or that they be taken for the ſole trueth, which were no ſmall injury vnto the word of God, which oftentimes admitteth as well the true hiftoricall, as the litterall ſenſe, together with the ſpirituall interpretation, if it be rightly applied.

Chap.

CHAP. II.

*The description and situation of
Paradise.*

THIS may seeme as strange a title to some, as how to measure the latitude of the heauens, the depth of the Sea, or how to number the innumerable starres of the firmament, yea much more; seeing that of these we haue some sight, some experience, some naturall ground; but of this of Paradise, we haue no view, no experience, nor any naturall foundation sufficient to build such mighty machinas of conceipts, as some doe more boldly, then soundly conceiue of Paradise.

But yet to this I answere; that as we ought, (according to prudence, and wisdom) to giue credit vnto such as are expert in any faculty, as long as we haue no sufficient ground to contradict: So much more vnto the Fathers and other learned Diuines, in points
apper-

appertaining vnto Diuinity : and in particular of these of Paradise, which though they be not altogether so euident in the Scripture; yet at least way, they are either euidently deduced, or probably inferred out of the sacred text ; such as *Isidors* description of Paradise is, who in the fourteenth book of his *Ætimologies* describeth it thus.

Isidorus Lib.
14. *ætimologiarum.*
The description of Paradise.

Paradyse is a place situated in the Orientall parts of the world, whose *ætimology* (the word beeing translated out of Greeke into Latin,) signifieth hortum a Garden. In Hebrew it is called *Heden*, which interpreted in Latin is the same that *delicia*, delights: wherefore both names being ioyned together, they signify a Garden of all manner of delights, and pleasures, a place beset with all kinde of fruitfull, and beautifull trees: where there is neyther cold, nor heat, but a perpetuall temper of aire; furthermore out of this so pleasant a place there floweth in great aboundance, a faire fountaine, which watereth the whole Garden and trees thereof, which afterward is diuided into foure huge and great riuers, but the entrance of this place is alwayes shut

A Treatise of Paradise.

13

shut up, for the sinne of our first Fathers: yea it is alwaies environed and guarded on every side with a fiery sword; so that the very flames doe alwaies almost touch even the heavens themselves. In this place finally, are placed the Cherubins, to wit, a most vigilant custody, or centinell of Angels, for the terror and expulsion of euill spirits. Insomuch that neyther man nor euill spirit may haue accesse thither, man being kept away by the fiery flame, the euill spirits by the watch of the Cherubins: thus farre Isodorus.

Which is the same in effect, which Alchimus expresseth in these few verses lib. 1. carminum de initio mundi. cap. 9.

Ergo ubi trāsmiſſis mundi caput incipit Indis,
Qua perhibent terram confinia iungere celo.
Lucus in accessa cunctis mortalibus arce
Permanet.

Hic ver assiduum cœli clementia seruat.
Turbidus anster abest, semperq̃ sub aëre sudo
Nubila diffugiunt ingi cessura sireno
Nec pœscit natura loci, quos non habet imbres
Sed contenta suo dotantur germinare rore.
Sic cum desit hiems nec torrida ferreat æstas,
Fructibus autumnus, ver floribus occupat annũ.

Alchimus
his descrip-
tio of Para-
dise lib. 1.^o
carminũ de
initio mun-
di cap. 9.

To

*Tertullianus
apolog. contra
gentiles.*

To which description I adde that of *Tertullian* in his Apologie against the Gentiles, where he saith, that *Paradise* is a place of diuine pleasure, destinated for the receiuing of the blessed spirits; segregated from the notice of the world by a fiery circle or girdle, which compasseth it about.

*Basilus
orat. de Pa-
radiso.*

Basil also in his oration of *Paradise* doth describe it thus. *Paradise* is a place flowing with all sorts of pleasure and delights, surpassing farre the beauty of all sensible creatures, which by reason of the height it hath, admitteth no obscurity of night, or darknesse by clouds, but rather is alwaies resplendent with the shining of the orientall starres: to which place also there can come no immoderate force of windes, no storme, no tempest, no horreur of winter, no inundation by waters, no burning of Sommer, no drought of Autumne, but a continuall and peaceable temperature of all times and seasons, insomuch that, that which may bee iustly thought the best and most pleasant of euery seuerall time of the yeare, that doth alwaies heere concur and abound, to wit, a continuall pleasure

sure of the spring, the abundance of harvest, the mirth and alacrity of *Autumne*, with the rest and quietnesse of the winter. To which *Ephren* (as hee is alleadged by *Barsephas* in his *Treatise of Paradise*) addeth, that it is beyond the Ocean, in another world. And *S. Augustine ad Orosium*, that it is a place situated in the East part of the world, reaching euen vp to the circle of the moone: and so as it was safe from the inundation of the flood; so also it is inaccessible to man after his first expulsion thence.

Abulenſis also seemeth in part to assent, saying, that though *Paradise* toucheth not the *Globe*, or circle of the moone, yet (saith hee) it farre exceedeth the limits of our turbulent, and darke aire; and that it is placed in the third region of the aire, higher at least by twenty cubits, then all the mountaines of the earth: so that the waters of *Noahs* flood, which transcended (according as the Scripture relateth) all the mountaines of the earth, fifteene cubits, could cause no damage

2 Cap. in
Gen 9. 2 &
6 13. 7. 107.

mage to so high a place, as that of Paradise.

*Bonauent.
lib 2 sent.
dist. 17.*

Finally *Bonauenture* in the second booke of the sentences, *dist. 17.* holdeth Paradyse to be vnder the equinoctiall line; because (as he and many others haue imagined) there is alwaies a perpetuall temper of the Heauens and time, by reason of the perpetuall equality of the dayes and nights vnder that line.

*Eugubinus,
Oleaster, &
Vatablus in
2. cap. Gen.*

Eugubinus, *Oleaster* and *Vatablus* vpon the second chapter of *Genesis* think that Paradise was placed in Mesopotamia, but that now it hath lost his beauty by the inundation of *Noes* flood: so that now beeing patent not onely vnto man, but also vnto the beasts themselves, it needeth no Angelicall custody, or fiery sword.

These be the common opinions of the Fathers, & doctors in these points; to which euery man may assent as he findeth most agreeable with reason and true Philosophy, for seeing that in these poynts there is nothing reuealed or declared vnto vs in the holy Scriptures,

tures, nature must bee the best guide and mistresse, where supernaturall authority is wanting.

Out of which naturall principles that of the huge height of Paradise, and reaching of it euen vnto the Spheare of the Moone, seemeth altogether improbable; for if Paradise was made for the habitation, yea for the delight of man, why should it bee situated in so inconuenient a place, yea (speaking according to naturall reason) naturally not inhabitable by reason of the neerenesse of the Sunne, and other Planets, and stars.

To which (I cannot denie) but some shew of answer may be made as that neither Sunne, nor any of the Planets, are (as the Philosophers say) formally but onely virtually hot; that is, though they haue the vertue to produce heate in these inferiour things, yet that they be not in themselves hot, neither are they capable of heate: because, as they neither agree in matter, nor forme (as many Philosophers hold) with these inferiour creatures;

C

so

so neither can they haue the same kinde of qualities that our Elements haue.

But this answer is easily confuted, because as the virtuall heate of the sun is sufficient to make inhabitable some places of the world (as diuers graue Writers affirme) by reason of the neernesse vnto it, why might it not also cause the like effect in Paradise? vnlesse wee will flie vnto the omnipotence of God, and miracles, the onely refuge of ill grounded Philosophie and ignorance.

Or say (as some haue fondly fained) that Paradise being of another kinde of matter then the rest of the earth, or of the same Species, and purity, that the heauens are, as these bee incorruptible by reason of their most pure matter, or incorruptible vnion, so likewise Paradise, and the thinges there: onely man being of the same nature that now he is, was by the particular prouidence of the omnipotent power, kept from mortalitie or corruption as long as hee preserved himselfe

selfe from the corruption of sin. But these and such like solutions, as they are forged without any ground, so they may easily be denied without any more reason, this onely being added to the former prooffe, that so high a place as the Spheare of the Moone, was altogether vnfit for the situation of Paradise, by reason of the perpetual agitation, and motion of that place, which is so continually rapt, and carried about with the most violent, and swift course of the heauen. Many other reasons (I confesse) might be giuen, but which rather appertain vnto Mathematices and longer discourses, then the breuity, which wee haue here taken vpon vs, will permit.

Now therefore onely remaineth that by the consideration of the excellencies of this place, wherein we were before our sinne, we gather the hatred God beareth to sinne; seeing that for the sinne of one, yea and that but one only, God, who is so good, yea infinite goodnesse and mercie, would punish with so long a punishment, and

with so great punishments, for so long a time, so infinite a number, as is, and shall be the whole posteritie of *Adam*, euen vnto the worlds end ; And that sinne, certainly, hath a kinde of infinitie of malice which could deserue so infinite a punishment, yea so much prouoke the infinite goodnesse and mercy of him, who is infinitely good, and mercifull. And lastly we may inferre, what sinneiustly deserueth, if it should not be punished more according to the rule of mercy, then according to that, which the rigor of iustice requireth ; seeing that nothing was, or could bee sufficient, to blot, or wash it away, but onely the bloud of the lambe of God, which onely washeth away the sinnes of the world ; by which, we are to be restored, not onely into a more high participation of God, and his grace, then we possessed before our fall ; but also into a more perfect Paradise, then that was, from which we were banished, for our first sinne, and fall : And this only by his merits, bloud, and passion,

passion, who could in no wise either slippe, or fall: So that wee may well exclaime with Saint *Austine*, O strange iudgement, o unspeakable disposition of the diuine mysteries; the sinner offendeth, the iust is punished: the guiltie transgresseth, the innocent is beaten; the wicked sinneth, the godly is condemned; that which the euill deserueth, the good suffereth; the seruant doth amisse, the master maketh amends: man committeth sinne, God beareth the punishment. O Sonne of God how hast thou debased thy selfe? how hast thou burned in affection? How farre is thy mercie stretched? whither is thy compassion come? Adam did wickedly, thou wast punished; man sinned, thou wast afflicted; Eue offended, thou wast tormented; we were disobedient, but thou obediently bearest the punishment of our disobedience; we serued our concupiscence, but thou enduredst hunger; the tree allured vs vnto an unlawfull desire, but perfect charitie ledde thee vnto the Crosse; wee tasted presumptuously the forbidden fruite, but thou sufferedst torments for our presumption, and momentarie delight. We enioy-

*August. in
meditationibus.*

ed the pleasure, but thou wast peirced with nailes ; wee delighted in the sweetnesse of the apple, but thou therefore didst tast the bitternesse of the gall.

Here astonished I know not what to say , nay I am so amazed I knowe not what to thinke, onely I can exclaime with the Apostle, *O altitudo sapientiae & scientiae Dei ! O deapth of the wisdom of God ! o mercy of the omnipotent without measure ! quid retribuam Domino pro omnibus quae tribuit mihi ?* What shall I giue vnto God again, who hath giuen himselfe so often for mee ? vnto hunger for my riot ; vnto nakednesse for my pride ; vnto dishonour for my honour, vnto humilitie for my ambition ; vnto mortalitie for my immortalitye : And finally vnto the ignominious torments of a thorny crowne, and other of his sacred passion, and vitall death, for to crowne mee with an eternall crowne of glory , in the life to come, in that euerlasting Paradise, vnto which no mutability, no mortality, and much lesse any impuritie can ascend : *vbi non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis*

itudinis adumbratio: whither not euen
the very shaddow of change can ap-
proach.

CHAP. III.

*Of the compasse and greatnesse of Para-
dise, and why it was so beautified, see-
ing God fore-knew, for how short a
time it was to serue for the vse of man.*

WHere there is lesse certainty in
the conclusion, there I meane
to spend lesse time in the resolution, as
in this of the compasse of Paradise: a
question of more difficultie, then ne-
cessitie: yet neuerthelesse because it is
vrged by some, I will endeavour to
giue some satisfaction in it, such as
may be in so vncertaine a point, at least
way as far, as other principles of Phi-
losophy, or Diuinitie, or finally as
the graue expositours of the sacred
text will giue me any firme ground of
discourse.

Amongst whom *Ephren* aboue al-

*Epōren lib
de Paradi-
so.*

ledged answereth to this question, *that Paradise was greater then all the earth now inhabited.* The reason may be, because as the inhabitants were to bee more in number then the earthly, and more worthy; so their habitation, according to the wisdom, & bountie of their Creatour, should haue beene more magnificent, and far more capable: of the beautie and magnificence no man can doubt, who doubteth not of the history of *Genesis*. Why then should we doubt of the other, seeing the same reason vrgeth in both? yea if we may discourse according to reason, in these things which depend only vpon the free disposition of the sole independent cause; certainly, as this cause of causes hath created all other things, *pondere & mensura* with due poise and measure of beauty, magnificence, and all other proprieties, according as the nature of the things required, and their finall ends, for which they were created, *a fortiori*, or much more, it ought likewise to bee inferred of the greatnesse and magnificence

ficence of Paradise ; wherefore, seeing that the seede of man, if he had not sinned, had beene more multiplied then now it is, because sinne (as true Philosophy teacheth) is no small impediment vnto generation ; it must needes follow, that as the Inhabitants should haue beene more in number, & the place of their habitation more magnificent ; so likewise the capacitie of the same place where all should haue dwelt, to wit, of Paradise, should haue beene greater then now the habitation of man is, in all the world now inhabited.

I know well what is wont to be answered, to wit, that if *Adam* had not tasted of the forbidden fruite, there should haue beene none in Paradise, but onely those, which should haue supplied the seates of the lapsed Angels ; and consequently they should haue been but few in number : according to that of the Gospel, *pauci electi, few be the chosen*. To what end then should their habitation haue beene of so great compasse, as is the world now inhabited?

A-

Againe, if we acknowledge God to be conscious of all future euent, and that this fore-knowledge, is as it were (according to our base maner of conceiuing so high mysteries) a direction vnto the free disposition of his Diuine will and prouidence, to what end should he create so mighty, huge, and so magnificent a place, for so few, and for so short a time, as hee knew our forefathers should be there?

The answer vnto both is easie, but first vnto the first. I grant that if wee had not sinned, onely the elect should haue beene created, and placed in paradise: whence without any subiection to mortalitie, or other things, now necessarily annexed thereunto, they should haue been translated vnto their supernaturall felicity in heauen; but it followeth not hence that they could be so few in number, as might well be contained in so little a compasse, as Paradise is imagined to be.

Neither, because it is said, that small is the number of the elect, for though they be so in comparison of the reprobate

bate (in which sense the fathers interpret that place) yet absolutely they be many, yea without question more, then euer there were men liuing in the world together. For so it is euidently gathered out of the Apocalypse, where the beloued Apostle after that he had made mention of twelue thousand in euery Tribe, sealed, and signed, hee concludeth with these words *καὶ πάντα ἐίδον καὶ ἰδοὺ ὄχλος πολὺς ὃν αἰθμήσαι αὐτὸν ἔδει ἡδυνατο.*

And after these things I saw, and behold a great multitude which none could number of all nations, and Tribes, and people, and tongues, standing before the throne, and in the sight of the Lambe: couered with white stoles, and with palmes in their hands: Now if these be the elected (as without doubt they bee) how could they all haue dwelt together at one, and the same time in Paradise? how could they (I say) haue beene contained in so little a space or garden as Paradise is imagined to haue beene? True it is, that man was created to supply and replenish the seates of the fallen Angels: but hence,

we

Apoc. 7. 9.

we are rather to inferre the contrary of that which was pretended in the objection; because the badde Angels, as the Fathers say, and hath been proued in our Treatise of Angels, were almost innumerable, wherefore if the blessed men be to supply their places, as indeede they bee, they must necessarily be more in number, then could conveniently inhabite so little a place as Paradise is imagined to haue beene: seeing that, if not all, yet infinite more should haue concurred together, then now possibly can after our exile out of Paradise; whence all occasions of mortalitie should haue beene remooued, and where the tree of life should haue beene sufficient for the preservation of mans life; if not for all eternitie (as many haue said) yet for many thousands of yeeres, or at least for a farre longer space, then now the life of man can naturally bee prolonged, for besides the naturall causes which then were more forcible, or of more vertue, for mans preservation, and none nociue to man, as long as hee was not hurtfull

hurtfull vnto himselfe, the supernaturall cause of causes did particularly concur in this, as well by his particular prouidence, as by the vertue of the tree of life.

Now to the second obiection, which presumeth to demand a reason of Gods secret decrees, and iudgements, to wit, why God foreseeing mans sinne, and that from all eternity, would create for mans habitation, a place so spacious, excellent, and capable, which he knew was to be enioyed for so short a time? I answered with the like obiection, why also did he create so infinite a number of Angells, with so many excellent gifts, as well of grace, as nature, and both *gratis*, yea and heauen so beautifull and admirable a place for them, whom hee knew would so soone præuaricate and fall from that felicitie, into the other extreame of infelicitie? yea the like I aske of *Adam*, why would God so adorne him with all kinde of gifts both naturall and supernaturall, whom hee knew *ab aeterno* from all eternitie was presently

presently to be so vngratefull, and wilfully to fall from his grace ? if these things be not vnbeseeeming his goodnesse, neither contradict his prouidence and fore-knowledge of future euent, neither doth this other of creating Paradise so beautifull, spacious, and capable of so great a number, whereas God knew from all eternitie that *Adam* by his fall was to loose that place both for himselfe, and all his posteritie. The onely reason of the question propounded may bee (and the same may be applied with proportion vnto the rest) because, as we finde by ordinarie experience, that God doth not ordinarily deale with man according to future euent, and his diuine prescience thereof, but according to his owne science of things as present, which the Diuines call *scientiam visionis* or intuitiue knowledge. Hence it is, that God seeing man not vnworthy of that place persisting in the grace, in which he was created, according to the present estate hee had created him in, therefore (I say) not respecting mans

Aquinas
prima parte
quest. 14.
Molina,
Suarins,
Valentia,
Vasquez &
alijs schola-
sici.

mans future demerits, but his owne present grace, as he bestowed originall Iustice vpon him, to be translated vnto his posteritie, so likewise hee gaue this so excellent and capable a place as a sufficient and apte habitation for him, and his posteritie, if they had not falne from his grace.

These bee the groundes of *Ephrens* opinion, which to mee is altogether improbable. Wherefore my iudgement in this so vncertaine a point, is, that though Paradise was not so ample, as the rest of the world inhabited, yet that it was of no small compasse, which I inferre of the greatnesse of the fountaine which sprung there, out of which foure mighty riuers were deriued. Secondly because there was no neede of any such extraordinary compasse as *Ephren* imagined, seeing that it was but to containe the elect onely, which should haue beene but few in comparison of the multitude which now possesse the face of the earth. Neither was it necessary that all beasts should remaine there; because man
in

The length,
breadth, and
compasse of
Paradise
according to
Abulensis
upon Gene-
sis.

in that happie estate had no such need of their seruice, as now he hath.

Wherefore *Abulensis* is of opinion, that the length of Paradise was about twelue miles, and the compasse 36 or 40. But these are but vncertaine coniectures in things, which are not so manifest in Scripture.

That which seemeth most probable in this matter, is, that seeing the Scripture calleth Paradise but a garden, that surely it cannot bee of any such compasse as some imagine. And secondly because it is said to be situated in the Region of *Heden* in the Easterne parts, which in no wise may be compared with the rest of the world for greatnesse.

Now to the other difficultie aboue insinuated, whether man persisting in the state of innocency, should haue dwelt in any other place, but onely in Paradise: I answere, that without all doubt hee should, because so small a circuit, as Paradise was, could not haue beene sufficient for the habitation of so great a multitude, as might
very

very well in one mans age conccurre together, for if after the fall of *Adam* some men liued all-most a thousand yecres, certainly if *Adam* had kept his originall iustice, he should in all likelihood haue tripled the time (as *Villalpandus* affirmeth) or liued much longer then hee did after he sinned in which space there must needes haue been almost an infinite number of inhabitants, and consequently the place of their habitation must needes haue beene of correspondent space, and capacitie, wherefore seeing that Paradise (as wee haue already shewne) was of no such capacitie, as was apt for the cōtaining of such a multitude, it is not likely that man should haue beene confined there onely, vntill the time of his translation into a more happy estate, which should haue bin after his sufficient triall in the terrene Paradise, according to the free disposition and decree of his Creator.

C H A P. IV.

*What may be the reason why Paradise
was neuer found as yet?*

*Ephren de
Paradiso.*

SOME with *Ephren* do hold the reason to bee the high situation of the place.

Others assigne three great impediments of free accessse vnto Paradise. First, the hugenessse and insuperable height of the mountaines, which are betwixt vs and Paradise. Secondly, for that there be mightie wildernesses full of all kind of most venemous Serpents, and wilde beasts. Thirdly, because there is no way but through large regions of most pestiferous aire, in which no man can liue. Others with Saint *Chrysostome* holde that at least, before *Noes* flood the way vnto Paradise was knowne, and where it was; but that men durst neuer adventure thither, for feare of the *Cherubin*,

*Chrysost. in
Genes.*

bin, which did alwaies gard it with a fieriesword.

Wherefore I iudge with Saint *Chrysostome* that though then that was the chiefe impediment of free acceſſe vnto Paradise, yet that now at least way, that Paradise is not acceſſible, knowne, or ſeen as a Paradise, becauſe it was deſtroyed with the Deluge, which paſſed all the higheſt places of the earth, and that many a cubite, which whether it be ſo or no ſhall bee diſcuſſed more largely in the Chapter following, becauſe the reſolution of diuers other curioſities depend thereupon.

C A H P. V.

Whether there be as yet any Paradise or no, or rather it was deſtroyed in Noes flood.

Saint *Baſil*, *Abulenſis*, and others ſaboue alledged doe ſeeme to hold that Paradise was not deſtroyed by

*Baſil. &
Abul. ſupra
cit.*

*Iren. lib. i.
contra her.*

the deluge, and consequently that it remaineth as yet. *Tertullian* and the Master of the Sentences, yea and *Irenaeus* in his first booke against Hereticks addeth, that it was the Paradise into which *Paul* was caried when he sawe such ineffable things which was not possible for man to utter. Moreover that this was the opinion of the auncient *Asian* priests the Apostles Disciples.

*Iustin in re-
spon. ad:
quest. orth.
quest 75.
76. 85.*

Moreover the famous Martyr *Iustine in responsione ad Orthodoxorum questiones quest. 75. 76. 85.* Auerreth, that Paradise is extant as yet, and is to be euen to the worlds end, as the habitation of the two Patriarkes *Enoch* and *Elias*, who shall come thence, to fight against Antichrist, not long before the end of the world. Finally hee concludeth as a thing vndoubtable, that this is the place, whither the good and conuerted Thiefe was carried, to whom Christ said vpon the Crosse, *this day shalt thou be with mee in Paradise*, to wit this earthly, the first habitation of mankinde.

Lastly

Aug. lib. 2.
contra Pe-
lagium &
Celestium.

Lastly Saint *Austine* seemeth more peremptory for this opinion in his second booke against *Pelagius* and *Celestius* where he saith, that there be some questions in which wee may bee ignorant without any preiudice unto our Christian faith, and the definitive sentence may bee suspended, or in which all humane coniectures may easily be deceived, as when it is inquired what manner of place is Paradise? or where that region is, where God created the first man of the dust of the earth? whereas notwithstanding our Christian faith doth not permit vs to doubt, but that there is such a place as Paradise, cum tamen esse illum Paradisum fides Christiana non dubitet. Wherefore, though we may be ignorant of the manner, qualities, situation, and the like circumstances of Paradise, yet if wee will not be Infidels we cannot be ignorant that there is such a place: And of this he giueth this example: Cum queritur ubi sit nunc Helias vel Henoch, an ibi vel alibi, quos tamen non dubitamus in quibus nati sunt corporibus viuere. As for example touching that question where Henoch or

*Iren. lib. i.
contra her.*

the deluge, and consequently that it remaineth as yet. *Tertullian* and the Master of the Sentences, yea and *Irenaeus* in his first booke against Heretickes addeth, that it was the Paradise into which *Paul* was caried when he sawe such ineffable things which was not possible for man to utter. Moreover that this was the opinion of the auncient *Asian* priests the Apostles Disciples.

*Iustin in re-
spon. ad:
quest. orth.
quest 75.
76. 85.*

Moreover the famous Martyr *Iustine in responsione ad Orthodoxorum quaestiones quest. 75. 76. 85.* Auerreth, that Paradise is extant as yet, and is to be euen to the worlds end, as the habitation of the two Patriarkes *Enoch* and *Elias*, who shall come thence, to fight against Antichrist, not long before the end of the world. Finally hee concludeth as a thing vndoubtable, that this is the place, whither the good and conuerted Thiefe was carried, to whom Christ said vpon the Crosse, *this day shalt thou be with mee in Paradise*, to wit this earthly, the first habitation of mankinde.

Lastly

Lastly Saint *Austine* seemeth more peremptory for this opinion in his second booke against *Pelagius* and *Celestius* where he saith, that there be some questions in which wee may bee ignorant without any prejudice vnto our Christian faith, and the definitive sentence may bee suspended, or in which all humane coniectures may easily be deceived, as when it is inquired what manner of place is Paradise? or where that region is, where God created the first man of the dust of the earth? whereas notwithstanding our Christian faith doth not permit vs to doubt, but that there is such a place as Paradise, cum tamen esse illum Paradisum fides Christiana non dubitet. Wherefore, though we may be ignorant of the manner, qualities, situation, and the like circumstances of Paradise, yet if wee will not be Infidels we cannot be ignorant that there is such a place: And of this he giueth this example: Cum queritur ubi sit nunc *Helias* vel *Henoch*, an ibi vel alibi, quos tamen non dubitamus in quibus nati sunt corporibus viuere. As for example touching that question where *Henoch* or

*Aug. lib. 2.
contra Pe-
lagium &
Celestium.*

*Helias be? whether they be there in Paradise, or rather in some other place allotted them to live in, as yet? without all doubt we may doubt about these particular curiosities, which are not plainly expressed in the holy Scriptures, but wee neither can nor may doubt but that they live, not according to the spirit onely, but corporally also, their soules being really vni-
ted vnto their bodies, as ours are: after the same manner we may doubt of the circumstances of Paradise, not of the reall existence or being of it.*

*And this the rather. because in the 44 Chapter of Eccles. it is said that Enoch was translated into Paradise that he might be a patterne of penance vnto the Gentiles. Therefore if Henoch be there as yet, yea as a patterne of penance vnto the Gentiles, there must not on-
ly bee an earthly Paradise, but also it seemeth that it must be a place habitable, or to which men may haue some accessse, in such sort, that they may see their patterne of repentance, for if either the place be destroyed, inaccessible, or inuisible, how can it bee true
that*

that *Henoch* is there detained as a patterne of repentance? therefore if *Henoch* be as yet preserved alive (as many doe hold) it followeth consequently, that there is yet a terrene Paradise, not as yet destroyed by *Noes* flood.

These be the arguments of this opinion, and for which many doe not thinke it improbable: neuer the lesse (all the places of Scriptures and fathers, together with their reasons well pondered) it seemeth much more probable, that Paradise, in which *Adam* was created is not now to bee found, but rather that it was destroyed by the generall deluge.

First, because the Scripture *Gen. 7.* Chap: saith, that all mountaines were couered with the waters of the flood, *a fortiori* therefore this pleasant Region or Garden was therby ouer-flowne.

But peradventure, this was a whole Region higher then any Mountaine, and consequently though all Mountaines were couered, yet this place might be safe, as which was the habitation of that blessed man *Henoch*: or

peradventure though it was not so high, yet was it reserved for the said reason by Gods particular providence.

I answered that neither, not the first, because as it is in the same place above alledged, the waters of the flood overflowed the highest mountaines seven cubits: neither the second, because such a great miracle was not necessary for the preserving of *Enoch*; who whether he bee yet alive, or how he is, it shall be more at large discussed in another place.

But supposing that the contrarie opinion is probable, to wit, that Paradise is as yet extant, not onely according to the place it selfe, but also to the beauty and pleasure which the Scripture testifieth it had, at the first creation; it may well bee inquired, what should be the reason why it hath neuer been discovered of any amongst so many as haue compassed the world.

Some as I haue already touched, answered, that the reason is, because Almighty

mightie God offended with *Adams* transgression, hath inuironed it with huge Hills, mightie mountaines, swelling seas, fearefull rockes, and great wildernesses full of all kinde of terrible beasts, and venemous Serpents, so that it is impossible for any mortall man to passe thither.

Others againe answered that Paradise hath not beene discovered, neither sought for by Infidels, because they thought it to be but a fable, neither by the faithfull or Christians; because they know it to be inaccessible. But if I may interpose my opinion and freely speake what I iudge in this matter, I think that none of these reasons are so concludent and certaine as that the place of Paradise is as yet vnkowne by the particular disposition and providence of God; as part of our punishment, for that sinne, for which wee were banished thence, as not only unworthy to inhabite the place it selfe, but also of the notice where it was. Or secondly because it is not in any wise necessary to beekowne, either
as

as belonging to the furtherance of our felicity in this mortall life, or to the obtaining of the eternall happines in the other immortall. As in like manner this also was the reason, why though our Saviour knew at least way by supernaturall meanes, and as he was the eternall wisdom of God, the time of the end of this world, and of his second comming to iudgement, yet because this was not necessary for man to know, therefore hee denied the reuelation thereof euen vnto his Apostles: insomuch that our Saviour said *Act. 1. cap. vers. 7. vnto his Apostles, that it was not for them to know the times or seasons which the Father hath put in his owne power.* So neither is it for vs, too curiously to inquire after this place of Paradise, which God hath either destroyed, or hidden from vs, as part of our punishment for our first and originall offence in that place.

CHAP. VI.

Of the trees of Paradise, whether all were fruitfull, or rather some only beautifull, though vnfruitfull.

Certaine it is, as we read in the beginning of *Genesis*, that in the beginning of the world God produced *omne lignum pulchrum visu, & ad vescendum suauē*, Euery tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the Garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and euill.

Now the difficulty is, how these words are to be vnderstood? whether coniunctiuely, or disiunctiuely? to wit, whether all the trees of Paradise were as well beautifull to the sight, as sweete in tast: or rather some were onely delightfull to the sight, some pleasant onely in tast, others both, as well beautifull in sight, as pleasant in tast?

Many (I know) answere, that all the trees of Paradise had both proprieties,

ties, so that there was no one tree there vnfruitfull, neither any fruitfull, which was not also beautifull: inso-much that those vnfruitfull trees, which now, after our miserable exile out of Paradise, are necessary, were not planted in Paradise: Because *Moses* saith that God planted euery tree *beautifull in sight, and sweete in tast*, to wit, coniuñctiuely: which could not be true, if any tree wanted either sweetnesse, or beauty, or was not both beautifull, and fruitfull.

Yea, which is more, God himselfe also commanded *Adam* that he should eate of euery tree of Paradise, *Gen. 2. 16.* excepting the tree of the knowledge of good and euill: consequently euery tree of Paradise was fruitfull, if fruitfull, questionlesse then pleasant both to tast and sight.

I dare not condemne this opinion, because it hath authours of no small authority, neuerthelesse to me it is altogether vnprobable: seeing there be many fruitfull trees not very beautifull: and many most beautifull, though

though

It is
both t
that it
wit, th
some l
both.

kiel 3

dar an

are na

the glo

red, th

not his

his bon

not lik

garden

beauty

titude

of Ede

enuied

though not fruitfull.

It is therefore more conformable both to reason and the sacred text also, that it be vnderstood disunctiuely: to wit, that there was trees of both sorts, some beautifull, some fruitfull, some both. Yea, this is plaine out of Eze- kiel 31, the 8. verse. where both the Ce- dar and Firre trees altogether vnfruitfull, are named as trees of Paradise; to whom the glory of the Assirian was thus compa- red, the Cedars in the Garden of God could not hide him, the Firre trees were not like his boughes, and the Chesnut trees were not like his branches, nor any tree in the garden of God was like vnto him in his beauty. I haue made him faire, by the mul- titude of his branches; So that all the trees of Eden, that were in the Garden of God, enuied him.

CHAP. VII.

Of the tree of life, to wit, why it was so called, and whether it was corporall as other trees be, or rather spirituall and food of the soule, not of the body, or rather appertaining unto both.

SVch was the bounty of God towards man in the happy estate of Paradise, that he did not only giue vnto him what was necessary or conuenient for his naturall estate there, but also added other most extraordinarie meanes and helpes both naturall and supernaturall, conuenient and necessarie for both his estates of nature and grace; such was this of the tree of life, which (as some well note) according to the originall text, was called the tree or wood, not *of life* onely, in the singular, but in the plurall, *of liues*, because it was so to lengthen the life of euery man, that euery singular and particular mans life, might well seame
the

the li
many

W

pow
his g
in th
good
who
after
many
tural

T

med
man
really
and r
of liu
tified
note
again
that
on, at
etern
all rep
the fa
may
tie, t

the life, not of one onely man, but of many.

Whereby we may first admire the power of Almighty God, secondly his goodnesse towards man: his power in the creating of such a fruite: his goodnesse, in bestowing it vpon him, whom he knew was in so short a time after, to be so vngratefull for that, and many other most excellent, as well naturall, as supernaturall gifts.

The second reason, why it is tearmed the tree of liues, is, because as a man hath three liues, virtually: if not really distinct, the sensitiue, vegetatiue, and rationall; so this fruite of the tree of liues should haue had vertue to fortified all three, in which also we may note the wisdom of God, but more againe his mercy: his wisdom in that hee knew to produce incorruption, at least way for many yeares if not eternall (as many hold) by a continuall repairing of nature by the eating of the said apple; but more againe (I say) may we admire his mercy, and bountie, by which he sought meanes to eternize

Man. 17.

ternize him, whom he knew by his fall was to bee his owne death, yea the death of his most deare and eternall sonne which was the true tree of life, prefigured by this tree of life or liues, so also called because it was not to giue, or prolong the life of *Adam* only, but also the liues of his posteritie; vntill such time, as it should please their Maker to translate them from that earthly beatitude, vnto a more perfect and supernaturall estate; where (as *Saint Austine* saith) they were to possesse in a more perfect measure, and that through all eternity *ioy without sorrow, rest without labour, honour without feare, wealth without damage; health without sicknesse; aboundance without care; life with all security; immortalitie without corruption; all happinesse with no miserie at all. Where all perfection is in the highest degree, and all imperfections remote; where sight is face vnto face, where perfect knowledge, and nothing unreuealed of which humane nature can be capable; where Gods soueraigne goodnessse raigneth super omnia aboue al things,*
and

and the light enlightening is glorified of the Saints ; where the present maiestie of the Almighty is perpetually beholden, and the minde of the beholders eternally filled with this fruit of life.

Fourthly, it was called the tree of life, or liues ; because it did after a double manner sustaine and renew the life of man : first in restoring our naturall moisture, by which wee liue, which consumeth euery day more and more by our naturall heat, which was a proprietie common also to all other fruits of Paradise.

Secondly, in that which was proper to this tree only, and for which it was particularly reamed the tree of life, because it was of such qualities and excellent proprieties, that being eaten, it did renew our *humidum radicale*, our naturall humiditie and moisture, whereby wee should haue liued with the like or equall puritie and perfection, which had beene in man at his first creation ; yea it should haue so fortified our naturall heat, that although it did naturally suffer some detriment and losse by conti-

E

nua!

nuall action, yet should it haue beene so strengthened by that fruit of life, that it could neuer haue decaied or perished, and consequently man could neuer die corporally in that happy estate, vnlesse hee had first killed himselfe spiritually by being partaker of the forbidden fruit, insomuch that the disobedience of one brought in by concupiscence was the cause of all our misery and mortalitie, that so God of his meere goodnesse through his infinite wisdom might thereby take occasion of shewing his mercy vpon those who after *Adams* fall were nothing but miserie, and by the obedience of his dearest Sonne might repaire and redeeme the disobedience of vs most accursed caitifes : so that wee participating of the fruit of the tree of life communicated vnto vs in the sacred communion by vertue of that tree of life prefigured in this Paradise, might thereby be reuiued from a temporall death to an eternitie of blessednesse, and perpetuitie of a most blessed life ; yea so by occasion of our first sinne, gaine more then euer we had

had obtained if we had not sinned: seeing hereby we obtained that fruit of life to be prepared for vs vpon the tree of the crosse, yea and thence communicated vnto vs in the sacred communion, and bread of life, which doubtlesse wee should not haue obtained, at leastway after that manner and measure, if wee had not transgressed. Or at leastway Christ prefigured in this tree of life, should not haue appeared passible as one of vs, if wee by our sinne had not needed his passion. Wherefore we being astonished at so great mercy shewne vnto vs in so infinite miserie, and that so lamentable a losse should be an occasion of so ioyfull and infinite gaine, we may well exclaime with Gregory the great, *O felix culpa, quæ talem & tantum habere meruit Redemptorem*, O happy fall, and happy unhappinesse, which was occasion of so great happinesse.

Lastly, the aforesaid tree was worthily called the tree of life, or liues; because it did not only preserue our naturall being, by the repairing of our naturall forces, but also did so renew them

by a supernaturall vertue proceeding thence, that thereby we might haue liued a life free from all kinde of feares of death, or of any griefes, vexations, or torments, now necessarily annexed to both deaths, corporall and spirituall, temporall and eternall: now I say annexed to both deaths, vnlesse wee haue applied vnto vs the vertue of another tree of life, by whose life all things being haue their being, and by whose influence all things liuing haue their life.

Hence it is that the former was a most perfect patterne or representation of the latter, but the latter a more perfect forme then could bee fully represented by the former, or by any other possible. Neuerthelesse the tree of life was created in the terrestriall Paradise, to the end that it might be a type, and in some sort represent that which should be fully represented or scene in the celestiall kingdome by the eternall light of glory, according to the diuine oracle, *In lumine tuo videbimus lumen*, in thy light wee shall see light; that is, by and through thy light of glory (which is a supernaturall

rall
ding
of th
whic
and e
the b
to eu
of glo
sure
or wh
super

Whet
Pa
tha
tw
or

A
worl
ward
spirit

rall habit infused into our vnderstandings) wee shall see the glorious light of thy essence, not comprehensiuely, which is impossible, but most perfectly and essentially, which is common to all the blessed Spirits and Saints of heauen, to euery one according to their degree of glory, correspondent vnto the measure of their faith heard here in earth, or while they were in the way to this supernaturall blessednesse.

CHAP. VIII.

Whether there was euer any such tree in Paradise as the tree of life, or rather that which is written of it in the Scripture is onely to be vnderstood spiritually or figuratiuely.

A Snow in this deluge of miseries, which haue ouerflowne the world, there be many which in outward shew and words pretend so much spirit, that they leaue nothing for the in-

ward but acts of carnalitie : so there wanted not these kindes of monsters in former ages, who though they were neuer so farre plunged in the depth of hell, as ours be, yet were they not farre inferior in the fictitious morallizing of Scripture, or rather wresting from the true sense the word of God ; such were *Origines* and his fellowes *Allegorici*, so tearmed because they wrested the Scripture beyond all truth and sense, only to a spiritual and allegorical sense, especially those places which speake of Paradise and the tree of life : some thinking it to bee our Sauiour Christ, or word of God incarnate, others the sole attribute of the eternall wisdom of God : some againe our euerlasting happiness in the kingdome of heauen, according to that of *S. Iohn* : *To him that ouercommeth will I giue to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of my God* : that is, as *Eugobinus* in his *Cosmopæia* holdeth, not our essentiall blessednesse in the sight of God, as the former opinion is, but a proprietie necessarily annexed thereunto, to wit immortallitie.

Reu cha 2.
vers. 2.

more
to A
perfi
when
H
ill gr
are f
the t
well
tour
is, th
and
terp
out a
ning
only
nifel
S. A
God
stand
Sain
of P
prud
by th
pline
work
dome

mortalitie, which God had promised to *Adam* and his posteritie, if they had persisted in their first state of innocencie wherein *Adam* was first created.

Here be many fictitious propositions ill grounded, and which of themselves are sufficient to overthrow themselves: the truth and the common opinion, as well of Schoole Diuines, as of Expositours of the holy Scriptures and Fathers is, that as the historie of the tree of life, and the rest of Paradise may well be interpreted in an Allegoricall sense, without any contradiction to the true meaning of the historie; so to vnderstand it only thus, excluding the historie, is a manifest iniurie done to the Scripture. So *S. Austine* in his 13. booke of the city of God, chap. 21. saith, that *we may vnderstand by Paradise the blessed life of the Saints of God: likewise by the foure riuers of Paradise the foure cardinall vertues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, & iustice: by the trees all profitable Arts and disciplines; by the fruit of the tree, the good workes of the godly; by the tree of life, wisdom the mother of all goodnesse; finally by*
E 4 the

the tree of knowledge of good and euill, the experience of the commandement transgressed. These things likewise may be understood of the Church, as propheties proper vnto her future estate. So that by Paradise wee may understand the Church according to that which wee reade of her in the Canticles. Moreouer, by the foure flouds, the foure Gospels; by the fruitfull trees, the Saints, whose fruits bee their workes; by the tree of life, the Saint of Saints, Christ our Saviour; lastly, by the tree of the knowledge of good and euill, our owne morall and ciuill actions, not the supernaturall, in which wee are more passiue then actiue.

These and the like of *Origenes* and others of the Fathers are questionlesse most excellent Allegories, yet not such as may be taken for sole verities, excluding the plaine historie of *Moses*, and literall sense, which is the second part of my assertion, deduced also out of *S. Augustine* in the place aboue alleaged, where he concludeth thus: *Hæc & siquæ alia, These and the like may be spirituallly applied vnto Paradise, so that the truth of the*
historie

historie be faithfully kept, and no iniurie offered to the word of God: for if once we giue a sole and generall passage to this kinde of Allegoricall exposition, wee shall soone bee brought to many fond definitions in matters of faith.

CHAP. IX.

Why the tree of life was so called, and whether it had truly the propertie of making a man immortall.

AS it is truly said of the bread of life, the Sacrament (I meane) of the Lords Supper, that it doth not con-
curre physically with any real influence vnto the grace of God inherent in our soules in this life, or to the eternitie of blessednesse in the life to come, but that it is only a signe of the one, and a pawne and pledge of the other, to wit, of grace in this life, of an eternall poies of glory in the other: so many holding the tree of life to be a figure or type of the bread
of

of life, haue with proportion held of them both, to wit, that neither of them were physicall and reall causes of their effects, but onely morall. Hence it is that *Eugubinus* aboue alleaged in his *Cosmopæia* thinketh that it was called the tree of life, *non effectiue quòd vitam faceret immortalem*, not because it did really cause or should haue caused immortalitie in man; *sed significatiue tantum*, because it should haue beene a signe and token only of immortalitie, if he had not transgressed the commandement of his Creator: a probable opinion certainly, or which cannot easily bee refuted; for although all almost Writers and Fathers both of the Greeke and Latine Church doe agree, that the effect of this fruit *was immortalitie*, yet in the manner how, they doe not agree. So therefore if wee agree of the thing, it is not materiall how wee hold of the manner of concourse. As in like manner wee doubt not to say of the bread of life, the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, that certainly it containeth the cause of life Christ, but how it containeth

neth
ceed
gels,
of m
thing
expro
can b
press
fore
N
in thi
trary
this t
token
was a
imme
gruen
can b
it wa
Fathe
tree,
the c
who
re, to
selfe)
himf
in the

neth him, who can expresse? This exceedeth the naturall capacitie of Angels, the other of the type also the reach of man. Agreeing therefore about the things, why should wee so contend to expresse the manner, which in no wise can be expressed, because it is not expressed in the booke of life, and therefore cannot be necessary to eternall life.

Neuerthelesse (if I may coniecture in things so hidden) I deeme the contrary much more probable, to wit, that this tree of life was not onely a type or token of immortalitie, but that really it was a cause sufficient to haue produced immortalitie: my reason, or rather congruence (because no concludent reason can be giuen in this point) is, because it was the most perfect figure (as the Fathers affirme) of that most excellent tree, which for all eternitie is planted in the celestiall Paradise, to wit, of Christ, who saith of himselfe, *Vincenti dabo edere, to him that ouercommeth* (to wit himselfe) *I will giue to eat, what will he giue? himselfe, to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of the eternall God, not carnally,*

Apoc. 2.
cap.

carnally, as carnall men dreame, but spiritually in the bread of life, as hee himselfe doth affirme of himselfe. As therefore he who is the tree of life, or rather the author of life, or to speake more properly, life it selfe, euen as he is in the Sacrament of life, doth heere truly in this miserable life produce in vs the life of grace, as a present pawne of our future glory: so it seemeth most probable that the other tree of life (as a most perfect figure of this) planted in the terrene Paradise, had the like inherent vertue, for to perpetuate, or at least to prolong the liues of *Adam* and his posteritie, as long as they were to liue in that terrene Paradise.

But whether this fruit of the tree of life was sufficient to perpetuate our life, or only to prolong it for some determinate time, many dispute probably for both opinions.

Abulensis
Super Genes.
c. 13. quest.
175.
Scotus li. 2.
sent. dist. 19
quest. 1.
Aquinas
1 p. q. 9. 7.
art 4. &
Caiet. id.

Tostatus vpon the 13. chapter of *Genesis*, q. 175. is most peremptorie for this perpetuitie; *Scotus*, *Thomas*, *Caietan* and *Durand*, for a very long time, but not for eternitie, because that is the naturall

A Treatise of Paradise.

turall measure of nature, this the supernaturall of him who is aboue all nature. Secondly, seeing the power of the tree of life was a naturall power and cause, the effect could not bee supernaturall: for though effects be often inferiour to their causes, yet neuer the causes vnto the effects; the reason, because no cause can giue that which it hath not, neither any effect haue any excellencie or perfection not proceeding from the cause: wherefore if the tree of life was (as without question it was) a naturall tree, as the Laurell, Cypresse, and other trees be, it could not haue as connaturall, the supernaturall effect of making eternall the life of man.

Moreouer it is a principle euen in naturall philosophie, that *omne agens physicum in agendo patitur & debilitatur*, that euery naturall cause doth suffer some detriment euen in and by his owne action: consequently therefore, though our naturall heat and yigour might bee very long conserued by the vertue of this excellent fruit, yet at length it should haue failed, and thence finally mortalitie

mortalitie should haue followed, as a necessary effect of so forcible a cause.

Lastly, it is not likely that God, who is the author and first rule of nature, doth produce any thing frustrate in nature : seeing therefore the fall of man was patent vnto him euen from all eternitie, to what end should he prouide an eternall cause for a temporary effect ?

But if this argument had any force, it should force also our aduersaries to the like, if not a greater inconuenience ; for who doubteth but that God knew also the little time that man was to persist in his grace ? and yet neuerthelesse he gaue him that fruit, which was sufficient for the preservation of his life for many a yeere, as our aduersaries hold, why then might hee not likewise for all eternitie ? is it because of the impossibilitie ? *at non impossibile Deo omne verbum*, to God nothing is impossible, which doth not imply contradiction, but what contradiction is in this ? is it, that here naturall philosophie is contradicted ? *omne agens in agendo patitur & debilitatur*, euery agent doth decay euen by his owne

owne action ; but seeing the author of nature is aboue nature, why might hee not here worke that which is aboue nature? or though in the compasse of nature, yet beyond our naturall capacitie, which is so small, that wee scarcely or very imperfectly vnderstand things of farre inferiour degree, yea such as are within our selues : why therefore shall wee deny vnto God that which we doe not vnderstand in our selues? My resolution therefore is that of *Abulensis*, *Propterea dictam esse arborem vitæ, quòd fructus eius vim haberet seruandi hominem à morte in omne tempus, & faciendi eum immortalem*, that this tree was therefore called the tree of life, because it had vertue to perpetuate our naturall life, and the vnion of the body and soule for euer, if we had not lost the supernaturall grace, which was the vnion of our soules with God ; but seeing wee wilfully separated our selues from our supernaturall life, it was most iust that wee should also be depriued of the naturall : hence therefore is that which *Paul* so often preacheth, *mortem in mundum*

dum intrasse propter peccatum, that death entred into the world by the doore of sinne, which doore if we had debarred to sinne, the grace of God should haue beene a perpetual vnion betweene God and vs, and the tree of life should haue caused the like betweene our bodies and soules; and this of his owne nature eternally, though *de facto* wee needed it but only temporally, both supposing our fall, as likewise not supposing any at all; for if we had not fallen or sinned in our first father, wee should certainly after some number of yeeres haue been translated from that terrene Paradise, which was our first though temporary habitation, vnto a more excellent and perpetuall in the kingdome of heauen; and this should haue heene without any assault of death, because we had alwaies liued in God, who as hee would then haue preserved vs by his grace from the corruption of sinne, would also haue preserved vs from this corruption, which was only the effect of sinne, according to that of the Apostle, *The wages of sinne is death*: the wager being the deuill,

deuill, our soules are bought and sold; sold away for nothing (sinne being nothing but a priuation of being) but bought againe by the death of the most precious of mortall liues, which in no wise should haue beene necessary, if wee had not beene lost, or fallen from our first grace and innocencie.

But as that poetickall fiction of the *Nectar* and *Ambrosia* seemed to *Aristotle* of small ground, so this for the like reason may seeme to bee as fabulous: for as *Aristotle* argueth against the former, either the Gods vsed this *Ambrosia* and *Nectar* for pleasure only, or also for necessitie; if only for pleasure, how then could *Ambrosia* and *Nectar* be any necessary cause of their immortalitie? againe, if for necessitie, certainly the Gods then had not beene immortal by nature, and consequently no Gods, seeing that, that which hath need of any thing for his preservation must necessarily be mortall.

After the same manner we may argue against this fruit of this tree of life, which is said to be sufficient to cause an

F

eternitie

eternitie of life, *à parte post*, as the Philosophers speake: for if our immortalitie was onely to be from the tree of life, then questionlesse without it wee had beene mortall, and subiect to death; contrary to that of the Apostle, *Stipendium peccati mors*, the wages of sinne is death: for whether wee had sinned, or persisted in our primatiue grace, all had beene one, wee should naturally haue tasted of death, if wee had not eaten of the tree of life. Againe, if it was onely *ad melius esse*, for a better preservation of our immortalitie due vnto that estate, and not absolutely necessary for that effect; then consequently it was not the tree of life in the sense which the Scripture insinuateth, but an antidote onely against death, and not a necessary cause of eternall life.

I answer, that though the argument of *Nectar* and *Ambrosia* doth euidently ouerthrow the deitie and immortalitie of the heathen gods, yet doth not the simile or comparison any thing impeach the immortalitie and deitie of the true God, as neither the immortalitie

tie of
them
which
true a
that
from
longe
in the
him a

Ne
the A
for th
witho
this c
nall g
there
life.

W
caus
shou
the p
whic
origi
was
conc
any
this

tie of our first parents, due onely vnto them in their estate of innocencie, and which did principally proceed from the true and only immortall God; because that immortalitie of life proceeding from the fruit of life, was to endure no longer with man then man perseuered in the grace of God, which was giuen him as a pawne of eternall life.

Neither doth this contradict that of the Apostle, *the wages of sinne is death*: for though death be due vnto man euen without sinne according to nature, yet this debt was to bee remitted by originall grace, and the naturall pronenesse thereunto to be redressed by the fruit of life.

Wherefore though the immediate cause of our immortalitie in Paradise should haue beene the tree of life, yet the primarie and principall of all, to which the other was consequent, was originall grace, whose immediate effect was our spirituall life, and thereto secondarily followed the freedome from any corporall harme, or death; yea and this for euer of his owne nature, though

wee had not beene translated thence to a better life : for so it is said of *Adam*, that therefore hee was banished out of Paradise, and interdicted the entrance vnto the tree of life, lest eating of it hee should liue for euer, *Genes. 3. chap. 22. v.* And the Lord God said, behold, the man is become as one of vs to know good and euill ; and now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and liue for euer, therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken.

Hence I conclude with *Abulensis* and others, *esum illius arboris sufficientem habuisse virtutem, ut vitam homini prestaret eternam* : that this tree of life had sufficient vertue to prolong a mans life for all eternitie. The which also is the opinion of *S. Austine*, *Chrysostome*, and *Rupertus lib. 3. de Trinitate cap. 30.* where hee addeth this more then other Doctors, *quod semel sumptus vitam prestitisset immortalem*, that this fruit of life had beene sufficient to haue caused immortalitie of its owne nature, though it had beene but once receiued; the which
though

*Aug. li. 13.
de ciuitate
Dei, cap. 20.
¶ 23.
Chrys. hom.
13. in Gen.
Rupertus
lib. 3. de
Trinitate,
cap. 30.*

though it may seeme improbable to humane reason, yet considering the omnipotence of God, and his infinite loue to man in that estate, it cannot at least-way appeare impossible.

CHAP. X.

Whether the vertue of the tree of life to preserve man immortall was naturall vnto it, or supernaturall.

LEst wee erre in the resolution of this question by any equiuocation of words, as it falleth out often in the like difficulties of naturall and supernaturall objects; I will first declare how the Diuines vse this distinction, and then how it is to be taken here.

Naturall (as farre forth as is necessarie for our present purpose) is that which floweth from the principles of nature, to wit, matter and forme, of which, as of their only compacts, all natural

turall and corporal substances are composed.

Supernaturall is that which is aboue all nature, or rather cannot in any wise proceed from the principles of nature: but as it is aboue all nature, so it floweth from that sole principle which is aboue all nature, if not only, yet principally.

Secondly, naturall oftentimes is taken *pro congenito*, for that which is originally produced with any other thing, though it flow not in any wise from the principles of nature, or bee not due thereunto; so no doubt but if an Angel were created with the light of glory, or beatificall vision of Gods essence, both the light of glory and the vision of God should be in that sense naturall, or rather connaturall vnto the Angell, because it was produced together with his naturall substance or essence. And the same oftentimes is auerred by the Fathers, of man, in regard of his originall iustice, in which hee was created: for though this original iustice did not flow from the principles of nature, yet neuertheless.

thelesse, because it was produced with nature by Almighty God, and infused into mans nature, as due vnto it in that happy estate, therefore it is, and may well be termed *naturall*, though in its owne essence it was supernaturall.

Now by these two distinctions of things *naturall*, wee may euidently inferre what is supernaturall, namely that which is aboue both these kindes of acceptions, or distinctions of naturall objects; that is, which neither floweth from the principles of nature, neither is any way due vnto nature: as originall iustice was due vnto vs in *Adam* before our fall and corruption of nature.

This distinction presupposed, the difficultie consisteth in this, whether the vertue of the tree of life for to preserue man from corruption, may bee called naturall, or rather is to bee deemed supernaturall?

Strabo answereth, *Lignum vitæ hanc naturaliter habuisse virtutem*, that the tree of life had naturally this vertue, that he who did eat of that fruit should be endued with perpetuall health, nei-

*Strab. in
Gen.*

ther should bee touched with any infirmitie, wearinesse, or irksomenesse, which are wont to be the companions of age.

Hugo de Sancto Victore addeth, *Lignum vite habuisse in se naturam, ut perpetuaret homini vitam, si competentèr ederetur*, that the tree of life had that vertue in it to perpetuate our life; if it were taken competently. For man (saith he) was made mortall and immortall: immortall because hee could not die by reason of that immortall food: mortall, because he might haue died by outward violence. But God had so inwardly fortified him by the tree of life, and outwardly by his diuine power, that hee could not die. Againe, because hee had shut vp within him the gate of negligence by the vigilance of humane reason, outwardly also the gate of violence by the diuine protection, inso much that vnlesse man abusing his reason should open the gate of negligence, neuer any harme should enter into him by the gate of violence. But because hee was not carefull to keepe the charge committed vnto him, God therefore forsooke the custodie and care he had ouer him.

S. Austine on the contrary side thinketh

eth that the vertue of this tree of life was supernaturall, for so he saith in his 8 booke *de Gen: ad literam cap. 5.* That though that meate was corporall, yet was it of such vertue, and nature that it did confirme man in perfect health: not as other meates, but by an occult vertue, proceeding from aboue. And this he confirmeth by two examples, the first of *Elias* his cake, the second of the flower and oyle of the widow of *Sarepta*, which without all question were effected by supernaturall power.

Beda likewise affirmeth, that therefore it was called the tree of life, because it hath receined from the diuine power, that whosoever should eat thereof should be confirmed in perpetuall health.

Neither ought we to maruaile, as *Bonauenture* well noteth, that a man might be disposed vnto immortalitie by the fruit of this tree, seeing there be many other things, as *Myrrhe*, and *Balme*, which doe preserve from corruption for a long time: therefore as our Sacraments doe not really concurre vnto grace; but the diuine power which alwaies is assistant vnto them: so
the

Bonauenture
2. lib.
sent. dist. 17

the fruit of that tree did not of his owne nature produce immortality, but rather the diuine power did communicate it by the eating of that fruit.

Here wee may see these so opposite opinions with their reasons and authorities, in which it may be free for euery one to follow as he liketh, seing there is nothing in this point plainly expressed in the Scripture; with me, both the authoritie of *S. Austin* and reason doth sway most for this latter opinion; because it seemeth not so probable, that a naturall tree or fruit, should haue of his owne virtue and substance so supernaturall a virtue, and qualitie, as to cause immortality. But to conclude, whether the virtue of this tree was naturall or supernaturall, all is one in regard of our losse, ingratitude, and sinne; our losse of both liues spirituall and corporall, our ingratitude towards God, to vs wards so infinitely good, our sinne also being the same: seeing that though it had beene onely a naturall virtue which was in that fruit of life, yet it depriued vs not onely of our owne liues, but also

ot

of the
rema
med
from
ally, v
and a
onely
our fo

of th
eu
na
wh

N
there
who
spiri
with
to d
happ
que

of the author of life. What therefore remaineth, but that now being redeemed from this sinne, and raised againe from this death, we blesse him perpetually, with all the powers of our soules, and all the daies of our liues, who is the onely giuer of life, and sole redeemer of our soules.

CHAP. XI.

Of the tree of the knowledge of good and euill, to wit, whether it was a true and naturall tree, like vnto others. And why it was so called.

Nothing can bee so plainly set downe in the holy scripture, but there will be some idle braine or other, who will so moralize, or so wrest it to a spirituall sense, though often-times without sense, that they will not sticke to deny the truth of the history, as it happeneth here in the first point of our question, in which some haue not feared

red to call in question and to doubt, whether euer there was any such tree, as that of the knowledge of good and euill, because that measuring the omnipotent power of God, with their weake capacity, they iudge as impossible, that there should be created any tree of that nature, by which the knowledge of good and euill might come vnto those that should participate of it; so that, not vnderstanding the name, and reason thereof, they denied, they knew not what.

But whosoever shall duely weigh the words of *Moyfes*, neither can, nor may make any doubt of the true and reall being of this tree, no more then of the rest planted in Paradise: such be the circumstances of the reall planting, the materiall eating, the beauty of it, the sweernesse of the taste, and the like, which in no wise, might bee truely attributed as these are here, but vnto a materiall and reall tree.

Neither is it any maruaile, that our aduersaries not knowing the reason of the name of the tree of the knowledge
of

of good and euill, should misse also in the nature of it; for it is not so tearmed, because the fruit thereof had this qualitie, that the eaters thereof should thereby know good and euill, but as *Rupertus* saith, *ironice appellatum est hoc lignum scientiæ boni & mali*; It was ironically, or by way of irrisiō, called the tree of the knowledge of good & euill: that euen the very name of it, might be a representation, and infallible token vnto the Readers, of that lie, whereby the Deuill deceiued our first fathers. Hence it is that this name of the tree of the knowledge of good and euill was giuen vnto this tree, either by *Adam* himselfe, or by *Moyse*, because the deuill hath decciued our first parents with the promise he made them.

But here peradventure it may be objected, that euen before *Eue* met with the serpent, this tree was called by the same name of the knowledge of good and euill.

I answer with *Rupertus* in the aforesaid place, *id facere scriptorem historiæ Moysen, per anticipationem*, that *Moyse* did that by anticipation, because it had not
that

*Rupertus in
Genesim.*

that name before, but afterwards of the event : so that when God commanded our fore-fathers, that they should not eate of that tree, either he called it by some other name, or he demonstrated it vnto them, as it were with his finger.

Many other reasons do the *Rabbins* giue, of the name of this tree, but so farre from reason, that they be not worthy the repeating, I will onely touch one as most fabulous, by which we may coniecture of the rest. They say that our first Parents were created as infants in sense, and reason, though men in body, strength, and stature. Now because this tree had a virtue of ripening mans iudgment, witt, and discretion of good from euill ; it was therefore called the tree of knowledge, of good and euill : because, to know good and euill, according to the Hebrue and scripture phrase is as much as to haue the vse of reason.

But this is not onely contrary to the text, but also to reason : for certaine it is, that as man was created perfect in all the parts of his body ; so was hee no lesse in the powers of his soule. Yea
how

how is it likely that he was without reason, who was created lord of all vnreasonable creatures? who gaue them their names proper to their natures, and was to gouerne all things according to their nature, by his owne rule of reason: yea with whom God the author of nature and chiefe rule of reason, had made this couenant most conformable to reason: that if he liued according to the law of nature, and instinct of reason, his reward should be aboue all nature, and exceed the capacitie of humane reason: wherefore who was both culpable in this pact, and punishable for his transgression, must in all reason, haue then had the vse of reason.

Iosephus in his first booke of his Antiquities, perceiuing well the absurditie of this opinion, fell into another, which *Lyra* deemeth not much lesse absurd: to wit, that this tree was therefore called the tree of knowledge of good and euill, because it had virtue to sharpen the wit, ripen the iudgment, and to giue prudence, and vnderstanding to all humane affaires.

Lyra

Lyra his refutation is this, because the fruit of that tree being corporall, how could it (saith he) haue any spirituall effect? wherefore the minde, witt, and iudgment of man being spirituall, how could they be holpen by any corporall cause? For though the superior cause, and more perfect then his effect may haue influence into the inferiour and imperfect, yet neuer the inferiour into the superiour. Therefore though the spirituall causes be of such excellent perfection, that they haue influence into our bodies: yet neuer any corporall creature (saith he) is so perfect, that it can inflow in the spirituall. For what is that which any corporall thing may produce in the spirit? not any thing corporall, seeing that all, that is in the spirit, is spirituall: neither againe can it be spirituall, because nothing spirituall can bee contained in the vertue of a materiall or corporall cause.

It cannot be denied, but that this discourse of *Lyra* might haue some force in those causes, which (as the Philosophers speake) doe worke *directè & per se*

se by themselves directly, yet in those, whose causaltie is altogether indirect, true philosophy teacheth the contrary. wherefore though it be most certaine that the body cannot directly haue any influence into the soule or spirit, yet because the spirit, whiles it is in this life dependeth in her operations of the body, and the dispositions thereof (according to the generally receiued philosophicall axiome) *the manner of the working followeth the manner of being*, it must necessarily follow, that accordingly as the dispositions of the body are better or worse, so may the operations of the minde be also more or lesse perfect.

Yea *Aristotle* teacheth vs in his 7. booke of his Politikes, that though those men, who are borne, and brought vp in the Northerne parts of the world, bee stronger then others in corporall forces; yet that they bee of a much more slow, and duller capacity: contrariwise, those who are borne in hotter climates of *Affrica*, *Spaine*, and *Mauritania*, and other more Southerne parts

of the world, though they be weaker in body, and more debile of complexion, yet that ordinarily they be more quicke of apprehension, and more subtle in iudgment, then the other of the Northerne parts of the world be. Finally, that those who liue neither in the extremitie of heate, nor piercing cold, doe commonly excell both the other.

A fortiori therefore may the qualities, and dispositions of our foode, especially that of the tree of good and euill, haue had no small operation in the inward dispositions, and powers of our soules, for to make vs of a more ripe iudgment, and quicker apprehension. yea finally make vs more apt to discern both good and euill, at least way in morall and ciuill matters, if not in supernaturall, and things belonging vnto grace, for so it was said of the Messias, *butyrum & mel comedet, vt sciāt reprobare malum & eligere bonum*, butter and hony shall he eate, that he may know to refuse the euill and chuse the good, the which though it be spoken more peraduenture for the mysticall meaning, then for

Iſa 7.15.

for the literall or materiall, yet no doubt but that the mysticall sense hath some ground euen in the materiall comparifon of butter and honie.

But because it seemeth not so probable, that God would hinder our spirituall good (such as this was, of the knowledge of good and euill) who hath made vs perfect in all corporall powres, and perfections; therefore I deeme most probable in this point either the opinion of *Rupertus* aboue alledged; or if that seeme to haue some inconvenience, then that of *S. Austin* may be rather followed, which now also is the common opinion of the schooles, with the master of the sentences, to wit, that *this tree was called the tree of the knowledge of good and euill, ab euentu, from the euent, for that which presently followed in the eating thereof: which was, that Adam then knew by woe-full experience the difference betweene good and euill.*

*Aug. lib. 14
de ciuit. Dei
cap. 17. &
lib. 8. de
Gen. ad li-
ceram cap. 6.
& 15.
Lombardus
cum schola-
sticis 2. lib.
sen. dist. 17.*

CHAP. XII.

Of the creation of man.

NOW all things being created, and this inferiour world perfectly replenished, there wanted only one, who should be gouernour and lord ouer all other creatures, *Faciamus* therefore saith God *hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram*, 1.cap. Gen. 26. let vs make man in our image, after our likenes, and let him haue dominion ouer the fish of the sea, and ouer the fowle of the aire, and ouer the cattell, and ouer all the carth, and ouer euery creeping thing, that creepeth upon the earth.

Gen. 1. 26.

5. 1. 9. 6.

1. Cor. 11.

7.

Eph. 4. 14.

Col. 3. 10.

But peraduenture some may demaund why man was created last of all creatures? seeing that hee being the most perfect and modell of the rest, hee should consequently haue beene created as prototypon and first type of the rest, and therefore as he was the first in perfection, he should also haue beene first

first in his being and production.

I answer, that euen for the very same reason, he was created last, because in a certaine manner hee was the end and perfection of the rest: and thus beside other interpretations, this also may be admitted of the philosophicall axiome, *quod est primum in intentione, est ultimum in executione*: that which is first or cheifest in the intention, is last in the execution, or production.

Secondly, man being to be lord of all the maine Machina of this world, it belonged vnto the diuine prouidence, first to prouide the habitation, and then to create him that was to inhabite.

Or thirdly, because man had neede of all these things, either for his corporall sustenance, or for his spirituall exercise.

Or fourthly, because it was conuenient, first to create the great world, containing euery thing in his due and distinct order; then afterwards to consummate, perfect, and as it were to crowne the end of all his workes, with one, who was to be the crowne, end,

and perfection of all corporall creatures, yea containing in a more perfect manner and degree, the perfection of all, whatsoeuer he had created before.

Finally, hauing created both corporall, and spirituall things each separate, and distinct in their proper natures, it remained only to conioyne them both in one: insomuch that, as in all things, whatsoeuer is composed of matter & forme, the parts haue their being, *prioritate naturæ*, by prioritie of nature (as the Philosophers say) before the conioyning of both together, because the parts are for the whole, and not the whole ordained for the parts. In like manner it was no lesse conuenient, that man being composed of both corporall and spirituall substance, hee should also be created after them both, as who was to be the secundarie end of all other inferiour creatures.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

*Of the manner of the creation
of Man.*

TH E manner of mans creation is described vnto vs in the aforefaid words. *Gen. 1. 16. Let vs make man in our image, after our like nes.* Now therefore it remaineth we explicate, what diuine deliberation is this, what image is this, and in what likenes, and similitude of God, was man created. And first of the first.

This word *faciamus, let vs make*, may be taken in three senses, or significations: for first, it may signifie, how the eternall wisdom of God, proceeding with a certaine deliberation and counsell with himselfe, the most holy Trinitie, did goe about such an excellent worke, as was the creation of man: to the end, that by that manner of proceeding, hee might manifest the excellencie of man, aboue all these inferiour

creatures, partaker of reason, beautified with prudence, perfect in wisdom, and created to his owne image, and likenes.

Secondly • God is said to vse this manner of deliberation in the creation of man, to manifest the weight of the businesse, and worth of the worke which hee then intended; to shew (I say) what a worke it was to create man, with so great sanctitie, grace, and felicitie, to conserue him in the same, and being lost to restore him againe. For God in his eternall wisdom, foreseeing the frailtie of man, did likewise foresee the act of his fall, and finally that hee would perish, he did likewise know before the difficultie in conseruing, and restoring of man after his fall; and finally how to bring him to the end, for which he was created before his fall.

Wherefore, if all these difficulties be duely considered in humane reason, it might iustly be doubted, according to our capacitie, whether it were conuenient, to create man, or no? wherefore the Scripture accommodating it selfe to

to humane sense and capacitie, doth describe vnto vs God the Father, as it were consulting with the Sonne and the holy Ghost, of the creation of man. Then how it was concluded in that diuine Consistorie, how it was most conuenient to create such a creature, without which all the rest had beene imperfect, and as a body without a head, a common-wealth without a ruler, or kingdom without a King, confused, imperfect, without order or beautie. But seeing that to bring man to this finall perfection and end, many things were necessary, each person of the blessed Trinitie did assume to himselfe diuers functions ; the Father to create, because power and might doth especially appeare in the Father ; the Sonne did assume the reparation of man after his fall (a worke of infinite wisdome) and therefore it is particularly ascribed to this person, and infinite wisdome : finally, the holy Ghost did particularly worke mans sanctification, this therefore is likewise accommodated to this person, together with all spirituall graces and
finall

finall glorification. Neuerthelesse these offices, operations, and workes, are so attributed to the three holy persons, not that any one of them was effected alone by any one person, for whatsoever is wrought out of the sacred Trinitie, in or by any creature whatsoever, is equally effected and wrought by all and euery person of the blessed Trinitie, but because something doth appeare in euery of these workes, which doth especially manifest the Father, the Sonne, or the holy Ghost, the Fathers power, the Sonnes wisdom, the grace and sanctification of the holy Ghost, therefore these and other the like attributes are particularly applied and attributed to each person of the blessed Trinitie.

*Rupertus
lib. 2. de
Trinitate
& operibus
eius.*

This is the ground of *Rupertus* his discourse, and reason why God created man to his likenesse and image, why he changed his voice, and altered his manner of speaking: for whereas hee said in the creation of other creatures, *Fiat, & factum est; Let it be done, and it was done;* now, as though hee had beene weary with going about the earth, compassing the seas,

and measuring the amplitude of the hea-
uens, he sate him downe, and as it were
taking his breath, hee called to minde that
there was one thing as yet wanting, which
was no lesse necessary then fitting to be
made ; then said he, let vs make man to
our owne image and likenesse. Thus doest
thou then thinke that a small matter, which
was intended by these words ? A great my-
sterie without doubt it was, in that counsell
of wisdom, in that counsell of such per-
sons, the Father, the Sonne, and the holy
Ghost. Canst thou iudge that there was any
thing wanting, any thing superfluous, ei-
ther done or to be done in vs, or about vs,
in that sacred Senate ? There doubtlesse
was all our cause considered, there our fall
foreseene, there our death and perdition
foreknowne, and determined upon, to wit,
that euery person should undertake some
part of the worke, that as it is said before,
the Father should create, the Sonne should
redeeme, and finally the holy Ghost should
worke the remission of sinnes, and the re-
surrection of the flesh.

But what should bee the reason why
God deliberating about the creation of
man,

man, should say, *Faciamus*, let us make? To whom did hee speake, speaking in the plurall, *let us make*? Shall we say to the earth, as to a compart of man? or to the Angels, as the fellow-workers with God, as though God had need either of the cooperation of the Angels, or were so senselesse, as thus to conferre with that his creature void of all reason and sense?

Ambrose in his seuenth chapter of the sixt booke of the *Exameron*, answereth, that God spake not to himselfe, because hee speaketh not in the singular, but in the plurall, *let us make*, neither yet to the Angels, as who are but his seruants; therefore though the Iewes and Arrians doe neuer so much repugne, these words without all question are spoken to his Sonne, as who is the true and liuely similitude and likenesse of God the Father. And this I deeme to be the truest opinion, seeing that the eternall Sonne of God, euen as hee is the Word and Sonne of God, is a liuely and expresse similitude and likenesse, not only of his eternall Father, but also a most perfect

perfect *Idea* and *exemplar*, according to which man was created.

Others not improbably doe interpret, that God therefore spake in the plurall, *Faciamus*, let *us* make, as Princes and great persons are wont to doe, to shew their authoritie and maiestie, saying, *We will*, *We command*, *We decree*, &c. yet of the two I deeme the first exposition to bee best, and that the text may admit them both.

CHAP. XIII.

How man was made to the image and likeness of God.

FOr the vnderstanding of this, wee must note the originall Hebrew words, *Selem* and *Demuth*; by *Selem* is properly signified a shadow or transitorie similitude, Psalme 33. *In imagine pertransit homo*, man passeth away like vnto a shadow. Likewise Psalme 101. *My dayes haue declined as a shadow*. The other word

*Saintes
Pagnines
in thesauro
lingue He-
brae.*

word *Demuth* signifieth to cut downe, to faile, to fade, to be silent, to recogitate, and to expect ; but most properly to assimilate or liken : wherefore seeing euery similitude or likenesse is transitorie, vanishing, and quickly passing away, the same word doth also signifie to vanish, to passe away, to faile, and to fade.

Now therefore, when God said that man was made to his image and likenesse, it was to giue vs to vnderstand, that such was the likenesse, and so perfect the representation, as could be betweene an inferiour creature and his Creator : but because God is of infinite perfection, it must necessarily follow, that his similitude should bee infinitely inferiour and of lesse perfection then the prototypon or first type of his perfection. Like as though the shadow be in some sort the similitude and representation of the body, yet is it obscure, and imperfect, yea nothing in it selfe, and in comparison of the body nothing. Hence consequently wee may inferre a twofold interpretation of the said words, *ad imaginem & similitudinem*

nostram,

nostram, to our image and likenesse, to wit, of that image or similitude which is in God his diuine nature, essence, being, or vnderstanding : insomuch that the nature of God, and his Ideall representation of his vnderstanding bee the exemplar and first type, vnto whose similitude man was made. Or againe that this be the meaning of Gods words, *let vs make man* such a one as wee are, or so like vnto vs, that he may bee such an image, forme, and similitude, as he may represent our nature, power, wisdom, and prouidence, yea and immortalitie in a body of its owne nature mortall.

For as *S. Austine* well noteth, diuers things doe diuersly represent Almighty God : some doe participate of vertue and wisdom, others only of life, others of existence and being, insomuch that those things which only haue existence, and neither liue, nor breathe, are counted an imperfect similitude of God, because they are good according to their kinde, and flow from that infinite Ocean of goodnesse, from whence all other goodnesse doth proceed. Again, those things

*Aug. li. 83.
quest. q. 51.*

things which doe liue, and yet doe not vnderstand, doe more perfectly participate the likenesse of God : but those things lastly which doe vnderstand, doe come so neere vnto the likenesse of God, that nothing created can come more neere. Wherefore seeing that man may participate of the wisdome of the diuine nature, yea euen according to his owne nature, hence it is, that hee is so framed to the image of God, that nothing can be more like in his being and nature vnto God : he liueth, he breatheth, he vnderstandeth, he hath existence and being, and is in all these, as a perfect patterne of his Creator and God.

CHAP. XV.

What is the difference betweene the image and the similitude of God, according to which man is said to be created.

SAint *Austine* in his questions vpon *Deuteronomie* thinketh it no lesse then blasphemie, to auerre any thing to be

be superfluous in the sacred text: wherefore lest we be enforced to contradict this so received a principle, and manifest truth, wee are to search what difference is betweene the image and likeness of God, according to which man was created.

Origenes, Basil, Nicenus, Eucherius, Victorinus, Theodoretus, Rupertus, Aquinas, the master of the sentences, with many others, both moderne and ancient Writers, are of opinion, that man is said to be made to the image of God, according to his nature and properties consequent vnto nature, as vnderstanding, memorie, and free will, which he exerciseth in his naturall actions, and in which he exceedeth all other inferiour creatures; the which image, though it may be, and is in some sort defaced by sinne, yet is it in no wise fully lost and blotted out, because as it is wholly of God, so it dependeth only of God, and therefore can be taken away only by God himselfe; nay not euen by God himselfe, man remaining a reasonable creature or man. For though he may haue his senses and

H

other

*Orig. lib. 3.
Peri archon,
cap. 6.
Basil. hom. 6.
in Gen. in
hunc locum
Ambros. li.
6. Exame-
ron. c. 6. & 8
Nicenus
homil. de
creat. hom.
Eucher. li. 1.
commen. in
Gen. in hunc
locum.
Victorin. in
disp. t. quam
scripsit ad-
uersus Ar-
rium.
Theodoret.
in quest. in
Gen. q. 20.
Rupert. li. 2.
de Trinitate
& operibus
eius, c. 3. et 5
Aquinas. pri-
ma parte
quest. 93.
Magister
sent. lib. 2.
distinct. 26.
& ibidem
Scholastici.*

other spirituall powers depraued, yea though he may also be depriued of the exercise of them all, yet in no wise can they be vtterly extinguished, man (as I said) remaining man.

Now as touching the similitude of God according vnto which man was created, wee are to consider him, not according vnto the naturall gifts which are necessarily consequent vnto nature, but according vnto iustice, sanctitie, and innocencie, and grace, which are gifts infused into nature, though aboue nature, the which as they are independent of nature, so also may they bee and are separate from nature, according to the free disposition and order of God, the Author of nature : but this certainly is alway for some sinne, which in this sense may be said to be a deprauation of nature, seeing it depriueth nature not only of these supernaturall gifts, which are the chiefe ornaments and helps of nature, but also because it depraueth nature herselfe euen in her selfe, and hindereth the due exercise of her naturall powers.

Rupertus

Rupertus in his second booke of the Trinitie, and second chapter, discourseth very acutely of this point, of the difference betweene the image and similitude, vnto which man was created, giuing also the reason why the word *image* is prefixed before the word *similitude* : in a word, his resolution is this, that the Sonne of God is signified by the word *image*, and the holy Ghost by the word *similitude* : for (saith he) the difference betweene *similitude* and *image* is this, that the *image* is in regard of one only, but a *similitude* is at least of two : now the eternall Sonne of the eternall Father is the image of God, according to that of the Apostle, 1. Coloss. who is the image of the inuisible God. The Sonne (I say) is the image of the inuisible God, equally inuisible. For the understanding of which, we must presuppose that there bee many kindes of images, as the image of man, of a horse, a picture in the wall, an image grauen in stone or wood, yea wee see euen the images of the Sunne and Moone in the water, yet wee may not thinke that the Sonne of God is so to be called the image of God,

Heb. 1.

Gen. 5.

but rather, as the Apostle writeth in another place, the figure of his substance; because as euery substance is knowne by his figure or shape, so God the Father by his word. Againe, the image of man is said to be a propertie of his substance, in which sense the sacred text saith, that Adam begat his sonne to his image and likenesse, and called his name Seth. Hence wee may understand how the eternall Sonne is the image of his eternall Father, and the holy Ghost the similitude and likenesse of the Father and Sonne, seeing the goodnesse and loue of the Father and Sonne is common to both Father and Sonne. Hence it is, that it could not rightly be said in regard of the Sonne only, let vs make man to our image and likenesse; for as the Sonne is Sonne in regard only of the Father, not of the Father and the holy Ghost iointly, so also is hee not the image of the Father and of the holy Ghost iointly, but of the Father onely. But it is rightly said in regard of the holy Ghost, to our image and likenesse, because as the holy Ghost is the infinite goodnesse of the Father and Sonne, so is he likewise the infinite similitude and likenesse common to both

both Father and Sonne. But this not by the force of his particular proceeding, as is the Sonne.

Others are of opinion, that this word *ad imaginem*, to our image, doth signifie vnto vs the second person of the blessed Trinitie, as he was to be incarnate, or to take our nature vpon him.

But if we marke the phrase of the sacred text, we shall easily finde that the Sonne of God was incarnate rather according to the similitude of man, then that man was created according to his similitude, *Rom. 8. Philip. 1. Heb. 2.*

Eugubinus in his *Cosmopæia*, and *Oleaster* vpon the first of *Genesis*, are of opinion, that God therefore said, *let vs make man to our image and likenesse*, because when hee created man, hee tooke vpon him the shape and forme of man, to the end that he might the better conuerse with man.

But this seemeth rather to bee an inuention of their owne, then grounded in Scripture, because it is most probable (that which the Schoolemen doe commonly hold with *Dionysius*) that all

those apparitions, which we reade in the old Testament, were not immediately of God, or by God himselfe, but by the mediation of Angels, who taking vpon them airie or other apparant bodies, appeared vnto men in the shape and forme of men ; but so neuerthelesse, that they so appearing and speaking, did alwayes represent the maiestie of their maker, repeating for the most part Gods owne words, which hee had immediately infused into their vnderstanding.

Againe, if the aforesaid opinion of the assuming of our humane nature is to bee vnderstood by a personall vnion betweene God and man, then questionlesse God hath beene twice incarnate, and twice vnited to our humane nature, which is contrary to the holy Scriptures. Or if there was no reall vnion, or assumption of our humane nature, but only a shade or similitude of the same, as wee reade that Angels haue oftentimes assumed humane bodies, how then was it truly said, *let vs make man to our image and likenesse*, seeing that similitude

litude of humane nature could not in any wise be the image of God ? neither could it be truly said, that *Adam* was made to the image of God, if so be that we vnderstand by the image of God not any true humane nature, but the shade only and similitude of mans nature.

Hence I conclude the first opinion to be the best, as which is most grounded in the sacred text, and most followed of the holy Fathers and other expositours.

CHAP. XVI.

Whether the woman be made to the image of God, or no.

IT might seeme rashnesse to doubt of this, if *S. Paul* did not giue vs some ground, denying (as some thinke) that woman was made to the image and likenesse of God, auerring her onely to be the image of man, in that he contra-

H 4

poseth

1. Cor. II.
& 6.

poseth woman, as the glory of man, to man as the image and glory of God. His words be these : *Man ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as hee is the image and glory of God : but the woman is the glory of the man ; for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man.* The woman therefore is not the image and glory of God, but immediately only the glory of the man, otherwise there could be no difference in this, betweene the man and the woman, contrary to the inference which *S. Paul* maketh in the precedent verse.

Neuerthelesse, euen the text it selfe doth clearly confute this opinion : for after that it had beene said, *let vs make man to our owne image and likenesse*, presently it is added, *hee made them, both man and woman*. Wherefore as man was made to the image of God, so likewise was the woman made to the same.

*Aug. li. 12.
de trinitate
cap 7.*

S. Austine is very large in giuing the reason of this conclusion ; but briefly this is the answer : If wee consider the principall reason, why man is said to be the image of God, to wit, as hee is an intellectuall

intellectuall creature, and as he is indu-
ed with the properties therevnto an-
nexed; so is it euident, that this word
image doth equally signifie, and may be
equally attributed both to man, and
woman: seeing that they both parti-
cipate of reason, and vnderstanding,
both bee indued with an immortall
soule, both partakers of free will, both
capable of supernaturall gifts, both of
grace and glory.

But againe, if this word *image* be ta-
ken in a more large, and improper sig-
nification (as hath beene already expli-
cated) we may well say, that man was
made to the image of God, & woman
framed to the image of man. Because,
as God is the end to whom man is im-
mediatly referred: so likewise man in
some sort is in regard of the woman,
because man is the head of the woman,
by whom shee ought to be directed vn-
to God. This explication seemeth to
be grounded in the afore-said place of
Paul, 1. to the Corin. 11. chap. for when
hee had said, *that man was the image of
God, and woman the glory of the man,* he
presently

presently giueth the reason. ver. 8. *For man (saith he) is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. ver. 9. for the man was not created for the womans sake, but the woman for the mans sake.*

Neuerthelesse, if the similitude of God in man and woman be considered, not according to their naturall gifts, but to the supernaturall of grace and glory, then questionlesse it hapneth often-times, that some women are more adorned with these supernaturall graces, and gifts, and consequently are more like vnto God then many men. As wee piously beleue of the blessed Virgin, who as shee was pronounced by the Angell of God to bee blessed amongst all women, so no doubt, but shee hath receiued an eternall blessing aboue all Angells and men, our Sauiour only excepted both God and man.

CHAP. XVII.

*Whether man be made to the image of God
even according to his body and corporall
proportion, shape, and lineaments; or
doth in any wise represent the diuine
maiestie.*

THE subiect of this question is so
certaine of it selfe, and without
all coutrouersie, that for the resolution
thereof, wee haue more neede of the
subtlety of distinction, then of any
profound diuinitie, or learning. For
seeing that the diuine maiesty is a most
pure spirit, as infinite in essence, as in all
and euery of his diuine attributes infi-
nite, how is it possible that there should
be any comparison, similitude, or like-
nes with him, in that, which is altoge-
ther corporall, limited, and most base,
such as is our humane nature according
to the body.

Neuerthelesse seeing the body doth
in some sort represent the soule, like as
the

the soule also is the image of God ; hence peradventure it may be inferred, that the body may in some sort be said to be a representation or similitude of God ; in as much as the body (if wee consider it in his full perfection) is an immediate glasse, similitude, or representation of the soule, the which most perfectly representeth Almighty God. Wherefore though in regard of our corporall substance, considered immediately in it selfe, without any relation vnto the soule, wee be no better then brute beasts : yet if we consider it, in regard of our soule, and as it is the receptacle of the most excellent image of God, it may after a remote manner, and mediately be said to represent euen God himselfe.

*August. lib.
6. de Gen.
ad literam
cap. 12.*

Wherefore *S. Austin* propounding this question, *in what doth a man exceede the brute beasts, seeing they are both made of earth?* he answereth, *in nothing, but because he is made to the image of God, not in body, or corporall substance, but according to his soule, and spirituall powers.* Though true it is also, that he hath euen
in

in his body, a certaine property, which doth in some sort demonstrate the rectitude of his soule; as that he is made vpright, to the end, that hee might vnderstand how hee ought not to abase himselfe to the terrene, vile, and base trash of the world, like vnto the brute beasts, and other most base creatures, who as they are framed prone, and haue their bodies inclined towards the earth, can neuer erect themselves to any spirituall, or heavenly thing.

Hence *Bernard* well noteth, that God made man vpright in stature, and erected towards heauen, to the end that his corporall rectitude and vprightnes of his shape, might stirre him vp to preserve the spirituall rectitude, and righteousness of the inward man, who was made to the image of God; and that the beauty of our corporall substance, and outward proportion, and right disposition of the lineaments of our body might correct the inward deformitie of our soules, and the powers thereof. For what can be more vgly, deformed, and abominable in the eye of that all-seeing God,

God, then a sinfull, and defiled soule in a beautifull body? Is it not a shamefull, and detestable thing, that an earthly and corrupt vessell, such as the body is, should contemplate the heauens, view the Planets, and be delighted with the aspect of the incorruptible spheares, and motions of the starres; and that on the contrary side, the spirituall and celestiall creature, far more perfect, then all the celestiall globes, and heauens, the soule (I meane) of man, should alwaies haue her eyes, that is hir inward powers, and affections debased, and cast downe to the terrene trash, and basest creatures of this world.

Consider therefore (ô man) thy dignitie of nature, the perfection of thy powers, thy priuiledges of grace, the immortalitie of thy soule, the excellencie of thy creation, the nothing of thy selfe, and lastly the infinite price of thy redemption, by the most precious blood and death of the Lambe, thy Creator, and Redeemer, and let not this so base, and transitorie trash of this world, so alienate thy minde, and bewitch

witch thy vnderstanding, that thou pre-
ferre the filthy and base pleasures of
the body, before the spirituall and eter-
nall of thy spirituall and immortall
soule.

CHAP. XVIII.

*Whether the image of God may be wholly
lost, and blotted out of the soule of man.*

O*Rigenes*, and *S. Austine* do seeme
to affirme that man lost the image
of God, *Epiphanius*, and diuers other
of the Fathers doe peremptorily deny
it out of *Gen: the Psalmes*, and *S. Paul*:
but I thinke this controuersie rather to
arise, by reason of the diuers vnder-
standing of the image of God, which is
in man, then of any true difference in
their opinions; for who can doubt,
but if wee consider man according to
the supernaturall gifts first infused into
the soule of *Adam*, but that he lost the
diuine similitude or likenesse of God,
and

Epiphanius
ep. ad Io-
hannē Hie-
rosol:
Aug: lib. 2.
contra A-
damantiam
Manich. &
l. 83. quest.
q. 66. & lib.
6. de Gen.
ad literam.
cap. 27. 28.

Gen. c 9.
Psal. 38.
1. ad Cor.
cap. 11.

and that wholly, nothing remayning but onely the deformity of sinne, in the deformed, and sinfull soule; but if we consider him againe according to the naturall substance of the soule, and her naturall faculties consequent therevnto, it is equally indubitable, that shee retained this likenesse of God, though not in the same perfection, which shee possessed before, but rather much defaced, blemished, and deformed.

My reason is, because there proceeded a more excellent beauty, and perfection vnto this naturall substance, by reason of the supernaturall qualitie of originall iustice; and consequently the depriuation of this supernaturall gift, which was also a sufficient cause of natures greater perfection, and more admirable beauty, was a depriuation and defacing of the said beauty of nature, which otherwise had beene a perfect type, and portraiture of the diuine nature, and being.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

*Why God made man to his image, and
similitude.*

MAny and most excellent reasons may be giuen of this, but which I must needs confesse, are rather morall congruencies, grounded in the infinite goodnesse of God, then in any other forcible convincing reason, plainly deduced out of the sacred Text.

The first whereof may be this, that God therefore made man like vnto himselfe, that thence it might be manifest how much the infinite goodnesse of God exceedeth the malignitie, enuy, and malice of man: for God being infinite in his goodnesse, yea in all other his attributes infinite; yet doth he not disdain out of his infinite goodnesse, that, that, which in vs is limited and finite should be compared and likened to that, which in him is infinite, and beyond all comparision: he enuierh not

I

the

the perfection of our nature, he maketh it more perfect by grace, and by a sacred league, and vnion, he combineth both, that by both we may be like vnto him in both, who is the author of both.

And this with such a degree of participated perfection, that man doth not only become like vnto God, but also may bee called, and is truly the adopted Sonne of God. So that all men may now participate of the grace, which one onely possessed by nature: insomuch that as he being the naturall Sonne of God, is a perfect patterne of his eternall Father by nature, so wee also be a participated likenes, and similitude in some degree by nature, but most perfectly by grace.

The second reason may be this (if so be that we may compare these inferior things of this world to those supreme, and infinite of God) like as a temporall Prince (having for to shew his power, magnificence, and maiestie) built, furnished, beautified, adorned, and deck'd some excellent Citty, in which

which hee himselfe doth meane to remaine, doth there erect, in some principall part thereof his owne image, or statue, in some precious porphire, marble, or other more excellent matter: euen so Almighty God, hauing out of his infinite wisdom made this maine Machina, and beautifull Citty of the world, for the manifestation of his glory, to the end that it might be knowne, and acknowledged, who was the only author and architect of all, hee was pleased to place in the midst thereof, in the garden of paradise his owne image, and similitude, man (I meane) who by his soule, and the three principall powers thereof should represent the vnitie and trinitie of his maker: yea and by his outward shape and forme in some sort likewise represent the inward, and consequently, though not immediately, euen God himselfe.

Insomuch that, as it is said of the portrature of *Venus* painted by *Apelles*, that none could perfect it, but onely *Apelles* who first began it: so likewise was it not possible that any should

bring our soule to her first perfection, but only God, who was her first Creator. Hence it is that like as he, who defaceth the image or statua of an earthly Prince, is iustly condemned of high treason; so, *a fortiori*, who depraueth his owne nature, and by offending his maker depriueth it of grace, (the which is the seale, signe, and similitude of the diuine power, nature, and maiestie) is worthily condemned of high treason against the same power, and maiestie. The third motiue, why God created man to his image and similitude, may be this, to the end that all corporall things might be subiect, and each after their manner seruiceable to man, as who of all other creatures, was the expresse similitude of their lord and maker, vnto which it seemeth that God did allude, when he said vnto Noe, *the feare of you and the dread of you shall be ouer euery beast of the earth, and ouer euery fowle in the heauen, and vpon all that moueth on the earth, and vpon all the fishes in the sea, &c.*

Gen: cap.
9. ver. 2.

And least those incorruptible creatures,

tures, the heauens, the planets, the
statres, yea most of all the Angelicall
powers, Cherubins or Seraphins should
disdaine the seruice of man, or lest any
other creature should rebell against
him, who as yet had not rebelled a-
gainst his God: or finally, lest the de-
uils should of enuy dare against him,
as who with his posteritie was to reple-
nish those glorious thrones, from
which those wicked spirits fell, it plea-
sed therefore the diuine maiestie to
beautifie, adorne, and fortifie man, with
his owne likenes and similitude.

So that as it is said of *Cain*, Gen. 4.
verl. 15. *the Lord set a marke vpon Cain,*
lest any man finding him should kill him,
so of the contrary side, it pleased our
Creator, to impresse his similitude, and
likenes, not only in our first father, but
also in euery man, lest any man finding
any other man, in whatsoeuer offence,
not hauing the authority, more then
of man, should lay his hands vpon
any other man. Not (I say) hauing
the authoritie more then of man, such
as I deeme to be in lawfull Magistrates,

and such as are deputed by them for the execution of iustice. Because this is not onely by the instinct of nature, but also proceedeth from the author of nature, and is lastly confirmed by the giuer of grace. Insomuch that hee himselfe doth say to all his lawfull ministers of iustice, and gouernours as well spirituall, as temporall, Luk. 10. ver. 16. *who heareth you, heareth me, who despiseth you, despiseth me.* Because as it is one and the same law, so likewise the contempt of the law is one, and the same; and consequently the punishment answerable therevnto must bee one, and the same: But this not onely as the law is onely from man, but as it participateth of the law of God, man being the immediate law-giuer, Gods law, and eternall wisdome being the first fountaine and rule, from whence all humane lawes are not only deriued, but also firmly established, and to bee conformed: for otherwise they be no lawes, but tyranies or deprivation of lawes, but as they be conformable to that diuine, and eternall law.

The

The fourth reason, or motiue that moued God Almighty to make man to his image, was, because he hauing created all these inferiour creatures, and subiected them to the rule, vse, and gouernment of man, as to the most noble creature: so also he was pleased to ordaine him to a most noble end, the enioying of his Maker, that so man might be a meane to reduce other inferiour creatures, to their Creator, and end.

Wherefore to the end that this excellent vnion of man with his Maker, might appeare more manifestly, he imprinted in him, his diuine image, with so liuely and firmly an impressed similitude, and character, that while man should remaine in his owne being, so long likewise, should he remaine, the type and image of the diuine nature and being. As it is said of the famous *Phydias*, that he did, with such rare Arte and cunning, ingraue his owne image in *Mineruaes* shield, that while the shield remained intire, his image likewise must remaine intire and vndefaced.

Another reason of the impression of

this most excellent & beautifull image of God, in man, may bee, that man should be incited and moued thereby, to the knowledge, and loue of his Creator. Wherefore as by the contemplation of other more imperfect creatures, he is brought in some sort to the knowledge of God; so with much more perfection by the knowledge of himselfe. Hence it is, that to the end, that he might be inexcusable, and not overcharged, in the curious searching of God in externall things, it pleased his Creator, to imprint in his soule, a most beautifull image, and cleare similitude of the diuine nature and being, the which should be a more perfect representation vnto him, of the diuine properties, then he should finde in all other inferiour creatures. Man therefore, reflecting vpon himselfe, and viewing his owne nature, may ascend vnto God, and perfectly view the diuine nature: Seeing the image, hee may also the prototypon: seeing himselfe, hee may ascend by contemplation vnto God: for seeing his owne soule, he ought to conceiue

ceiue it as the image of God; and whatsoever perfection or shade of perfection he findeth in himselfe, that doubtlesse hee ought and may conceiue to bee in God, though in a more infinite degree of perfection. The soule vnderstandeth, God infinitely more; the soule freely disposeth, willeth, and determineth, much more God: the soule is capable of the diuine vertue, wisdom and grace, God is euen vertue, wisdom and grace it selfe, yea that infinite ocean of graces and gifts, from whence all other graces and gifts doe proceed: according to that of *Iames* chap. 1. vers. 17. *Euery good giuing and euery perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights.*

CHAP. XX.

Whether the dominion ouer all other liuing creatures was giuen vnto man, and what manner of power that was.

AS nothing doth more declare the loue of God towards man in this life,

life, then that hee made him Lord and ruler ouer all his creatures: so nothing doth more declare the excellencie of mans nature, especially in the estate of his innocencie, then that he had power and dominion ouer all creatures, the which as they were made for his seruice, so were they alwayes ready at his becke in due obedience. No Lion so terrible, no Elephant so mighty, no Tiger so fierce, no Fowle so rauening, no Whale so monstrous, no not any creature so indomite, but that it was subiect vnto mans dominion, while man was subiect to his Lord and Maker. So God commanded, nature obeyed, (though now in some sort that be contrary to nature) yea, all creatures did concurre vnto this subiection, while man was subiect vnto his Creator, who *cloathed him (as the Preacher speaketh) with strength, and made him according to his owne image*: yea made all flesh to feare him, so that hee had dominion ouer the beasts and fowles. Or as the Psalmist speaketh, *he made him a little lower then himselfe, crowned him with*
glory,

Psal 8. v. 5.
6. 7.

glory, and made him to haue dominion
ouer the workes of his hands : and finally
put all things vnder mans feet : all sheepe
and oxen, yea and the beasts of the field,
the fowles of the aire, the fish of the sea,
and ouer all things which passe thorow the
paths of the seas. And hence it was, that
Adam as Lord of all gaue names vnto
all creatures, and Eue though by nature
timorous and fearfull, was not in any
wise daunted at the presence and
speech of the Serpent.

So that as we partly finde as yet by
experience, and was much more in that
happy state of Paradise, all creatures
should haue beene subiect to man,
while man was not disobedient to
God : yea as all inferiour creatures are
subiect to their superiour, according to
their nature, order, perfection, and
Gods decree, the imperfect to the more
perfect, the matter for the formes, the
corporall for the spirituall, the acci-
dents for the substances, the elements
for the mixts, yea euen the heauens,
starres, and planets for man, man only
for God, as subiect only to God, while
he

he did not infringe this sacred order and chaine, where by him all things were to be reduced and linked to God.

Furthermore, this power and dominion of man ouer all other liuing creatures, proceeding from the excellencie of his nature, did remaine in him euen after his sinne, though not in the same act, or actuall exercise of his power and dominion. For albeit whatsoeuer was due vnto nature, was blemished, defaced, and corrupted by sinne; yet nothing substantially belonging vnto nature, or necessarily consequent vnto the same, was wholly taken away. Wherefore this diuine image of God being engrauen in mans nature, mans nature remaining after sinne, the same image of God must needs remaine, at leastway as much as was due vnto nature, or not aboue the spheare of nature; and consequently the aforesaid dominion must also continue, as hauing his beginning from this image: it must (I say) continue (as the Philosopher speaketh) *non actu, sed potentia*, not alwayes according to the exercise of the
act

act in all particulars, but according to the extent of the power in generall, as may be manifestly proued out of the 9. of Genesis : *The feare of you and the dread of you shall be vpon cuery beast of the earth, and vpon euery fowle of the heauen, vpon all that moueth on the earth, and vpon all the fishes of the sea ; vnto your hand are they deliuered.* Thus God said to Noe after the generall deluge, and consequently this dominion ouer all creatures doth remaine euen after sinne.

Gen. 9. v. 2.

CHAP. XXI.

Whether in the state of innocencie one man should haue beene subiect to another, or rather all of equall dominion, power, and authoritie.

Saint Augustine answereth, that seeing God had made man a reasonable creature, he would not haue him to domineere, but only ouer the vnreasonable.

Aug. lib. de
Ciu. c. 15.

nable. So that man should not haue had power ouer man, but onely ouer beasts, & other vnreasonable creatures. Hence it was, that our first Fathers and Patriarchs of the world were rather keepers of sheepe, and feeders of oxen, then gouernours of men; that thence wee might vnderstand, both what the right order of creatures did require, and what followed the disorder of man, and desert of sinne: seeing base bondage, vile flauerie, and ignominious subiection proceedeth of sinne, as rooted in sinne not springing from nature. Wherefore before the iust *Noah* reuenged the sinne, of his sonne, wee neuer reade in the Scripture the names of bondage, seruitude, or slauish subiection, which therefore must necessarily bee rather the desert of sinne then the effect of nature. Yea this may be confirmed, in that God giuing power vnto man ouer all inferior creatures, he maketh no mention of the power of man ouer man, because all men were equally made to the image of God, as likewise because in that estate all were equally to be borne both in perfection

perfection of nature, and adorned with grace, and consequently all were to bee equall in power and dominion, as consequent to the perfection of nature and height of grace, seeing this is equally grounded in nature, and with no lesse equalitie was to be confirmed by grace.

Now as it cannot be denied, but that this opinion of *S. Augustine* hath some probable reasons; yet I deeme the contrary to be much more probable: to wit, that though there should haue beene no such dominion in Paradise, as which should then haue beene burdensome vnto nature, and is now necessarily following our lapse and fall: yet questionlesse there should haue beene a kinde of order, subiection and subordination, of children, inferiours, and subiects, to their parents, superiours, and politicall gouernours: not by way of an imperious command and absolute authoritie, but by a voluntary and sweet subiection flowing from nature, and confirmed by grace.

My reason is this, for as all should not haue beene equall in the gifts of nature,

ture, wisdom, knowledge, skill, magnanimitie, and prudence; neither could they haue beene all equally apt for politicall gouernment: such as I suppose should haue beene in that most perfect place of Paradise, though in a most perfect manner. Neither may it be thought contrary to the happinesse of that estate of Paradise, that man should haue some kinde of subiection or subordination to man, seeing wee must necessarily admit the like in the blessed spirits and holy Angels: who as they are distinct in nature, indiuiduall, and specificall perfections; so are they no lesse in their subordination, offices, and degrees. So *Ierome* saith, *if there bee principalities, powers and vertues, it is necessary that they haue some subiect vnto them; who fearing and seruing them, are confirmed with their vertue and valour: which distribution of offices are not onely in this wicked world, but also are to bee in the world to come.* *A fortiori* then, there might haue been the like subordination and order of gouernment amongst men euen in the state of innocencie.

So

So that as wee finde in *Daniel* and *Zacharias*, that one Angell doth command another, notwithstanding the perfect blessednesse of both: so likewise it seemeth most certaine, that there might haue beene the like subordination amongst men, the like command and power ouer others, though wee had all remained in that pleasant place of Paradise. The wife should haue beene subiect to her husband, the children to their parents, the youth to their elders, and finally all inferiours to their superiours.

Daniel 8.
Zachar. 2.

But how then (may some say) was the subiection of the wife vnto her husband inflicted as a punishment due vnto her sinne, according vnto the sentence of God, *thy desire shall bee subiect to thy husband, and he shall rule ouer thee*? How could this be inflicted for sinne, if so be it was consequent to nature?

Genes. 4.
vers. 16.

I answer briefly, that there is a twofold subiection of the wife to her husband; the one voluntary, the other involuntary; the one of nature, the other of sinne; the one burdensome, the other gratefull;

K

gratefull ; the one confirmed by grace, the other repugnant to nature : finally the one nothing repugnant to the state of innocencie, the other inflicted for originall sinne.

For certainly, though *Eue* had not fallen, and transgressed the commandment of God by tasting the forbidden fruit ; yet because shee was the weaker vessell, therefore euen her owne nature would haue required subiection vnto her husband ; subiection (I meane) voluntary, not constrained ; naturall, not forced ; yea free, and without any contradiction, which now euen the best of *Eues* descendents doe sometimes experiment in regard of their husbands, so that though the one subiection bee a propertie of nature, yet the other is a punishment of sinne, signified by these words, *and he shall rule ouer thee.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

*Whether the Angels did concurre to the
production of man, or no?*

THis doubt may be vnderstood of
the seuerall parts of man, the body
or the soule : first therefore as touching
the soule, which as it was altogether of
nothing, so it was not possible that it
should be brought out of that nothing,
but by the immediate power and parti-
cular concourse of the Almighty : for
as *S. Austine* saith *lib. 9. de Gen. ad lit. cap.*
15. as it is impossible for any Angell or
creature to create it selfe, so is it no lesse
that any other thing should bee produ-
ced of nothing, but by him only which
is aboue all things.

Wherefore the doubt onely is, whe-
ther the Angels did in some sort con-
curre to the creation of the body of
man, seeing that (as *S. Austine* saith in
his 8. booke *de Gen. ad lit. cap. 24.*) all ma-
teriall and corporall creatures are subiect

to the *Angelicall powers* : seeing also that their ordinary apparitions vnto men are by corporall shapes and formes, which they assume vnto themselves, it may seeme not improbable, that in like manner they may frame and depute vnto euery soule her materiall substance, and corporall shape, yea and vnite the matter and forme together, and consequently that they may in some sense be said to create man.

Neuerthelesse, though I cannot denie, but that the Angels might in some sort concurre vnto the disposition of the materiall substance of man, and thereby instrumentally to the introducing of the forme; yet they may not in any wise bee said to haue created either matter or forme, seeing both were immediately from Almighty God, as which were both produced of nothing.

So (as *S. Austine* most fitly compareth) though the husbandman doe digge, plough, plant, manure and till the ground; and the Physitian by his medicines, potions and physicke doth prolong the life: yet neuerthelesse neither

*Aug lib. 9.
de Gen. ad
lit. cap. 15.*

ther of them may be said to create: euen so though the Angels might in some sort dispose to the creation or generation of man, yet may they not absolutely bee said to create, because this is a production of nothing presupposed, which only belongeth to an infinite power.

CHAP. XXIII.

Whether Adam was created in his perfect corporall stature and age.

SAint *Ausline* answereth, that as it was proper only to Adam, not to be borne of parents, but framed immediately of the earth; so also was it peculiar vnto him alone, that hee was created in perfect age.

*Aug. lib. 6.
de Gen. ad
lit. cap. 13.*

Neither may this kinde of production (saith the master of the sentences) be said to be against nature, vnlesse it be in regard of vs, to whom it may seeme to be beyond nature; for whatsoever God worketh, that in regard of God may be

*Magist.
sent lib. 2.
distinct. 17.*

Gen. 1.
ver. 22.
& 24.

counted nature : yea this seemeth to haue some ground in the sacred text, seeing that God hauing newly created our first Fathers, he presently commanded them to increase and multiply : wherefore as hee created other things perfect, and apt for to multiply each one in their seuerall kindes ; so also did he create our first parents in the like perfection both of stature and age, (as some say) as between 30. and 40. yeares of age, or (as others doe assigne) about 50.

Iosue 14.
Numb. 13.

Now as concerning the dimension or greatnesse of his body, though some auerre that hee was the greatest of all men and Giants that euer were, deducing it out of the 14. of *Iosue*, and the 13. of the *Numbers* ; neuerthelesse this seemeth altogether vnprobable: if those places be vnderstood of *Adam*, they are rather to be interpreted so, that hee was the greatest of all men, not in quantitie, but in qualities ; not in dimension of body, but in beautie both of body and soule ; not in corporall extension, but in dignitie, prerogatiues, and all other excellen-

excellencies, both corporall and spirituall; because otherwise hee might rather seeme a monster in regard of vs, then a man.

My opinion therefore in this point is, that as hee was created perfect in all other respects; so likewise in this of perfect corporall stature, greatnesse, and all other dimensions; and consequently that hee was created of the best stature, and proportion of all lineaments and members of his body, that euer man was, or shall be, our Sauour onely excepted.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Whether the soule and the body were created in the same instant, or no.

CHrysostome, Eugubinus, Alphonsus de Castro, Ferus and Genadius denie, that the soule and the body were created in one and the same instant: yea this opinion seemeth to be grounded in the word of God, Gen. 2. vers. 7. where

K 4

Moses

Chrysost. in
Gen. hom.
12. & 13.
Eugub. in
Cosinopæit,
& in Pen-
tateu. hum.
Castro lib. 2.
contra he-
reticos, ubi
disputat de
anima.
Ferus in
cap. 2. Gen.
To stat. ibid.
sicut & Ge-
nadius ibid.

Moses saith, that the Lord God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, and the man was a living soule. Wherefore man (as these Doctors say) was first made according to his materiall part, afterward this matter was disposed by God by the con-temperating of conuenient qualities; and lastly, after all this, was the soule infused, and vnited to the body thus disposed.

Gregorius Nicenus, Damascenus, Aquinas, and S. Austine are of the contrary opinion, to wit, that the soule of man was made and infused into the body in the very same instant and indiuisible point of time, in which the body was created by God.

Aquinas his reason is this, because such is the nature of parts, that while they are separate the one from the other, they are reputed to bee in an imperfect estate: for why, the part being ordained for the whole, it cannot in any wise obtaine its due perfection, while it is a part from the whole: wherefore seeing all things were created in
their

their perfect estate, in their first production: it is not likely, that either the soule was created without the body, or the body produced separate from the soule, as powerfull (I meane) and *in potentia proxima* (as the Philosophers speake) fully disposed for the receiuing of the soule.

CHAP. XXV.

Whether the immortalitie of the soule may be demonstrated out of the Scriptures, or no.

E*Vsebius* writeth of certaine *Arabians*, who held, that though the soules of men should revieue in the generall resurrection vnto immortalitie, yet that now at the separation of the body, and soule, the soule perisheth with the body. Yea *Tertullian* also (as *S. Austine* writeth) doth seeme to hold no lesse.

Neuerthelesse, the contrary is most certaine

Augustin.
de har. nu:
86.

certainly deduced, out of those places of Scripture, which do signifie that man was made to the image, and likenes of God. First, in his infinite capacity of minde, and will, which are satisfied by no created object. Secondly, in the liberty, which he hath vnto whatsoever particular good. Thirdly, in his naturall propension vnto eternitie, and immortalitie, the which euen *Plato* and *Porphirius* thought to be sufficient arguments of the soules immortalitie.

*Plato in
Alcib. & in
Phaedone.
Porph. l. i.
ad Boet.
vide Euseb.
lib. i. de
prepar. e-
uangelica.*

Yea the immortalitie of the soule is evidently proued, in that as *Moyſes* saith, God constituted man supreme Lord ouer all inferiour creatures, yea in that he breathed into him a reasonable soule with full liberty ouer all his naturall actions, according vnto that of the fourth of Genesis, the 7. verse, where God saith thus vnto *Cain*, that his desire shall be subiect vnto him, and hee shall rule ouer it, but more particularly this is demonstrated out of the third of Exodus; where God saith vnto *Moyses*, that he is the God of *Abraham*, the God of *Isaac*, and the God of *Iacob*, and
this

this not of the dead, but of the living, as our Saviour added in the gospel.

Finally, this may be deduced out of Deuteron: 4, where it is said, *that God made the Sunne, the Moone, the starres, and the planets for the service of man, as for a more perfect creature, and consequently participating a more perfect immortalitie, then is the incorruption of those eternall globes, and starres.*

CHAP. XXVI.

Whether the soule of Adam was immortal by its owne nature, or onely by grace.

S*ophronius, Ierome, and Damascene* are of opinion that the Angels and humane soules are not immortal of their owne nature, but only by Gods grace. To this also *S. Paul* in his first Epistle to *Timothie*, and his last chapter may seeme to incline, where hee saith, *that God onely hath immortalitie*. *Plato* plainly

Sophronius
in his 11.
ep. in the 6.
Synode.
Hierom. l. 2.
con. **P**e.
lag.
Damasc. l. 2.
de fide or-
thod. c. 3. &
12.

plainely insinuateth the same of Angells, much more then of humane spirits.

Math. 10.
ver. 28.

Neuerthelesse it is most certaine, that mans soule is immortall euen of its owne nature, for which reason our Sauiour commandeth vs Math: 10. *not to feare them that kill the body, but are not able to kill the soule.* Wherefore as the body is mortall, and corruptible, it followeth by the antithesis, that the soule is immortall, and incorruptible.

Againe this is most plaine out of diuers other places of scripture, *Psalme 29, & 16. Ecclesiasticus 12, and the 9. Matth. 10. 2. Sam. 23. & 32. Phil. 1. 23. 1. Pet. 3. & 19. Apoc. 9. 6. & 7. 9.*

CHAP. XXVII.

That Adam was not created in Paradise, and why not, and by what meanes was he placed there after his creation.

AS touching the first point, that he was not created in Paradise, it is manifest,

manifest, that though the woman was created in paradise, yet the man was not, for so it is said of him. Gen: 2. the 15. verse. *Then the Lord tooke the man, and put him in the garden of Eden, that he might dresse it, and keepe it,* therefore he was not there before, at his first creation, though *Eue* was; for so it was conuenient, that shee should be produced of *Adam* in his most perfect state, and being, according to both body, soule, and habitation, which is the opinion of *Basil, Aquinas,* and the most of the ancient Diuines against *Tertullian, Iosephus,* and *Rupertus.*

As touching the second point, that *God tooke man, and put him into the garden of Eden.* This may be vnderstood three wayes; first by inward inspiration, by which God might shew him, that it was his pleasure, that hee should haue that for his habitation, in which sense many vnderstand that of Math. 4. *that our Saviour was caried of the spirit into the wildernes, to wit, by the inward inspiration of the Holy Ghost,* though he went also voluntarily of himselfe.

Secondly,

*Basil. homil.
de paradyso.
Aquinas 1.
parte q. 102
ar. 4 & plu-
res in 2. sen-
tentiarum
distinct. 18.*

Secondly, we may vnderstand it, that he was caried by the spirit of God, or rather conueighed by the immediate power of the Almighty, as we read of *Henoch, Habacuck, and Philip.*

Or lastly, that he was transported by some Angell, in the shape and forme of man, who shewing him the way, did lead him into paradise, as wee read of the Angell *Raphael*, how he lead *Tobias*, and to this last I incline the rather, because it is the opinion of *S. Austine.*

But now it may be demanded, why God would not create man in paradise? the reason may be, to the end that hee might more manifestly vnderstand his goodnes, and liberality towards him, and that, that place was rather giuen vnto him of meere grace, then any wise due by nature.

But why then (may some say) were the Angels created in heauen, yea all other liuing creatures created each in their owne place? I answer, that neither the puritie of the empyreall heauen, did exceed the Angelicall puritie, neither the grosnesse of this inferiour globe

glob
ture
and
most
on of
tures
parac
deem
habit
confi
of G

M
him in
dresse
hath,
to vn
reth i
place,

globe of the earth, did exceed the nature of corporall creatures there liuing, and therefore these two places were most apt for the creation and habitation of Angels, and these inferiour creatures. But such was the perfection of paradise, that it was in no wise to be deemed a couenient place for humane habitation, mans nature (I meane) only considered, not the grace, and bounty of God thereby manifested.

CHAP. XXVIII.

To what end was Adam placed in Paradise.

Moyſes answereth, Gen: 2. ver: 15. *that the Lord tooke the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, that he might dresse it, and keepe it; or as the vulgar hath, that he might worke in it, to giue vs to vnderstand how much God abhorreth idlenesse, seeing that euen in that place, where there was no neede of labour,*

bour, God would not haue man idle: not an ill item for our lazie gallants, who thinke their gentilitie to consist in idlenes, and a point of honour to liue of other mens labour: but euen in this (I am of opinion) that God doth punish them, that they haue more griefes, and more discontent in their idle pleasures, then others in their most wearisome toiles, and labours, which though it be a most voluntary bondage, yet is it likewise the most base, and cruell flauerie to the base appetites; a tyranny of Satan, a double bondage to a double tyrant, to Satan, to sinne; for as *S. Paul* saith, who committeth sinne, is the slaue to sinne; so who subiecteth himselfe to the suggestions of Satan is a slaue to Satan; an intolerable flauery, and an infinite misery; the beginning miserable, the proceedings damnable, the end, as which hath no end, intolerable.

Now therefore lest *Adam* or his posteritie should by alluring idlenes, come to this endles paine; God of his mercy placed *Adam* in paradise, *ut operaretur*,

℥

& *custodiret illum*, that he might worke and keepe it, to wit, that hee working might keepe paradise, and paradise by the same worke might keepe him from idlenes, from sinne: because that is the ordinarie cause of sinne, for as it is true, that which the Poët saith, that labour blunteth the arrowes of Cupid, so doth it no lesse other darts of the deuill.

But hence peradventure some patron of idlenes may inferre, that labour was contrary to that blessed state of Paradise, as which required all quiet, rest, and content; no, rather I say that it was consequent, or necessarily pertaining to that blessed state, seeing that labour was not any toile, or paine, but rather a pleasure, and a voluntary effect of his well disposed minde, as it is now likewise to men not so ill affected, *quorum otium*, as *Seneca* saith, *maximum negotium*, so as *S. Austine* saith l. 8. de Gen: ad lit: cap. 8. *non esset laboris afflictio, sed voluntatis exhilaratio, cum ea, quæ Deus creauerat humani generis adiutorium, latius feraciusq; prouenirent*, that it should not be a toile or affliction of the body, but a

L

recre-

recreation, and reioycing of the will and minde.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether the precept of not eating of the tree of knowledge of good and euill, was giuen aswell to Eue, as to Adam, and how that was.

THe difficultie of this question proceedeth of the diuers readings of the precept, because some with *Greg. l. 35. moral. cap. 10.* do read it according to the Greeke in the plurall; the Hebrue, & Caldæan, with the vulgar Latin, and English are in the singular. *Gen. 21. 16. and the Lord God commanded the man, saying, thou shalt eat freely of euery tree of the garden, but of the tree of knowledge of good & euill, thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt dye the death.* Whereby wee see that this commandement was directed to the man only, not to the woman, seeing
thee

shee as yet was not created, as is apparent out of the 18 verse, the 21, 22, & 23, where the creation of *Eue* is described.

Neuerthelesse it is manifest that the same commandment was extended to *Eue* also, for so shee answered the serpent according to the vulgar edition, *de ligno quod est in medio paradysi, præcepit nobis deus ne comederemus*, but of the tree, which is in the midst of Paradise, God commanded vs, wee should not eat; wherfore though this precept was principally giuen to *Adam*, yet was it also to be obserued of *Eue*, for as they were conioyned in nature, so were they not to be separated in regard of their precept and grace.

But why then (may some say) was the name onely of *Adam* expressed? I answer with *Rupertus lib. 2. de Trinitate, & operibus eius c. 32.* because the precept was principally giuen vnto him, as vpon whose obedience or breach, his, and his posterities happinesse did solely depend, not vpon *Eues*.

CHAP. XXX.

Why God commanded Adam that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and euill.

T*ertullian*, in the beginning of his booke against the Iewes, saith, that this commandement was giuen to *Adam*, as the first principall foundation and ground from whence all other lawes were deriued, and in which all the ten Commandments be virtually included: so that as *Adam* was the first beginning of mankinde, so this was the first ground of all other lawes. But though this cannot be reiected, as an improbable speculation, yet certainly it is not so firmly grounded in the sacred text, as *Tertullian* imagined.

The reasons therefore in my opinion why God so strictly prohibited the eating of the aforesaid fruit, was, first, that thereby, as God had declared vnto vs, his power ouer vs: so wee should shew

shew our obedience towards him : not that (as *S. Austine* noteth) God hath neede of our seruice ; but that wee haue neede of his power, protection, rule, and dominion ouer vs ; according to that of the Psalmist, who speaking in the person of God, saith, *constitue super eos legislatorem, vt sciant gentes quoniam homines sunt*, *Constitute a ruler ouer them*, (as the vulgare translateth) *that the heathen may know that they are but men*: so that as it is a token of vassalage, and subiection to receiue lawes, so is it of power, dominion, and authority to command, constitute, ordaine, and set downe lawes to bee obserued. Yea secondly, God gaue this law vnto man, that thereby he might exercise his obedience towards God, a vertue as necessary to man, as acceptable in the sight of God, and therefore (as *S. Austine* well noteth) God gaue not this law in any object of it selfe otherwise euill, or of its owne nature good : to the end that the vertue of his obedience might be the more illustrious ; because it deriueth not his excellencie, from the ma-

*Augustin. l.
8. de Gen.
ad literam
cap. 11.*

*Aug. lib. 8.
de Gen ad
literam cap. 8.*

teriall object, but from the formall, the sole subiection to Almighty God.

It may seeme peradventure not improbable to some, that the law of nature, which God had infused into the nature of man, might haue sufficed to lay open, try, and manifest mans obedience towards God: to what end then should the second law of abstaining from the tree of the knowledge of good and euill be added, as a second tryall of that which otherwise might sufficiently bee manifest by the law of nature, and obedience therevnto? I answer, that the law of nature would not haue beene a sufficient tryall of *Adams* obedience: because it is not altogether manifest by the law of nature, that God is sole and supreme Lord ouer all mankinde: for some doe imagine that the law of nature is a proper tie onely due vnto a reasonable creature, as euery species, or kinde of liuing creatures hath their particular proper tie agreeing to their nature.

Againe some are of opinion, that those things which are contained in the law

law

law of nature, are to be imbraced, or reiected in as much as they agree, or disagree with naturall reason: not as they are commanded, or forbidden by God, as supernaturall agent. So that although it be prescribed by God vnto all men, yet doth it not sufficiently manifest his most ample & absolute power ouer all mankind: seeing that by this law there is not any thing commanded, or forbidden, but onely that which is according to humane reason, either good, or euill, of its owne nature.

Wherefore Gods absolute dominion, and extent of his diuine power, were not sufficiently knowne onely by this law of nature, but onely as it is agreeable to the instinct of nature: the which as it was but onely in things within the spheare of nature, could not possible shew the extent of the absolute power of God in things both within the compasse of nature, and aboue nature.

Hence *Gregorie* well noteth, that the forbidden fruit was not euill of its owne nature, but was forbidden, to the end, that

man being created upright by nature, might increase in righteousness by the subjection of his nature, and perfection of his obedience to the author of nature.

CHAP. XXXI.

Why God commanded Adam that he should not touch the tree of knowledge of good and euill, especially seeing he fore-knew his fall.

THe answer is easie, to wit, that by the tryall of his obedience, in this one commandment, hee might subiect the whole man vnto himselfe in all things, and that man by the breach, or keeping of the said commandement, might know by wofull experience (as he truely did in his wofull fall) the difference, betweene good and euill; so that whereas before hee knew it onely by contemplation, now he should find it by a lamentable experience: yea, in this,

this, his sinne was the greater, in that the object of his obedience was so facile, and the commandement so easie to be kept. For (as *S. Austine* saith) like as the obedience of *Abraham* is highly extolled, because the slaying of his sonne with his owne hands was of such difficultie; even so the disobedience of *Adam* in *Paradise* was the more hainous, by how much the precept which he had imposed was the more facile to haue beene fulfilled. Again, as the obedience of the second *Adam* was so much the more admirable, because hee was obedient even unto death; so the disobedience of the first *Adam* was the more detestable, by which he became disobedient even unto death: for where the punishment of the disobedience is great, and the thing commanded easie, who can expresse how great an euill it is, not to obey, and how great an iniurie to so great a power, especially threatning so great punishments?

Now as touching the second point, I answer, that therefore God as absolute in his will, science, and power, would create *Adam*, and giue him the aforesaid precept, which hee knew neuerthelesse hee

*Aug. li. 14.
de ciu. Dei,
cap. 15.*

hee would so presently violate ; to the end that his vnhappy fall might bee an occasion of our most happy Redeemer: for as the Schooles commonly hold, if *Adam* had not sinned, the Sonne of God had not beene incarnated : so that (as *Gregory* saith) in regard of this it was a happy fall, which deserued, or rather required to haue such a Redeemer : *O fælix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum habere meruit Redemptorem* : in which I know not whether I should more admire the goodnesse of God in the creation and restauration of man, or the ingratitude of man towards God, in and after both his creation, redemption, and infinite offences and falles ; but that as it is the nature of that infinite goodnesse to effectuate the greatest good, of the greatest euill, so is it no lesse consequent to mans naturall propension, and of himselfe, as it were an infinite of euill, of the greatest good to worke the greatest euill: a thing not easily beleeued, if our daily and wo- full experience did not so manifestly proue it : for as God by our greatest and originall euill, did worke our greatest
and

and originall good, and this onely out of his infinite goodnesse (the incarnation I meane of his eternall Sonne) so man out of his infinite malice, did by occasion of this so infinite a benefit, worke the most wicked outrage that could bee imagined, against his benefactor, by seeking his dishonour and death, who so abased himselfe, to giue him life : so that I know not whether I should more admire God shedding his blood for man, or man spilling the blood of God ; mans ingratitude towards God, or Gods infinite bountie towards man.

And hence it is, that as faith teacheth vs, this euill and sinne of *Adam* was foreseene and permitted of God, so is it no lesse a blasphemous heresie, to auerre, that this or any other sinne is wrought by God, wrought I meane by his particular command or concurrence ; not by his vniuersall, which is due vnto all entitie and being, yet in some sense neither due vnto this of sinne, as which in it selfe hath neither entitie nor being: but rather (if wee speake formally) is a priuation

priuation of all rectitude, goodnesse, and being.

CHAP. XXXII.

What death that was which God threatned to inflict upon Adam for his transgression.

AS it is certaine that the mortalitie of *Adam*, and consequently of all mankinde, did proceed of sinne ; so it hath no small difficultie to declare what instant death that was, which God so instantly threatned should follow mans sinne, for so saith the text, *Gen. 2. the 17. verse : In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die the death.* What day is this? what death is this? seeing that he neither first sinned the last day of his life, nor yet died the first day of his sinne: true it is, that as death was due at his last day, for his first sinne, so was it not inflicted in the first houre, for his first dayes sinne. Was this death peradventure

ture the priuation of grace, by which his soule supernaturally liued ? for as the body liueth by the soule, so *Adams* soule liued by grace, consequently as the body is said to die by the absence of the soule, so the soule spiritually by the priuation of grace : but yet though this be true, yet it cannot bee the sole meaning of the aforesaid words ; so that then no other death should haue beene due vnto man, but only the death of the soule, the separation from God, who as he had sinned both in body and soule, was iustly to be punished in body and soule ; which the effect afterward shewed, that God had before accordingly decreed : so that the sentence of his death, as it was executed both in body and soule, so it is to bee vnderstood to haue beene decreed as well in regard of the body, as of the soule ; because the corporall death is a necessary consequent of the spirituall ; now then the spirituall being inflicted in the very instant of mans sinne, how chanced it that the corporall also did not befall him in the day of his sinne ? especially
seeing

seeing that though God threatned not death in the instant of his sinne, for the instant of his sinne, yet at least God saith, *that man shall die in the day of his sinne.*

Is it peradventure threatned, and not truly decreed? or if really decreed, how is it not absolutely performed? God threatned his death in the day of his eating; *Adam* eateth, and yet liueth long after his eating. Could *Adam* change the decree of God, or could God decree that hee meant not to performe? Hee performed not, therefore he decreed not; if he decreed not, how then was it said, *In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die the death*; not of the soule only, for that was instantly, but of the body principally, seeing that is said to be *in tempore, in the day*, not *in instanti*, or momentarily. Was it a threat only, as wee reade of the *Ninivites*? but they changed their minde, they repented their sinne; therefore as the sentence was conditionall, the condition being changed, the sentence of God (though eternall) is said to be reuoked, not changed

ged in act, but immuted in obieſt, the act being immutable, the obieſt mutable, according to the decree of the immutable act. But here in this of *Adam*, the cauſe is altered ; God threatneth, the ſinne is committed, why then is not the ſentence preſently executed ? *In the day that thou eateſt thou ſhalt die the death.*

Iuſtinus the Martyr, in this more acute then Catholike, answereth, that euen the very ſame day that *Adam* was deprived of the ſpirituall life of his ſoule, he was no leſſe alſo of the other of his body : for though he died not the ſame day, according to the naturall reuolution of the heauen, yet ſeeing that a thouſand yeeres (as *Dauid* and *Peter* ſpeake) are but as one day in regard of Gods eternitie, *Adams* death being within the compaſſe of the thouſand yeeres, may well be ſaid according to Gods and the Scriptures phraſe, to haue died euen the ſame day that he was created.

But ſeeing true histories doe ſeldome admit any ſuch ſubtilities, I rather incline to the interpretation of *Ierome* and
S. Auſtine,

*Iuſtinus in
dialogo cum
Triphore.
Iren. lib. 5.
aduerſus
hereticos.*

S. Austine, who vnderstand that sentence of death, not of death then instantly inflicted, but of the necessitie of death then forthwith contracted. *Ierome* therefore commendeth *Symmacus*, who for that which our translation hath, *moriæris, thou shalt die*, translateth *mortalis eris, thou shalt become mortall* : so that whereas hee had beene created to an eternitie of life, now he is made subiect to the penaltie of death ; or as our interpretation seemeth to insinuate, euen to death it selfe, seeing that euen from thenceforth hee began to be mortall, who by grace before was altogether immortall. So that, as according to true Philosophie, wee may say, that the alteration of qualities, or the dispositions vnto generation, are in some sort generation ; so likewise by this phrase of Scripture, *that Adam should die in the day of his sinne*, we may well vnderstand that he began to die, *dispositiue*, by way of disposition, in the day of his sinne, seeing sinne was the immediate disposition or cause of his mortalitie and death, sinne (I say) being the cause of his

his mortalitie, his mortalitie consequently prepared forthwith the way vnto death. For so it is said in the second booke of the Kings; *We all die, and slide away as water*: for though at the present, while we live, we be not iointly dead, yet because wee slide away towards death, as the flouds towards the Ocean, wee are all said to die instantly, because our life, euen from the first instant thereof, is nothing else but a swift sliding towards death: yea our temporall life (as *Gregory* the great well noteth) compared to the eternall, is rather to be called a present death, then a continued life; seeing that our continuall corruption and declining towards death, may rather be tearmed a long or continuall death, then euen a very momentarie life.

M. CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the creation of the woman, and to what end she was created.

AS it is most certaine that the principal end of the creation of *Adam* was to serue, loue, honour and obey his Lord and maker ; so the same likewise was the womans principal end. Againe, as *Adams* secondary end was to bee the father of mankind, so was it also *Eues* to be the mother of all, and to bee a comfort and helpe vnto her husband, *Gen. 2. vers. 18. It is not good that man should be alone ; I will make him an helper meet for him :* good neither in regard of God, of man, nor of the world ; of God for his seruice, of man for his helpe, of the world for procreation : for though this was not absolutely necessary, neither in regard of God, man, or the world ; yet supposing the decree of God, that hee would be preserved by the beautifull disposition and order of
this

this world, it was not only most conuenient, but in some sort necessary, that he should *make man a helper*, and a helper *meet for him* : for though hee could otherwise haue disposed of things by immediate creation, yet was it more agreeable to the nature of things, and for the sweeter disposition of the course of nature, that mankinde should rather be multiplied by naturall course of generation, then by supernaturall power and immediate creation.

Hence peraduenture it may be inferred, that seeing God saith, *it is not good that the man should be himselfe alone*, that consequently it must be euill if hee bee alone; and therefore as by this sentence lawfull matrimonie is confirmed, so virginie by the contrary consequence is condemned: for whatsoever is opposite to that which is good, must necessarily bee condemned as bad, as which is nothing else but the priuation of good.

To this I answer, (as our Saviour did to the Sadduces, in their objection touching mariage) *Matth. the 22. 29. verse, Yee are deceiued, not knowing the Scrip-*

tures : for as Christ is not against *Moses*, neither the new Testament contrary to the old, neither the greater perfection to the lesse; so neither is virginie contrary to matrimonie; both are laudable, both in their degree excellent, but virginie more laudable, more excellent, most admirable, as by which wee rather imitate the angelicall state and perfection, then follow our owne depraved nature and corruption. This is the definition of *Paul*, not any humane inuention; for thus doth *Paul* determine this controuersie, the 1. to the *Corinthians*, ch. 7. vers. 25. *Now concerning virgins I haue no command of the Lord; but I giue mine aduice, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithfull.* Loe here, virginie is not commanded, but commended; not exacted by force, but commended through grace; neither counselled to all, because it cannot be performed of all; counselled therefore onely to some, and those but few, seeing few can attaine to this perfection.

My counsell therefore is that of Saint *Paul*, *Art thou bound vnto a wife? seeke*

not

1. Cor. c 7.
vers. 27.

not to be loosed, lest loosening the knot, which God hath knit, thou loose thy selfe. *Art thou loosed from a wife?* seeke not a wife: here *Paul* counselleth, hee commandeth not, neither is his counsell extended to all, seeing all cannot be capable of this counsell; not onely by nature, because this is not any gift of nature, but also euen by a lesser measure of grace: for though the Sunne of iustice doth shine ouer the iust and vniust, and send downe the dew of his grace vnto all, yet not with equalitie vnto all, but according vnto his good pleasure and will.

Wherefore as *S. Paul* prosecuteth, *If thou takest a wife, thou sinnest not; and if a Virgin marie, she sinneth not: verse 37.* He that standeth firme in his heart, that he hath not neede, but hath power ouer his owne will, and hath so decreed in his heart, that he will keepe his virgin, he doth well: so then hee that giueth her to mariage doth well, but he that giueth her not to mariage doth better: the wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liueth; but if her husband be dead, she is at libertie to marie

with whom she will, only in the Lord : but she is more blessed if she abide, in my iudgement ; and I thinke that I haue also the spirit of God.

Neither is this the minde onely of S. Paul, but euen of his master our Lord and Sauour : Matth. 10. Some there bee, which haue made themselues Eunuches for the kingdome of heauen : not that this is contrary to the first institution of matrimonie, but only a greater perfection, supposing a sufficient or superabundant multiplication of mankinde; so that (as Cyprian saith) the first decree of God was concerning generation, the second perswaded continencie ; when the world was as yet void and rude, wee multiplied by generation ; now that the world is filled, and fully replenished, those that can containe, *spadonum more viuentes, castrantur ad regnum*, by puritie of life doe dedicate themselues to the kingdome of heauen.

Now as touching the time and place of Eues creation, and first as concerning the time, it is euident out of the sacred text, that Adam was first created. Paul

in

in the first of *Timothie*, chap. 2. saith, that *Adam* was first created, and then *Eue*. Furthermore, it is evidently deduced out of *Moses*, when he saith, that after *Gen. 2.* *Adam* was created, all the living creatures were brought before him, among all which no helpe meet for him being found, the Lord God caused an heauie sleepe to fall vpon the man, and he slept, and he tooke one of his ribs, and closed vp the flesh in stead thereof, and the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man, made he a woman.

Hence it is euident, that there was some time betweene the creation of the man, and the womans production: but it is not so easie to determine, how much that was, though certaine it bee, that this time did not exceed the compassse of the first six dayes: for in the *seuenth* day God ended his worke which hee made, and the *seuenth* day he rested from all his worke which he had made. Wherefore the creation of *Eue* could not bee the *seuenth*, as *Catharinus* and others presume to auerre.

As concerning the place, where *Eue* was created, though *Iosephus*, and Ter-

Gen. 2. 18.
21. & 22.

tullian doe thinke, that shee was created out of Paradise: neuerthelesse the contrary seemeth more agreeable to the written word: for thete it is euident, that after *Adam* was brought into Paradise, all liuing creatures were set before him: where God seeing the necessitie of the womans creation, to wit, that *Adam* might haue an helpe meets for him, he framed her out of the side of *Adam*, for so saith the text, and the Lord God said, it is not good for man to be alone, I will make him an helpemeete for him. And the Lord God caused a deepe sleepe to fall upon *Adam*, and he slept; and he tooke one of his ribbs, and closed up the flesh in stead thereof. And the rib which the Lord God had taken from him, made he a woman. Wherefore it is not in any wise probable (as some haue coniectured) that after *Adam* had beene in Paradise, hee was caried out againe, and *Eue* then created.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What sleepe that was, which God caused to fall upon Adam for the creation of Eve, and whether it was a true sleepe or no.

THis difficultie doth principally arise out of the diuers translations of the fore-alleadged text. Gen: 2. 21, where it is said, that *the Lord caused an heavy sleepe to fall upon man, and he slept*, wherein place of the Hebrue word *Tardemah*, Aquila translateth *κατακοιμω*, and *Simachus καεν*, a profound sleepe.

But most of the Fathers following the translation of the seauenty two Interpreters, translate *an extasis*, or an excessse of minde.

My opinion is, that seeing the translation permitteth both, that it is to giue vs to vnderstand, how it was both a sleepe, and an extasis, or an extaticall sleepe, or a sleepe extasis: a sleepe, because the text in rigor doth signifie a sleepe,

Gen. 2. 23.

leepe: an extasis, or rapt, because hee had then his minde supernaturally illuminated, and filled with a propheticall spirit, insomuch that presently awaking, he said forthwith, *this now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: shee shall be called woman, because shee was taken out of man.*

CHAP. XXXV.

Why Eve was created out of the ribbe of Adam sleeping, and how that could be without any grieffe unto Adam, and finally why the woman was not created immediatly of the earth as well as man.

THe master of the sentences, and divers other schoole Divines say, that Eve was framed out of the side of Adam sleeping, for to signifie the mysticall production of the Church, out of the sacred side of the second Adam dying; but with this difference of productions, that the first sleepe was ioyfull

to

to the first *Adam*, because hee had not transgressed as yet; the second, most ignominious and painefull vnto the second, because he had taken vpon him the sinnes of the first. The first was deprived of paine, by particular dispensation of the author of nature; the second was full of ignominie, and paine, by a supernaturall, and gracious dispensation of God, as author both of nature, and grace: to the end that nature being now depraved by sinne, might be raised againe, and restored to her former estate by an omnipotent grace.

But how could this be, that *Adam* should haue a ribbe taken from him without any griefe?

For the vnderstanding of this wee must necessarily præsuppose that no griefe was agreeable to *Adams* estate before his fall. Now then I answer, that as God could, and *de facto*, did suspend, or withdraw his concourse, and action from the Babilonian fire, for the preservation of the three children, *Sidrach*, *Misack*, and *Abednego*: so likewise here, for to shew the like power, did God
with-

withdraw his concurse from all naturall passion, which naturally should haue followed the extracting of the ribbe.

Now to the last, why the woman was not created immediatly of the earth, as well as the man, but of the mans side and ribbe? I answer, it was, to the end, that *Adam* acknowledging her to bee a part of his substance, and shee also knowing that shee proceeded thence, it might be an occasion of a more perfect loue: for that otherwise, he considering how shee was the cause of his misery, it might be an occasion of a perpetuall, and implacable hatred betweene them: or principally this was to signifie the mylticall vnion betweene the second Adam Christ, and his Church; according to that of Paul, *this is a great myste-
rie, but I speake concerning Christ, and con-
cerning the Church*, because the diuine vnion betweene Christ, and his spouse, was signified by the vnion of *Adam*, and *Eue*: so that as *Eue* was framed out of the first *Adams* ribbe, so was the Church out of the side of the second.

Ephes. 3.

32.

CHAP. XXXVI.

*Why, and how Eve was made of the
ribbe of Adam.*

IT was not without the particular providence of the wisdom of God, that the woman was not made neither of the most principall, nor of the most base parts of man: not of the principall, lest shee should be too impudent; neither of the baser, lest shee should be too much debased; shee was therefore created of the ribbe, and of that ribbe, which was next to the heart; the one to signifie the mediocritie of her condition; the other to insinuate the esteeme, and respect, which both shee should haue towards *Adam*, and *Adam* towards her; as also to signifie the heart, loue, and fidelitie, which he should beare vnto her, who had her being from so neere his heart.

Now the difficultie is, how *Eve* being of so perfect stature, as she was created, could

could be created out of a ribbe of so little quantitie, seeing either shee was equall in stature with the man, or not farre inferiour in greatnes vnto him, was there any matter added vnto the ribbe? or was the same matter of the ribbe multiplied? surely it might be, as *Lombard*, and *Gabriel* said, by the multiplication of the same matter, or by rarefaction of the same ribbe; or rather, which I deeme more probable, by addition of new matter, as the Diuines hold it happened in the multiplication of the five barley loaves (of which wee read in the gospell).

Neither may it be inferred hence, that then it should rather haue beene said, that the woman was framed of other matter, then of the ribbe of *Adam*, because the more principall part beareth the name, not alwaies the greater; especially, when the principall part, is not only the principall, but also the first of the whole compound or worke.

Wherefore, seeing the ribbe of *Adam* was the first, and principall matter, of which the woman was created, and vn-
to

to the which the other was but an addition: it is therefore rightly, and absolutely said, that *Eue* was made of the ribbe of *Adam*, without the expressing of any other matter; because, though the new assumed matter was the greater in quantitie, yet lesse in perfection: so likewise in the multiplication of the five loaves, though that which was added was much more, then the precedent quantitie of bread; yet because it was but an addition vnto the former, therefore the name was deriued of the more principall part, according to the common axiome of the Philosophers, *denominatio sequitur principaliorem partem*, the name must follow the more principall part.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether the ribbe of which Eue was created, was requisite to the perfection of Adams body or no.

BOth the Philistians, and Philosophers doe agree in this, that euery man

could be created out of a ribbe of so little quantitie, seeing either shee was equall in stature with the man, or not farre inferiour in greatnes vnto him, was there any matter added vnto the ribbe? or was the same matter of the ribbe multiplied? surely it might be, as *Lombard*, and *Gabriel* said, by the multiplication of the same matter, or by rarefaction of the same ribbe; or rather, which I deeme more probable, by addition of new matter, as the Diuines hold it happened in the multiplication of the five barley loaves (of which wee read in the gospel).

Neither may it be inferred hence, that then it should rather haue beene said, that the woman was framed of other matter, then of the ribbe of *Adam*, because the more principall part beareth the name, not alwaies the greater; especially, when the principall part, is not only the principall, but also the first of the whole compound or worke.

Wherefore, seeing the ribbe of *Adam* was the first, and principall matter, of which the woman was created, and vn-

to

to the which the other was but an addition: it is therefore rightly, and absolutely said, that *Eue* was made of the ribbe of *Adam*, without the expressing of any other matter; because, though the new assumed matter was the greater in quantitie, yet lesse in perfection: so likewise in the multiplication of the five loaves, though that which was added was much more, then the precedent quantitie of bread; yet because it was but an addition vnto the former, therefore the name was deriued of the more principall part, according to the common axiome of the Philosophers, *denominatio sequitur principaliorem partem*, the name must follow the more principall part.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether the ribbe of which Eue was created, was requisite to the perfection of Adams body or no.

BOth the Physitians, and Philosophers doe agree in this, that euery
man

man according to his naturall constitution, and perfection hath 24 ribbes, twelue of each side; wherefore if our first father had thirteene on the least, it may bee thought that this was rather monstrous, then agreeable to nature, which neither admitteth want, nor superfluitie; either therefore this ribbe was super-abundant in him, and so he monstrous by super-abundance, or it is wanting in vs, and so we monstrous by defect.

I answer, that though it were monstrous in any of vs to haue 13 ribbes, yet was it in no wise in respect of *Adam*: it were in regard of vs, because none is to be created of vs; but in regard of him the defect were rather monstrous, because *Eue* was to be created of it; so that neither was *Adam* a monster, when he had that, which we haue not, neither yet deficient, when he wanted that of which *Eue* was created: because the name of *monster* is not so much in regard of superabundance or want, as in regard of the ends, and purposes intended by the author of nature, grounded in

in that, which is most connaturall.

Wherefore, though in regard of the particular nature of *Adam*, as hee was but one particular man, this ribbe was superfluous, and so consequently in an other person might be thought monstrous, yet in regard of him, of whom the rest of mankind was to proceed, it was most naturall.

Neither doe these two sorts of considerations imply contradiction: seeing that euen in nature we haue infinite examples of this: for so the heauiest drosse, and massiest matter, hath a naturall, and particular inclination to descend to the center, which neuerthelesse will ascend for the preservation of the course of nature: *ne detur vacuum*, when there is any danger of vacuitie of aire, or want of any other body, which naturally should fill all places; so that, as to descend is proper to heavy things, considering their particular inclination, and nature; so to ascend is no lesse agreeable vnto their nature considering their vniuersall propension for the preservation of the vniuersall good of nature.

N

In

In like manner if we consider *Adam*, as one particular man, not as first parent of our humane nature, it were monstrous, that hee should haue more ribbs on the leaft side, then on the right, or more then any of his posteritie haue: but if we consider him, as he was to be the first father of mankind, after that particular manner that God hath determined, it was most necessarie, and agreeable to his nature, that hee should haue more ribbs then any other of the same specificall nature, seeing, that our first mother *Eue* was to haue her being of this ribbe of his, and we all ours, by her.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

How mankind should haue beene multiplied if Adam had not sinned.

Gregory Nisene, Damascene, Chrysostome, Procopius Gazens, and diuers others were of opinion, that if *Adam* had not sinned, there should haue beene

no

no such naturall generation of mankinde, as is now, but rather an immediate multiplication, and production of men by the immediate power of God. So that as we shall be like vnto the Angels in the coelestiall Paradise through our vnion vnto Christ; so wee should not haue beene vnlike vnto them in the terrestriall by the immediate production of God: wherefore as sinne was the cause of our dissimilitude from the Angelicall life, so was it (according to these Fathers) the cause also of the dissimilitude of our production; the Angells being by creation immediately from God, wee not immediately, but by mediate generation: and hence it is that *Austine* saith, that consanguinities, and affinities proceed of sinne, not of nature.

The ground peraduenture of these Doctors may be the impure, and corrupt manner of our generation, and the deformitie of lust together with the immoderate pleasure thereof proceeding, the which our first fathers (as *S. Austine* saith) presently vpon their sinne expe-

rimented, and thence were ashamed and couered themselues.

Neuerthelesse, I cannot but deeme it most certaine, but that so long, as mans superiour powers were subiect to God, so long also should mans inferiour powers haue beene obedient to man; wherefore whiles there was no deformitie by sin in the will, neither should there haue beene any filthines or abomination in the actions of nature: But as our eyes, and other senses be as yet subiect to our will, so also, all other now rebelling inferiour powers, should haue beene subiect to their superiour: lastly, as all deformities and disorder should haue beene taken away; so all conformitie and order should haue beene left. The sensitiue appetite should haue been subiect to the reasonable, the reasonable to the spirit, the spirit to God. And as no disorder in nature could proceede from the author of nature; so no disorder in the acts of nature, could haue beene found in the course of nature; and this, though euen in the very estate of innocencie there had beene genera-
tion

tion of mankinde, as now it is: as now (I meane) in the substance of the act, not in the manner of raining, and raging lust.

And this certainly was Gods intent in the creating of our first fathers male, and female; because, if it had not been for generations sake, they might haue beene both created males: because all things at their first creation were created in their greatest perfection: if therefore the man bee more perfect then the woman, why should they not both haue been created male, if it had not beene for their multiplication, by the ordinarie course of generation, especially seeing God blessed them with these words, which signifie no lesse; *increase*, or (as the Hebrue hath) *fructifie, and multiply*, especially seeing (as the Philosopher saith) *generation is the most naturall action of life; yea then euery thing is in his perfect estate, when it is powerfull to bring forth another like to it selfe.*

*Aristotiles
l.b. 2. de a-
nima, & lib.
4. meteor.*

CHAP. XXXIX.

Whether there should haue beene more men, or women in the state of innocencie : or rather an equalitie of both sexes : and how there could haue beene any women, seeing they are said to proceed out of the defect of nature.

AS touching the first point, I thinke it most probable, that there should haue beene more men, then women, if so be that wee had persisted in the state of innocencie: my reason is, because nature then being in a full perfection, would for the most part haue produced the most perfect, which questionlesse is the male, for the most part I say, not alwaies, because the female also was necessary for the naturall propagation of mankind.

Againe it was necessarie for the most part, not altogether necessarie, but only most perfect, and therefore most agreeable to that most perfect estate.

As

As touching the second point of the multiplication of the female sexe, and how that could be connaturall and agreeable to that perfect estate of paradise, seeing it belongeth to the perfection of nature, to bring forth the most perfect, and consequently male not female, as which is rather a declining from perfection, and argueth some weaknes in nature, or imperfection in the Parents; yea as *Aristotle* saith is *præter intentionem agentis*, and therefore seemeth rather a monstrous act of generation, then a perfect issue, or patterne of the Parents, or nature.

And least this may seeme improbable, euen nature herselfe (as the Philosopher writeth) giueth sufficient tokens and signes of this, seeing that the female sex is begotten rather in tender and old age, then in the flourishing, and vigorous time of mans age: for as naturall heat hath not attained vnto his perfection in the one, so hath it lost his former vigour in the other. It is also ordinarily seene that the moistest, and most feeble bodies doe beget females, by

*Aristotelis
de genera-
tione ani-
malium lib.
4 cap. 2. &
6.*

reason of the want of naturall heate.

Furthermore the same philosopher saith, that the female kinde being of their owne nature feeble, and cold, are to be deemed as a defect, error, default, or declination of nature.

Neuerthelesse I answer briefly, (because this matter more belongeth to Philosophy then to Diuinitie) that the production of the female, doth not proceede only, or rather not alwaies of the defect of nature; but oftentimes also of the more remisse manner of concurse of the power of generation, as also of the imagination thereto inclining, and other like naturall defects: whence it is, that though the generation of the female be in vs a signe of lesse vigor of nature; yet was it not so in *Adam*, but rather it proceeded of the afore-said causes of the imaginative apprehension, or particular disposition of the author of nature, for the multiplication of mankinde.

CHAP.

CHAP. XL.

Of the prerogatives and excellent gifts with which Adam was endued in the state of innocencie, and first as touching his knowledge and naturall wisdom of naturall things.

IT is the common opinion of the Fathers, and other Diuines, that Adam had infused into his soule a most perfect knowledge of all naturall obiects, according to that of the Preacher, the 17. chapter, where thus hee describeth the creation of man, together with the prerogatives wherewith he was first endued, vers. 3. *He endued them with strength by themselves, and made them according to his image, and put the feare of man upon all flesh, and gaue them dominion ouer beasts and fowles. They receined the vse of the five operations of the Lord, and in the sixt place he imparted them vnderstanding, and in the seuenth speech an interpreter of the cogitations thereof. Counsell, and*

Ecclesiasticus cap. 17.
v. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
8. 9. 10. 11.

a tongue, and eyes, eares, and a heart gaue he them to vnderstand Withall hee filled them with the knowledge of vnderstanding, and shewed them good and euill. Hee set his eye vpon their hearts, that he might shew them the greatnesse of his workes. He gaue them to glory in his maruellous acts for euer, that they might declare his works with vnderstanding. Besides this, hee gaue them knowledge, and the law of life, for an heritage.

And hence it was that *Adam* perfectly vnderstanding the nature of other inferior creatures, gaue each of them their names according to their natures; for so saith the text, *Gen. 2. 19.* And out of the ground the Lord God formed euery beast of the field, and euery fowle of the aire, and brought them vnto *Adam*, to see what he would call them, and whatsoeuer *Adam* called euery liuing creature, that was the name thereof, and *Adam* gaue names to all cattle, and to the fowles of the aire, and to euery beast in the field. Now if *Adam* gaue to each liuing creature his name according to his nature, as questionlesse he did, it can be no lesse certaine, but

but that he had a perfect notice (if not comprehension) of their natures, according to which hee had giuen them their names.

But now the difficultie is, how this is to bee vnderstood, that God brought the beasts and fowles vnto man ; whether only by an intellectuall representation, bringing them or representing them as objects of his minde and cogitation, as *Caietan* holdeth; or corporally, truly, and really, in their owne nature, essence and being : and if thus, by what meanes ? whether by naturall instinct, guiding them to performe this will of the author of nature, or that God himselfe immediately by himselfe, or by the ministerie of his Angels did present them before *Adam* ?

Though I finde no constant resolution of this point, either in the Scripture, Fathers, or reason ; neuerthelesse that which seemeth to me most probable, is, that as euery liuing creature hath his naturall, peculiar, and proper instinct vnto diuers things, according vnto the diuersitie of their natures, varietie of dispositions

tions and qualities ; so likewise I thinke it most certaine, that they had in regard of this, a particular instinct by the extraordinary concourse of God : to the end that as they were all to acknowledge *Adam* for their Lord and master, hee might according to his absolute power and dominion over them, giue them their names as a token both of their subiection, and of his absolute power and dominion.

And this may also bee the reason, why God presenting all other creatures to the presence of man, he did not likewise bring him the fishes as well as the beasts of all species and kindes, because the beasts being domable, and easie to be tamed by man (at leastway whiles man was subiect to God) might serue for the vse of man, while man was not disobedient to God : or peradventure this was, because the fishes could not naturally liue out of the water, as man cannot in any wise persist without God.

Moreouer, as touching his knowledge and perfect comprehension of the natures of these inferiour creatures, I doubt

doubt
prom
of S.
7. ch
him
as w
him
wisd
gaue
that
was
ment
of the
of th
the ci
the st
and t
of wi
diner
roots
cret,
Fo
of S
regar
he w
only
all on

doubt not, but that I may bee bold to pronounce that of him, which was said of *Salomon* in the booke of wisdom, 7. chap. vers. 15. to wit, that hee granted him to speake as hee would, and to conceiue as was meet for the things that were giuen him : because it is hee that leadeth vnto wisdom, and directeth the wise. Hec gaue him certaine knowledge of the things that are, namely to know how the world was made, and the operation of the elements : the beginning, ending, and midst of the times : the alterations of the turning of the Sunne, and the change of seasons : the circuits of yeeres, and the positions of the starres : the natures of liuing creatures, and the furies of wilde beasts : the violence of windes, and the reasonings of men : the diuersities of plants, and the vertues of roots : and all such things, as are either secret, or manifest, them he knew.

For if this be indubitable in respect of *Salomon*, it seemeth much more in regard of *Adam* : wherefore doubtlesse he was the wisest of all men, our Sauour only excepted, the author of his and of all other wisdom.

Neither

Neither doth my position in any wise contradict that which is said vnto *Salomon* in the first booke of Kings, chap. 3. vers. 12. *Loe I haue giuen thee a wise and vnderstanding heart, so that there hath beene none like thee before thee, neither after thee shall arise the like vnto thee.* For though the proposition bee vniuersall, yet such like oftentimes are not to be vnderstood vniuersally, as *S. Hierome* well noteth, exemplifying in that of the Psalme, *Euery man is a lier: againe if hee who speaketh it, lieth, neither can it be true which he speaketh, that euery man is a lier:* wherefore if it bee a true saying, that *all men are liers*, wee must take this word *all*, not that absolutely and vniuersally all be liers, but that a great many are liers. So likewise although it bee said that *Salomon* exceeded all men in wisdom, yet this word *all* may be vnderstood not absolutely all, but with some exception. For so argueth the same Father in another place: *Scribit & alibi Apostolus; The Apostle writteth also in another place, how hee taught all men, and warned euery man, not that he taught* all,

*Hieron in
comment. in
cap. primum
ad Ephesios.*

*Hieron. in
comment. in
caput quin-
tum ad Ro-
manos.*

*all, for
which
ctrine*

*On
positi
all me
those
dome
can t
and i
ough
of Sal
pared
dome
uour
positi
not ce
onles
uour
also b
was
when
gifts
be tha
grace.*

all, for how many be there euen to this day, which neuer heard of the Apostolicall doctrine or name?

Or peradventure this vniuersall proposition, that *Salomon* was the wisest of all men, is to be vnderstood in respect of those, who had not their science, wisdom, and knowledge infused: for who can thinke (who thinketh so diuinely, and iudgeth so supernaturally as hee ought of our Sauiour) that the wisdom of *Salomon* was in any wise to bee compared euen with the accidentall wisdom infused into the soule of our Sauiour? Wherefore if that vniuersall proposition be not vniuersall in all, and doe not conclude in regard of all, as questionlesse it doth not in regard of our Sauiour, I doe not see why *Adam* may not also be exempted, especially seeing hee was to haue beene our head, from whence all naturall and supernaturall gifts should haue beene deriued, if so be that hee had persisted in his originall grace.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the knowledge which Adam had of the things aboue nature.

AS it is most certaine that our first fathers were created perfect according to nature; so is it no lesse in regard of grace, and all other supernaturall acts and habits thereto annexed: wherefore as hee was endued with the perfection of all naturall knowledge, so was he no lesse perfect in the supernaturall; not in so high a degree as the soule of our Sauour, nor yet as the least of the angelicall spirits, yet certainly more perfect then all other men, not only in regard of his faith, which was most perfect, but also in regard of other objects more clearly reuealed.

And first as touching faith, it cannot be denied, but that he had this supernaturall gift infused into his soule, because this, as *S. Paul* testifieth, *is the substance or argument of things hoped for, the evidence,*

Ad Heb.
c. ix. v. i.

*dence, ground, or confidence of things not
seene.*

Againe, seeing he was created not so much for the obtaining of any naturall thing, as for the enioying of supernaturall blessednesse ; it must needs follow, that as his nature and naturall end did necessarily inferre and bring with it the knowledge of the naturall meanes, by which it was to be obtained: so likewise the decree of God, by which hee was predestinated vnto a supernaturall object and end, did necessarily inferre and bring with it by a connaturall consequence, the notice of the supernaturall meanes necessary for the obtaining of that end, object, and felicitie, which was aboue nature. Insomuch that as the substance of the matter and forme of things either corruptible or incorruptible, is in regard of the accidents : so likewise is Faith a necessary argument, of things not appearing ; necessary (I say) in regard of the inference, not euident in regard of the conclusion, or that which is inferred. For, though the objects bee sufficiently patent, and most cleere in
O them-

themselves, and vnto those blessed spirits who haue the eyes of their vnderstanding already illuminated with the light of glory: yet is it obscure vnto vs, who as *Paul* speaketh, as yet see only in *speculo* & in *enigmate*, in a glasse, and by *species*, *obscure enigmaes*, and other imperfect representations of inferior creatures.

Hence the difficulty is, what things in particular were reuealed to *Adam*? I answere, that as the objects of this supernaturall science may bee reduced to foure kindes: so likewise the sciences, and knowledge, may be sayd to haue beene fourefold. The first, of his reward, for though the perfectest loue bee not mercenarie, and so base, that it doe principally respect the reward: yet neuerthelesse, the all-seeing and infinite good God doth neuer leaue the least loue of man without his reward. *It is necessary* (saith *Paul*) *that hee who doth come vnto God, should beleue, and especially beleue that he is a rewarder.* Wherefore as the first act of a regenerate person is faith, so the first object of this act is touching
our

our end : for (as the Philosopher saith) *quod est primum in intentione, est ultimum in executione*; that which is first in intention or speculation, is last in practise or execution: and contrariwise, that which is first in practise and execution, is last in intention and speculation. Wherefore as our supernaturall end and felicitie is the last thing which wee are to enjoy; so is it the first and principall which we ought to seeke and intend : and if this bee true in all our actions, it must needs bee much more in this of faith, which is (as *Paul* said) *the substance, ground, or confidence of things hoped for*, and of all our supernaturall actions.

By this it is manifest, that the measure of the knowledge of the meanes of this supernaturall felicitie, was according to the perfection of the apprehension and notice of this end, insomuch that as this end may be attained vnto by a threefold meane, so was man ordained thereunto by the same meanes, to wit, faith, hope, and loue : faith for the discoverie of the object of our felicitie; hope, for the effectuating of the meanes

of our happinesse ; loue, for the combining of both the meanes ; a triple cord, with a triple knot, which not euen the power of Satan shall be able euer to dissolve.

Againe, it seemeth most certaine, that he knew the fall of the damned spirits, because he might by the knowledge of this be much holpen in the obtaining of his end ; as thereby inferring the seueritie of the diuine iudgement towards the Angels, and his infinite mercy towards men, by the one he might be moued to feare the like seueritie, if himselfe should fall, and hope to replenish the places of the fallen Angels if he should stand.

The third obiekt reuealed vnto *Adam* was the mysterie of the blessed Trinitie, how God (I meane) was three in one, and one in three ; three in distinction of persons, one in the indiuisibilitie of nature, being, and essence, and all his other infinite attributes : the which though distinguished for our capacitie according to their objects, yet he well vnderstood them to bee one and the same in nature, realitie, and simplicitie of essence.

sence. My reason why I thinke the re-
velation of this object vnto *Adam* to be
certaine, is, seeing that the sight of it is
to be the perfection of our blessednesse
in the life to come, it must needs be also
a beginning of it here: wherefore as it is
there by a perfect sight face to face; so
it must be likewise here *in speculo & in
enigmate*, with imperfection and obscu-
ritie. Yea seeing *Adam* knew himselfe
to be made to the image of God, three
in one, and one in three, in his simple
essence, and his three spirituall powers:
so he must needs inferre the same of his
prototypon and Creator. Lastly, hee
had reuealed vnto him the incarnation
of the Sonne of God, not as passible for
his sinne (which certainly hee did not
foresee) but as to bee vnited to our na-
ture for the excellencie of the mysterie,
and because he was to bee the head of
mankinde.

CHAP. XLII.

Whether Adam was created in the grace of God, or no.

THough it be out of all controuersie, that *Adam* was before his fall in the state of grace ; yet many bee of opinion, that hee was not created so ; this was the opinion of *Alex. Hales, Scotus, Bonan, Marsilius*, and *Altisiodorensis*, who though they grant that he was created in originall iustice, yet distinguishing these two, they deny that hee was created in state of grace ; their reason is, because by grace there is contracted a spirituall kinde of wedlocke, league, and vnion, betweene God and our soules. Now then as matrimoniall vnion requireth the consent of both the parts ; so likewise here, and the rather, that *Adam* thereby might the better know himselfe, and the weaknesse of his owne nature, by an after infusion of grace.

Neuerthelesse it seemeth much more probable,

probab
grace fr
uer, th
for (as
first ma
would
haue b
withou
and wh
no sinn
vnto si
the sam
of the
natur
ate his
this, ac
Victori
August
ed by
cording
to wit,
militu
euer fo
nuated
the Co
where
to anot

probable, that though wee distinguish grace from originall iustice, or howsoever, that *Adam* was created in grace; for (as *S. Austine* saith) God created the first man in that estate, in which if hee would haue kept himselfe, hee should haue beene transposed at his due time, without any death, vnto a better estate, and where, as he could haue committed no sinne, so could hee haue had no will vnto sinne: so that it was with *Adam* as the same Father saith in another place of the Angels, God did *simul condere naturam, & largiri gratiam*, ioynedly create his nature, and giue him grace: yea this, according to the opinion of *Origen, Victorinus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostome, Augustine, Beda, and Rupertus*, is signified by these words, *let vs make man according to our image and likenesse*; image, to wit, in nature, and her proprieties, similitude, according to grace, and her euer following vertues; yea this is insinuated by *Paul* himselfe, in his epistle to the *Colossians*, 3. chap. 9. and 10. verses, where he saith, *that wee should not lie one to another, seeing that wee haue put off the*

old man with his works, & haue put on the new man, which is renewed with knowledge after the image that created him.

CHAP. XLIII.

Whether if Adam had not falne, all his posteritie should haue beene borne in the grace and fauour of God, and confirmed in the same.

H*Vgo de sancto Victore answereth. that though Adam had begot children in his innocencie, yet that his children should not haue beene borne inheritors of their fathers righteousnesse, because righteousness proceedeth not of flesh and bloud, but of the meere grace of God: so though they had not beene borne in sinne, yet neither should they haue beene endued with originall iustice.*

Neuerthelesse the common tenent of Diuines doth perswade the contrary: to wit, that as *Adam* by his sinne did transfuse into his posteritie the imputation

tion of sinne together with the crime it selfe : so likewise if hee had kept the same originall iustice, in which hee was created, he should also haue deriued the same vnto all his posteritie. And this in effect is the meaning of the Arauficane Counsell, where it defineth *Adamum peccando sanctitatem & iustitiam perdidisse, non sibi tantum, sed omnibus etiam posteris suis*, that Adam lost both his sanctitie, and righteousness, by his originall sin and transgression, not only in regard of himselfe, but also to all his posteritie.

Neither may it bee inferred hence, that then grace were no grace (as Paul speaketh) seeing that it should be cōnaturall in the aforesaid cause : for though in some sense it should haue been conaturall, that is, hauing her being together with nature ; yet seeing it was not of nature, neither due vnto nature, it cannot be denied, but that it was grace, as which was not consequent vnto nature, but aboue all nature. Wherefore as now in the law of grace, all that are regenerated by baptisme in Christ, doe in and by baptisme (according to the opinion

nion of many Diuines) receiue the grace of Christ: so likewise in the state of innocency all that should haue been borne of the loines of *Adam*, should in, and at the very instant of their naturall conception, and first moment of naturall life, haue receiued the first influence of their spirituall birth, and supernaturall life.

Now the difficultie is, whether if *Adam* had persisted in the state of innocencie, all we his posteritie should then haue beene confirmed in grace: inso-much, that as wee should haue beene borne in the grace, and fauour of God; so wee should neuer haue fallen from the same.

Anselmus
lib. 1. Cur
Deus homo.
cap. 38.
Gregorius
lib. 4. Mo-
raliū. c. 36.

Anselmus, and *Gregorie* the great answer, that if *Adam* had not sinned, then all his posteritie should haue beene confirmed in the grace, and fauour of God: for who (saith *Anselmus*) dare presume to affirme *plus valere iniustitiam?* that iniustice should haue beene of more force to binde vnto bondage: in mans first perswasion: then his iustice to confirme him in liberty if he had persisted

in

in his
huma
sinne
if he
N
stine,
not,
gene
thou
nall
they
dant
ther,
W
ated
py e
prob
seein
prou
whi
ther
ny
grac
that
infu
vnto

in his first temptation : for euen as all humane nature was ouercome by Adams sinne ; so by him all should haue ouercome, if he had not sinned.

Neuerthelesse I resolue with *S. Augustine*, that the posteritie of *Adam* should not, at least way in the instant of their generation, beene confirmed in grace, though *Adam* had persisted in his originall iustice : for how is it credible, that they should haue receiued more abundant grace, then their first head, and father, at his first creation.

Wherefore like as *Adam*, though created in grace, could fall from that happy estate of grace ; so it seemeth most probable, that his posteritie might also, seeing that wee read of no particular prouidence & grace promised to them, which was not profferd to their first father. For though *Adam* could (as many *Diuines* hold) haue increased in grace ; yet none but *Palagians* hold, that hee could merit vnto himselfe the infusion of the first grace, much lesse vnto others.

CHAP. XLIV.

Whether Adam before his sinne was mortall, or immortall.

SAINT *Austine* in his 7. booke *de Gen. ad lit. cap. 25.* answereth most excellently that the body of Adam before his sinne was both mortall, and immortall; mortall because he could die; immortall because hee could not haue died. For it is one thing not to be able to dye; another to be able not to dye: that belongeth only to the Angells, this is agreable euen vnto man; not by the constitution of his nature; but by the benefit of the tree of life; from which tree hee was banished, as soone as hee sinned, that hee might dye; who if he had not sinned, might not haue died. wherefore he was mortall by the nature of his corruptible body: but yet immortall by the benefit of his Creator, for if the body was mortall because it could dye, by the like reason it was immor-

immortall, because it could not haue died: for, that is not immortall onely, which cannot dye at all, vnlesse it be spirituall, which is promised to vs in our resurrection.

Now therefore the difficultie is, whether this gift of immortalitie due to the perfect state of Paradise, was due also and connaturall vnto man persisting there.

Many of the best learned of this age are of opinion, that this originall iustice, which did bring with it a power of immortalitie, and a perfect subiection of the flesh, and senses vnto the rule of reason, was a gift due euen vnto nature, granted vnto man, as not only agreable, but likewise belonging, and consequent vnto his naturall integritie, and perfection: insomuch, that mans nature being now depriued thereof, may iustly bee deemed in a manner maimed, imperfect, and monstrous, especially seeing it was to proceed of naturall causes, such as was the eating of the tree of life. Again euen naturall reason doth require, that the minde, and reason should rule and gouerne

gouverne the whole man, and consequently, that the flesh, and senses should be ruled by reason, and obey the superior power: wherefore as it is without all question, that the rebellion of the flesh against reason is contrary to mans nature; so originall iustice, which did restrain the rebellion, did questionlesse pertaine to the naturall state, integritie and perfection of man; yea, how were it otherwise agreeable to the diuine wisdom to make a creature partly immortal, and incorruptible; partly againe mortall and corruptible.

Neuerthelesse vnlesse the question be more *de nomine*, then *de re*, I deeme it most certaine, and out of all question, that, that gift of immortalitie was supernaturall, as which was in no wise due or consequent to nature, for neither this immortalitie could proceed of the qualities proportionate to the body, seeing these tend rather to corruption, then immortalitie, as which are each contrary to other, and after a sort consuming one another, and these tending to the disvniting of the body and soule: neither

ther
terno
ciple
it w
sort
ture,
ready
as tha
ioynt
be sai
tural
of in
altog
ly, an
to na
that i

Wh

I of
E
true,

ther could this immortalitie be *ab externo agente*, from some outward principle, and cause; for then, if it were so, it were rather to bee deemed in some sort opposite to the inclination of nature, the which of it selfe, as we haue already said, tendeth to corruption; yet, as that which is *congenitum*, or produced ioyntly with nature, may in some sort be said to be naturall, or rather connaturall, so I will not deny of this quality of immortalitie (though of it selfe it be altogether aboue nature) yet respectiue-ly, and in regard of the first infusion into nature, I will not (I say) deny, but that it may be deemed naturall.

CHAP. XLV.

What kinde of serpent that was, which tempted Eue.

Iosephus in his first booke of *Antiq. & chap. 1*, holdeth that, as it was a true, and naturall serpent, which temp-
red

ted our first fathers : so it was naturall vnto it to speake, vnderstand, yea, and to goe vpright like vnto man : and that vnderstanding mans felicitie, moued with enuie, hee sought his ouerthrow ; *maliciose persuadens mulieri, vt de arbore scientia gustaret*, maliciously perswading the woman, that shee should taste of the tree of knowledge.

Ephraim the Syrian (as *Barsalas* relateth in his booke of Paradise the 27. chap.) held that the serpent which spake with *Eue* was a true corporall serpent, and that Satan had obtained of God the facultie of speech to be giuen vnto the serpent for a time ; so that as in *Balaams* reprehension God gaue the vse of speach vnto the Asse, for his iust reprehension and punishment ; so likewise here, saith *Ephraim*, God gaue not only speach, but euen intellectuall power, and vnderstanding, vnto the serpent for a tryall of our first fathers obedience.

Cyrius in his third booke against *Iulian* the apostata, and *Eugubinus* in his *Cosmopæia*, are of opinion that this was not a true serpent, but that it was the deuill

deuill in the shape and likenes of a serpent, and therefore he was cursed vnder the name of a serpent.

Neuerthelesse this opinion seemeth not true, for if it had beene a deuill, then would he haue left the likenes of a serpent after the temptation: as when any Angell doth assume for any time a humane shape, presently after hee hath performed his purpose, hee putteth of that corporall shape: but this serpent, euen after the temptation remained in his former shape, for after that *Eue* had beene so seuerely reprehended for eating the forbidden fruit, presently she excused her selfe, and said, *the serpent deceiued me*, then the Lord God said vnto the serpent, *because thou hast done this, thou art cursed aboue all cattell, and aboue euery beast of the field, vpon thy belly shalt thou goe, and dust shalt thou eat, all the dayes of thy life.* So that the serpent retained his former shape, euen after *Eue* had eaten of the forbidden fruit, neither could this curse be fitly applied to a fained serpent.

Caietan in his Commentaries vpon
P Gen.

Gen. thinketh that here by this word serpent, is neither signified a true serpent, nor yet any thing that hath the resemblance of a serpent, but onely the deuill in his owne likenes, who by reason of his subtiltie, and vehement desire of mans destruction, is often in the scripture termed a serpent, and therefore he saith that this temptation was not externally, by proposing the forbidden fruit in outward speach, and perswasion, but by the inward suggestion, mouing, and inclining her appetite.

Neuerthelesse, as this opinion is most improbable, so is it contrary to the common opinion of the Fathers, interpreters of the Scriptures, and common sense of all Christians; who generally hold, that *Eue* was tempted of the deuill in a corporall, and true serpent, who allured her by externall perswasion, and present view of the forbidden fruite.

Furthermore the whole text in this place is peruerterd by this, and such like allegoricall expositions. Neither can there

there any sound reason bee alleadged, why this place may not be vnderstood historically, as the text soundeth, and is propounded vnto vs: or if not, why may not the same be said, and the like allegoricall exposition be onely admitted of Paradise, the trees of life, of good and euill, of the foure riuers, of the creation of *Adam*, and lastly of the framing of *Eue* out of *Adams* side.

○ The fift, and last opinion, and which I hold to be the most true, is, that it was a true and naturall serpent, by which the deuill tempted and ouercame *Eue*, speaking with her in the shape and substance of a serpent, not in his owne voice, as who hath none, neither by the hissing of a serpent, which was not sufficient for that purpose, but with humane voice, sounding as some thinke like vnto a woman, as most accomodate for to deceiue the woman; and this is the opinion of *Basil*, *Austine*, *Damascene*, *Chrysostome*, *Theodore*, *Beda*, and *Rupertus*. The deuill (saith *S. Austine*) spoke in the serpent, vsing him as his instrument, after that manner that

Damascen.
lib. 2 de fide
Orthodoxa
cap. 10.
Augustinus
de ciuit. Dei
lib. 14 cap.
21. & lib.
11. de Gen.
ad lit. c. 27.

the Deuill could moue, and be moued, to expresse the sound of the words, and corporall signes, by which the woman might vnderstand the will and intent of the tempter: though not so that the serpent could vnderstand the sound of the words, which were spoken vnto the woman: neither is it to be thought, that the soule of the serpent was transformed into a reasonable soule, seeing that neither those men, who are possessed do not know what they say, when the Deuill spcaketh in them. For although it be the opinion of the vnlearned, that the serpents heare and vnderstand the words of the enchaunters, insomuch, that they leape out of their holes, and caues by the force, and vertue of the enchantments, yet that also is by cooperation with the Deuill. Yea it seemeth to proceed by the particular providence and permission of God, that serpents are moued more by verses, and enchauntments, then any other liuing creature, which is no small signe and token of our first seduction by the serpent: yea euen the deuils reioyce, that

that as yet they haue this power permitted vnto them; by which they moue serpents by mens enchauntments: that after some sort they may deceiue, and ouercome man, who in some sort was occasion of their fall: the which is permitted vnto them, for a memorie of the first fact, by which the deuill seduced mankind, vsing the serpent as an instrument of their seduction; and vtter ouerthrow, vnlesse it had pleased God to haue redeemed vs by the blood of the Lambe.

CHAP. XLVI.

Whether that which Moyses saith, that the serpent was craftier then all beasts of the earth, is to be understood of the true serpent, or of the Deuill.

SAINT *Austine* answereth, that the serpent is said to be craftiest of all kinde of beasts, by reason of the craftinesse of the deuill, who vsed him as his instru-

*Augustin.
lib. 11. de
Gen. ad lit.
cap. 29.*

ment to deceiue mankind: like as the tongue is said to bee prudent, subtile, wise, cunning, or craftie, moued by a subtile, prudent, or crafty man.

Neuerthelesse, this seemeth not probable, that the serpent is called the craftiest of all beasts, by reason of the craftinesse of the deuill, for that either this was for the subtiltie, which the serpent had of himselfe; or for that which hee was to receiue of the deuill: not the first, because the craftinesse of the deuill was not inherent in him, neither could the deuill impart any such craftinesse vnto him, seeing the Serpent is not capable of any such craftinesse either rationally, or sensitiue remaining a serpent.

That therefore which seemeth more probable is, that the reason, why the Serpent is called the craftiest of all beasts, was not so much to signifie his naturall craftinesse, as to shew the order and conformitie of the diuine providence in taking so apt an instrument for the fulfilling of his permissiue will about the fall of *Adam*, for if we marke it, we shall finde, that such is the providence

dence of him *qui attingit à fine vsq; ad finem fortiter* (as the Wise-man saith) *disponens omnia suauiter*, that euen in workes most miraculous, and aboue nature, he vseth those instruments for the most part, which are most accomodate by their owne nature: for although we admit that Wolues, Foxes and Elephants be more subtile, wise and craftie in their kinde, yet neuerthelesse we shall finde no creature so naturally bent by a malicious craftinesse to hurt man, as the serpent is: this therefore was the reason why God curling the serpent, said, *Gen. 3. 15. verse: I will put enmitie betweene thee and the woman, and betweene thy seed and her seed: she shall breake thine head, and thou shalt bruise his heele.* Yea questionlesse this naturall instinct of the serpent is signified in that Prophecie of the Patriarch *Iacob*, of the tribe of *Dan*, *Ge. 39. ver. 17. Dan shall be a serpent by the way, an adder by the path, biting the horse heeles, so that the rider shall fall backward.*

CHAP. XLVII.

What was the reason why the woman was not afraid of the speech and communication with the serpent.

*Petr. Com
ester in hi-
storia l.
Gen. cap. 21.
Bonan. in 2.
l. senten.
dist. 21.
Dionysius
Carth. in
Gen. alle-
gans Bedam
authorem
huius opini-
onis.*

Bonaventure, Dionysius Carthusianus, Bede, and Peter Comestor doe answer (though not altogether approving the opinion) that the reason why our first mother was not afraid to approach and talke with the serpent, was, because the deuill had chosen such a serpent, as which (in face at leastway) represented a woman, yea and one most beautifull like vnto her selfe : for as ordinarily in all his temptations hee doth craftily accommodate himselfe vnto the nature, complexions, and dispositions of the persons tempted ; so here hee deemed it most fit for the accomplishing of his desire in the temptation and fall of the woman, to accommodate himselfe, as much as possibly hee could, to the feature and naturall disposition of the woman.

Yea

Yea *Basil* in his *Treatise of Paradise*, and *Ioseph* in his first booke of *Antiquities*, and first chapter, doe not much disagree ; for so saith the first, the serpent then was not horrible to man, but gentle and tame ; neither did he creepe vpon the superficies of the earth, but did goe vpright vpon his feet, insomuch that, as *Damascene* saith, hee was more familiar vnto man then any other creature, fawning often vpon him with pleasant circumuolutions of his body : and this was the reason why the deuill tooke him for his instrument in the fall of our first parents.

Neuerthelesse it seemeth most agreeable to reason, that which *Chrysostome* saith in his 16. homilie on *Genesis*, to wit, that therefore *Eue* did not feare to see and conuerse with the serpent, because before the fall of our first Fathers, all serpents and beasts were gentle, meeke, and subiect to mans command and gouernment, so that as they had no power to doe any harme to man, so neither did they appeare horrible in their aspect.

Hence

Hence ariseth a new difficultie, for which though wee haue no authoritie out of the Scripture, yet somewhat we may say out of naturall reason, and discourse, to wit, what kinde of serpent that was, that deceiued *Eue*; to which *Eugubinus* answereth, that it was the *Bafiliske*, who as he is the most venomous, and king as it were of Serpents, so therefore he may bee deemed to haue bene the most fit instrument of the Prince of darknesse, for the ouerthrow of our first fathers. But this seemeth not likely, seeing that this serpent is so deformed, pestiferous, and noisome euen in the very aspect. If therefore I may coniecture in a thing so doubtfull, it seemeth more probable, that because *Eue* was so delighted with the company of the serpent, that it was that most beautifull serpent *Scytile*, the which (as *Solinus* in his 39. chapter saith) is so glistering with varietie of spots vpon her backe, that it maketh men stay to behold her beautie, insomuch that whom she cannot ouertake by reason of her slow creeping, she taketh them as amazed at her wonderfull

full beautie ; not vnlike vnto the common and powerfull temptation of women, to whom nature hath denied the force of the body, yet hath permitted her to ouercome by her beautie, those who are most powerfull and vigorous in body : whereby wee may see that which God doth so ordinarily execute by most iust prouidence ; *in quo quisque m. me excellit, & excellentia præsūmit, præsumptione peccans, punitur maxime.*

CHAP. XLVIII.

Why the deuill tooke the shape of a serpent, rather then of any other creature, and why Moses made no mention of the deuill, seeing he was the chiefe author of the temptation.

SAint Austine in his 11. booke *super Gen. ad lit. cap. 3.* answereth, that wee are not to thinke that it was in the deuils choice, to chuse the instrument of the temptation, but that it was by Gods particular

particular permission and designement, that he made choice of the serpent. Yet in his 4. booke *de ciu. Dei*, 11. chap. hee answereth more probably, that the reason was, because this is *animal lubricum, & tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum*; because the serpent was a most deceitfull, cunning, and craftie creature: for though, as the master of the sentences saith, *l. 2 sent. dist. 21* the deuill would haue come in the shape of a doue, that by her innocencie and simplicitie hee might more easily couer his owne craftinesse and subtiltie; yet God would not permit this, to the end that his malice might be detected with more facilitie, and *Eues* sinne be lesse excusable. Neither againe was it conuenient, that this shape and type of puritie should be depraued by the impuritie of the deuill, seeing the holy Ghost was afterwards to appeare vnto the Apostles in the forme of a doue.

Now as touching the second point, why *Moses* made no mention of the deuill; I answer, that he relateth only that which was done, not interpreting the meaning

meaning of the fact, and therefore described that which did appeare outwardly to *Eue*. Like as in the 18. of *Gen.* the Scripture making mention of those three which *Abraham* did entertaine, he called them men, although they were not men, but Angels. As also in the 32. chapter, the Angell which wrestled with *Jacob* is called a man, because hee appeared in the likenesse of man. Yea *Paul* in the 11. chapter of the second Epistle to the *Corinthians*, imputeth this deceit of the deuill to the serpent, and not to the deuill: *But I feare* (saith hee) *lest as the serpent beguiled Eue through his subtiltie, so your mindes should be corrupt from the simplicitie that is in Christ.*

CHAP. XLIX.

Whether when God cursed the serpent, it is to be understood of the true serpent, or of the deuill.

Moses Barcephas, Ephren, with diuers other, thinke that this curse
is

is laid vpon the serpent, although hee did not commit any crime at all: his reason is, because this narration of *Moses* being historicall, it is to bee vnderstood simply, as the words doe sound.

Now if it bee demanded how this standeth with naturall reason, and the iustice of God, which is neuer contrary to reason, but is rather the rule of all reason, that the serpent being innocent, and not capable of reason, neither consequently of sinne, that hee should haue inflicted so great a punishment and curse, as is denounced against him, *Gen. 3. vers. 14.* where God said to the serpent, *because thou hast done this, thou art cursed aboue all cattell, and aboue euery beast of the field; vpon thy belly shalt thou goe, and shalt eat dust all the dayes of thy life*:

I answer with *Barcephas* and others aboue alledged, that God did this principally as a punishment, and in hatred of the principall agent, the old serpent the deuill; thereby to punish him not only in himselfe, but euen in his instrument,
by

by which hee had committed that hainous offence against his God: like as he who breaketh the instrument in hatred of the Musitian who plaied vpon it. So likewise in the 20. chapter of *Leuiticus*, God commanded that the beast shall be stoned to death, with which any man hath offended; thereby to signifie how great the offence is in the sight of God, who doth punish it, not onely in the principall actor thereof, but euen in his instrument; thereby to signifie vnto vs how hatefull sinne is, seeing often hee doth punish it in his vnreasonable and insensible creatures, who are not capable of the sinne it selfe.

Againe, he cursed the serpent for Satans sake, as he did the earth for *Adams* sinne: yea and that which is most dreadful, he drowned the world with an vniuersall deluge, not sparing the beasts, for their owners sinnes.

The like also we finde in Princes and other Potentates of this world, who take vengeance of the innocent for the nocents sake, of the sonnes for their fathers offences, of their subiects for their
Princes

Princes outrages. So the Poet, not as a Poet saith :

*Quicquid delirant Reges, plectuntur
Achivi.*

The *Chastillians* bloud in *France* spilt at the massacre, was long after required of the *Guisan* race. The *Thracians* did beat their wiues, because their forefathers had killed *Orpheus*. And *Agathocles* wasted the Iland *Corsyra*, because in ancient times it gaue entertainment to *Vlysses*.

But now the difficultie may be about these words aboue alleaged: *Vpon thy belly shalt thou goe, and shalt eat dust all the dayes of thy life*. For if it were a serpent before, euen the very name doth signifie, that it crept vpon its belly: if then it was the serpents nature, how was it a curse? or if a curse, how was it his naturall propertie?

I answer with *Ephren* and *Barcephas* in his booke of *Paradise*, that creeping rather proceeded of Gods curse, then of the serpents nature, who as we reade of other serpents, went vpon his feet, yea more vpright then any other serpent,

pent, but as *Lucifer* his principall mouer became by his sinne a most vgly deuill of a most beautifull Angell ; so the serpent, who was the instrument of *Lucifer* in this action, became a most filthy, venomous, and detestable creeping beast or worme, of a beautifull and vpright going creature.

Neuerthelesse, as I haue already before insinuated, the curse pronounced against the serpent, is principally to bee vnderstood against the principall author of the temptation, and mouer of the serpent, to wit, the deuill, according to the opinion of *S. Austine*, *Beda*, *Rupertus*, *Hugo de sancto Victore*, *Caietan*, and many others : so that the deuill (as hath beene touched already) is called a serpent, for his subtiltie and craft in deceiuing of mankinde. Againe, he is said to be cursed amongst all the beasts of the earth, because he is condemned to eternall punishment : and whatsoeuer is said to be obscene, filthy and abominable in any whatsoeuer beast, or other most filthy creature ; that spiritually is found in the deuill in a higher degree,

Q

and

and more detestable measure: *hee goeth likewise vpon his breast and belly*, because he tempteth principally in pride and lecherie: and therefore most fit to tempt, attempt, and ouercome the woman, as most inclinable to these kinde of vices: he especially (I say) tempteth *in pride*, signified by the breast; *in lust*, by the belly. Or finally, hee goeth vpon his breast, which is the seat of the irascible power, anger, and wrath; and vpon his belly, because this is the fountaine of all filthy lust and concupiscences.

Mosis Bar-
cephas su-
pra citatus.
Philoxinus
oratione de
arbore vite
Ephren co-
ment in
Gen.
Sabugensis
oratione de
passione Do-
mini.
Irenaus, Cy-
rius, &
Diodorus
Tharsensis.

CHAP. L.

*Whether Adam was cast out of Paradise
the same day that he was created.*

SOME thinke that *Adam* was created the first houre of the sixt artificiall day, without the compasse of Paradise, and was brought in thither at the third houre: afterwards about the sixt houre he eat of the forbidden fruit; and finally about

about the ninth being reprehended by God, he was cast out about Sunne setting. The reason of this opinion is taken from the words of the serpent vnto *Eue*: *Why did God command you, that you should not eat of euery tree of Paradise?* by which words wee may inferre that *Adam* and *Eue* had not eaten any thing till that time, and consequently that they were but newly brought into Paradise, yea that they were created but a little before.

Neuerthelesse I thinke it more probable, that our first parents persisted more then one day in Paradise, and that this was done by the particular prouidence of God, to the end that they might the better perceiue the miserie into which they fell by sinne, by the knowledge and experience which they had of their former felicitie in Paradise. And this is the opinion of *S. Basil*, *Damascene*, *Austine*, *Gregory*, *Abulensis*, and *Iosephus*. Yea it seemeth most probable, that our first parents were not one only day in Paradise, for otherwise the serpent would not haue asked them, *why*

Basil. homil. de Paradiſo Damascen. l. 2. de fide Orthodoxa, cap. 10. August. lib. 11. de gen. ad lit. cap. 21. & l. 20 de ciuitate Dei, cap. 26. Gregorius lib. 4. dial cap. 1. Iostatus Abulensis super 12. cap. 1. Gen. Ioseph lib. 1. antiquitat.

they did not eat of every tree of Paradise : for then it might easily be answered, because their necessitie did not require it as yet.

• Wherefore though many haue defined the time of their abode in Paradise to haue beene so many yeeres as our Sauiour liued in this mortall life, others fortie dayes, according to the time of our Sauiours fast ; yet if it be lawfull to coniecture in this matter so doubtfull and vncertaine, I would thinke that they were only eight dayes in Paradise, because this was sufficient for the experience of that happy estate : so that as our Sauiour was conceiued (as many thinke) on the Friday, and died on the same day ; so likewise (as some coniecture) was the fall of *Adam* the cause of his death the same day : so that *Adams* fall, his creation, and redemption, was by the particular prouidence of Almighty God, wrought (as some contemplate) vpon one and the same day. The which, though it be no conuincing reason, neither sufficiently grounded in the sacred text, yet can it not be denied but

but that it hath some congruities and conveniencies in reason, that the wound and the remedie should be in one and the same day appointed to be by God, who from eternitie foreseeeth the end, together with the meanes, and decreeth of the end together with the meanes, to the end that the common course of time, and remembrance of the day, might put vs in minde both of our miserable fall by *Adam*, and our more happy redemption by Christ: that so wee might continually bewaile our sinnes, proceeding from *Adams*, and giue humble and hearty thanks for the infinite mercies receiued by Christ.

CHAP. LI.

Of the Cherubin and sword which were put at the entrance of Paradise.

THe *Originists* doe vnderstand this allegorically, so that by this kinde of custodie is meant nothing else but

Q 3

the

the particular prouidence of God, by which our first parents were deprived of all hope of returning to Paradise.

Others thinke that by the Cherubin and fiery sword is mystically vnderstood a twofold impediment or means, by which we be now debarred from the celestiaall Paradise: the first inuisible, of the inuisible spirits and deuils, according to that of *Paul* to the *Ephesians*, the last chapter, verse 12. *For we wrestle not against flesh and bloud, but against principalities, against powers, and against the gouernours of this world, the Princes of darknesse, against spirituall wickednesses, which are in high places.*

The second impediment (as these Authors say) mystically signified by the fiery sword, is the perpetuall fight of flesh and bloud in our spirituall battell, as well in prosperitie as aduersitie, according to our Sauiours words, *Matth. 11. chap. 12. verse: The kingdome of heauen suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force: and that of Iob; Militia est vita hominis super terram.*

Or rather (as other doe interpret) we
may

may vnderstand by these lets of accesse to Paradise, three principall hinderances of accesse to the celestiall Paradise : by the Cherubin, which is interpreted the fulnesse of science, wisdom and knowledge, may be vnderstood too much curiositie of science, and spirituall pride oftentimes contained therein, much repugnant to the simplicitie and puritie of Christian faith. By the fiery sword may bee vnderstood (as some Authors doe allegorize) all enflaming lusts and vices proceeding from the sensitiue appetite ; the which as it is twofold, concupiscible and irascible, so is it signified by the fire and sword, or fiery sword : the which being voluble, or as it were wheeling about, and alwayes in a perpetuall motion, doth plainly expresse the perpetuall inconstancie, volubilitie, and motion of humane matters.

Aquinas and *Tertullian* thinke, that by the Cherubin and fierie sword, is vnderstood the place and situation of Paradise, vnder the æquinoctiall line, or *Torrida Zona*, the first Climate of the world.

Q 4

But

Aquinas
2.2æ quest.
165. ar. vlt.

But certainly, the heat of this place is naturall vnto it, and proceeding from the neerenesse of the Sunne (as the Mathematicians doe demonstrate) and therefore could not bee occasioned by the sinne of man, much lesse proceede thereof, as a naturall effect of sin, which in it selfe hath no reall being, but is rather the priuation of goodnesse, according to its formall essence and being.

*I vva. in
Genesim.*

Lyranus thinketh, that by the Cherubin and fiery sword, is vnderstood a mighty and flaming fire, issuing out of the mountaine of Paradise, defending and compassing it round about, in the manner of a wall.

*Ambrose in
Psalm. 118.*

Ambrose vpon the Psalme 118. thinketh the fore-sayd flaming sword to be the fire of Purgatory, by which the soules that depart out of the world not altogether purified, are cleansed before their entrance into Heauen.

But (to omit the controuersie of Purgatory) this cannot bee, seeing that the sword and Cherubin were placed at the entrance of Paradise (as is manifest in the Text) lest *Adam* should enter into Paradise,

Paradise, and participate of the tree of life; for so saith the Text, Gen. 3, ver. 24. *Thus he cast out man, and at the East side of the garden of Eden he set the Cherubins, and the blade of a sword shaken, to keepe the way of the tree of life.* That therefore which seemeth most probable in this poynt, is, that the words of the afore-sayd text are to be vnderstood literally, of a true Angelicall custody of Paradise and fiery swords; the first against the infernall spirits, the second for to terrifie man. The Diuels were repelled and kept from this place of Paradise, lest they should deceiue man by the tree of life, promising him thereby a perpetuity of life, such as he should haue enioyed, if he had not falne; man also was banished out of the same place, not onely by the iust iudgment of Almighty God executed vpon him for his disobedience, but also by a fatherly diuine prouidence and tender loue towards mankind, lest eating of the forbidden fruit, which was of immortality (a sufficient cause I meane to make him immortall) he should liue an immortall life in this vale

vale of misery, and so become miserably immortall, and immortally miserable.

CHAP. LII.

What was the cause, why Adam and his posteritie were banished out of Paradise? wherein two auncient errours are refuted as touching originall sinne.

T*Vrrrianus* in his Epistle to the Bishop of Towres alledgeth as an ancient opinion of diuers Doctors, that originall sinne was that, which the soule had cōmitted before it was infused into the body: which opinion seemeth first to haue beene taken from *Origenes*, who held that the soules of men being first created altogether in heauen, were cast downe thence, into this vale of misery, and ioyned vnto these materiall, and grosse substances of our bodies, in punishment of their sinne committed in heauen, before their vnion to their bodies.

But

But this is evidently convinced as false, out of many places of Scripture: for if originall sinne was contracted in heauen, how was it contracted by *Adam* in Paradise, and if we did all contract it by one, how did wee all contract it in our selues, by our selues, according to that of *Paul*, Rom. 5. chap. vers. 12. *By one man sinne entred into the world, and death by sinne, so death went ouer all men, forasmuch as all men haue sinned.* vers. 16. *Neither is the gift so, as that, which entred in by one, that sinned; for the fault came of one offence vnto condemnation, but the gift is of many offences to iustification.* vers. 18, & 19. *As by the offence of one the fault came on all men to condemnation; so by the iustifying of one, the benefit abounded toward all men, to the iustification of life.* Where wee may manifestly see contraposed, death, and life; iustice, and iniustice; condemnation, and iustification; these as proceeding from the obedience of Christ; those as flowing from the disobedience of *Adam*.

The second opinion in this point, is, that our originall sinne doth not consist
in

in any qualitie, or accident inherent in the substance of our bodies, or soules, or in any priuation of any excellencie, or good qualitie, which wee ought to haue retained in our soules, but euen in the substance of our corporall, and spirituall nature: the reason is, for whatsoever is not conformable to the law of God is sinne; but all our nature is corrupt, and auerse from the law of God, therefore the whole nature of man both body and soule being thus corrupt, and become abominable in the sight of God, is sinne.

But thus it would follow, as *S. Austin* well vrgeth against the *Manichees*, (who held some things to be euill, euen of their owne nature) it would follow (I say) that God were the author of sinne, seeing he is the author of nature. Therefore as *S. Austine* saith of the Angell, so I of man: *Diabolus natura est Angelus, sed quod natura est, Dei opus est: quod verò diabolus est, vitio suo est, utendo male naturæ suæ bono: opera verò eius mala, quæ vitia dicuntur, actus sunt, non res.* The Deuill by nature is an Angell,
and

and this is Gods worke: but that hee is a Deuill, commeth of his owne sinne, by the euill vse of his good nature: so that his euill workes which are called vices, are the actions of his nature, not nature it selfe or his Angelicall substance.

After the same manner, God of his infinite goodnes created man good in substance, in nature excellent, in his powers perfect, and in essence of all inferiour creatures the most eminent: but he by his will abusing Gods gifts, depraued his powers, and depriued his nature of these supernaturall gifts, which were made connaturall vnto his first creation: not that either his nature became formally sinne; or that his sinne was transformed in substance, and nature: least that he, who is the author of nature, should also be iudged the author of sinne: but that man freely subjecting himselfe, vnto the breach of Gods commandement, voluntarily depriued himselfe of those supernaturall graces, which according to the former decree of God, were due vnto his happy

py estate of innocencie. Inſomuch that all the goodnes, beauty, and graces, which before were connaturall vnto him, were beſtowed by God: and all the euill which was preternaturall vnto him, and accidentary vnto his nature, was deriued from himſelfe, according to that of the Prophet *Hosea* chap. 13. verſ. 9. *Thy perdition is of thy ſelfe, but in me is thy helpe.*

Hence it is moſt euident, that our nature depraued with ſinne, muſt needs be diſtinguiſhed from that ſinne, which depraueth nature, as the man infected with any maladie, or ſickneſſe, is diſtinguiſhed from the qualitie, or maladie infecting the man.

CHAP. LIII.

In which diuers other opinions of many Diuines touching the eſſence of originall ſinne are declared, and refuted.

Lombard. 2.
diſt. 33.

Lombard the maſter of the ſentences,
Driedo, Ariminenſis, Pariſienſis, and
Altiſi-

Altiſi
Diuine
of orig
quadra
qualit
ſoule,
the ca
ſeeme
booke
where
not re
or ſpir
of an
ing. a
morbi
ction,
rituall
Aga
chap.
plaine
ſome
tions p
or any
ſo all
may b
Philof
called

Altiſiodorensis, with diuers other ſchole
Diuines, are of opinion, that the eſſence
of originall ſinne conſiſteth in *morbida*
quadam qualitate, in a certaine infectious
qualitie, not of the body, but of the
ſoule, deriued from the corruption of
the carnall appetite; yea *S. Auſtine* may
ſeeme to allude vnto this in his firſt
booke *de nuptijs & concupiſcentijs* cap. 25
where he ſaith, that originall ſinne doth
not remaine ſubſtantiually in vs as a body
or ſpirit: but that it is a certaine affection
of an ill qualitie, as a diſeaſe or languish-
ing. and in his 13 chap. hee calleth it
morbidum affectum, a ſickly qualitie, affe-
ction, or diſpoſition, though more ſpi-
rituall, then corporall.

Againe in his ſixt booke againſt *Iulian*
chap. 7. hee explicateth himſelfe more
plainely, oppugning others in this wiſe,
ſome Philoſophers ſaid that it was the vi-
tious part of the minde, by which the minde
or any part of it becommeth vicious, that
ſo all being healed, the whole ſubſtance
may be conſerued; ſo as it ſeemeth, the
Philoſophers by a figuratiue kind of ſpeech
called that vicious part of the minde, *libi-*
dinem,

Greg. 2 diſt.
30. q. 12. art.
Gabr q. 2.
ar: 1. & 2.
Hen: quod
l. 2. q. 11.
Guliel. Pa-
riſ. tract. de
vitijs &
peccatis cap
2. & 4.
Altiſiod.
lib. 2. tract.
27. cap. 1.
& 2.
Driedo lib.
1. de gratia,
& libero
arbitrio. p. 3
conſider. 4.
Holcottus
q. de impu-
tabilitate
peccati ad
primis prin-
cipale.

dinem, lust in which the vice, which is called lust, is inherent after the manner that those who are contained in the house, are called the house.

*Ambrosius
in cap. 7. ad
Romanos.
Magister
sent. lib. 2.
distinct. 31.
cap. 8.*

S. Ambrose likewise, seemeth to bee of the same opinion, in the 7. chap. of the epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes, where propounding this question, how sinne doth dwell in the flesh, seeing it is not any substance, but the priuation of goodnes? he answereth, ecce primi hominis corpus corruptū est per peccatū, &c. Behold (saith this Father) the body of the first man was corrupted by sinne; and the corruption by reason of the offence, remaineth in the body, retaining the force of Gods sentence, denounced against Adam; by whose fellowship, and society the soule is spotted with sinne.

But certainly, if wee duely ponder the aforesaid places, we shall easily find, that neither Austine, nor any other of the Fathers is of this opinion; wherefore the meaning of S. Austine in the places aboue alleadged, is, that concupiscence is not any substance, or part of substance; but rather a qualitie, or affection,

ction
there
disea
from
it is t
now
(as th
da, a
on, o
Fir
sway
goue
actio
Se
origi
rents
conn
vnto
ction
help
grace
were
subie
direc
natu
T
repe

ction, or effect of an ill qualitie: and therefore it is most fitly compared to a disease, not because it is distinguished from the sensitiue appetite; but because it is the very appetite, and power it selfe now depraued, which is a qualitie, and (as the Diuines tearme it) *affectio morbi- da*, a sickly, corrupt, or infected affecti- on, or inclination.

First, because it doth preuent, or ouer- sway reason, which ought to bee the gouernesse, and rule ouer all humane actions.

Secondly, because it is deprived of originall iustice, which in our first Pa- rents, was a power aboue nature, yet connaturalized (if I may so tearme it) vnto their nature, as well for their dire- ction in matter of nature, as for their helpe; and furtherance in actions of grace: insomuch that while their wills were ruled by reason, they were alwaies subiect to their Creator: and likewise directed in all things belonging both to nature, and grace.

True it is (as S^r. *Austin* doth often repeat) that the soule is corrupted by

R

the

the flesh, as the liquour, by the corrupt and vncleane vessell : not because that there was any such quality, as the fore-mentioned, deriued into the soule by the sinne of *Adam* : but rather because the soule is infused into the body, which descended of the defiled seede of *Adam*, and therefore doth contract this sinne, by which it is truly said to be polluted.

And according to this interpretation, wee are also to vnderstand, that which the Master of the Sentences aboue alleadged, doth falsely cite out of *S^r. Ambrose*, being rather the words of the ordinary glosse vpon that of Rom. chap. 7. *But that sinne which dwelleth in me* : for the Author of the glosse addeth vnto the rest of *Ambrose* his word, *cuius consortio anima maculatur peccato* : by whose society the soule is defiled with sinne : which by no wise can bee vnderstood, by reason of any infectious quality deriued from the body, and thence transfused into the soule, but accordingly, as hath beene partly explicated already, and shall bee heereafter more declared.

And

And this may be further demonstrated, euen by reason, for first, either this *morbida qualitas*, this infectious quality was naturally produced in our appetite, and thence transfused into our wils, or supernaturall: the first is impossible, because sinne had no such naturall force or power in *Adam*, otherwise it should haue had the same effect likewise in all the posterity of *Adam*: which euen our aduersaries doe deny, seeing there is no reason, why it should bee so auerred of one more then of all.

Or peraduenture this quality was not produced by naturall means, but by supernaturall, not by any naturall power of man, but by the supernaturall of Almighty God, and as some hath aduentured to pronounce, *ex sola Dēi voluntate*, meerly by the will of him, to whom nothing is impossible, *cui non est impossibile omne verbum*, to whose will all doe obey.

But certainly if wee waigh this answer, either in the naturall principles of true philosophy, or supernaturall of grace, we shall finde the aforesayd posi-

tion and solution to bee most dissonant to both, seeing that both doe evidently demonstrate vnto vs the repugnance and contradiction of this ; that hee who is the fountaine of all goodnesse, or rather goodnesse it selfe, should bee the particular and naturall efficient, or morall cause of that which is *summum malum*, the greatest euill, nothing more distant then *summum bonum* and *summum malum*, nothing so vnlike in their being, so nothing so impropportionate in their causalities and effects. Wherefore, as it is impossible for goodnesse it selfe not to be good, so is it no lesse contradiction to the particular cause of euill, and consequently seeing that sinne is *summum malum*, the greatest euill possible, and seeing likewise of all sinnes, this in some sort is the greatest, as which is the originall and fountaine of all other actual sinnes, as it doth imply contradiction, that God should be the particular cause of other actual sinnes, so it doth *a fortiori* imply the same, that he should be in any wise of this originall ; yea, euen natural reason was a sufficient light of this
vnto

vnto the very Heathen Philosophers. So *Plato* in his second booke *De Republica* saith, *Omnibus modis pugnandum est, ne Deus qui bonus est, dicatur esse malorum causa, alioqui secum Deus pugnaret, qui suis legibus contrarium fieri mandauit.* Wee must by all meanes endeauour (saith this diuine Philosopher) lest God, who is altogether good, be said to be the cause of euill, otherwise God should bee contrary and repugnant vnto himselfe, seeing that hee hath commanded the contrary in his lawes: whose eyes (as *Abacuc* saith) are so dimme, that they cannot see euill, neither can they behold any iniquity. Not that really, hee doth not perfectly view, and comprehend with his all-knowing science, the secretest and most hidden, and abominable action, or most inward cogitation, and that from all eternity, euen before it bee conceiued or thought of by the sinner himselfe: but he is said not to see it, or not to know it, *scientia approbationis*, that is, he doth not approoue it, but reprocue it: not allow it, but condemne it: and in this sense that is to be vnderstood, which the Gospell saith, shall be

Abacuc. 1.

pronounced vnto the vnrepenting sinners, *nescio vos*, I know you not, not that our Sauiour either according to his humanity, much lesse in his diuinity, was, or is ignorant of any good or bad action, according to which hee is to reward in his iudgement: but that he did not see or know them so, as that hee did deeme them as worthy of the diuine knowledge and approbation, or of any reward, but onely of eternall fire, prepared for the Diuell and his Angels.

*Albertus,
Pighius, &
Catharinus
de originali
peccato.*

Albertus, Pighius, and Catharinus flying the inconueniences of the aforesayd opinions, fell into another extreame: to wit, that there was no other originall sinne in *Adams* posterity, then the sinne of *Adam*, by which he first of all, then all his discendence were reputed sinners; hee inwardly, they outwardly; and as the Schooles terme it, by an outward denomination, to wit, by *Adams* sinne inward to *Adam*, imputed onely to them, as though it had been really their own, and actually committed by them, whereas in very deede they had none proper, or inherent, but *Adams* onely by

by imputation, not by reall appropriation.

Which opinion may fitly bee declared by the example of a man, who being adopted by a King, as his sonne and heire apparant to the Crowne, should haue granted vnto him and to his posterity, all the priuiledges annexed vnto his adoption and principality : but yet with this condition, that if this Prince so adopted should commit any treason against his father, both he and his posterity should not onely lose the aforesayd titles and priuiledges, but also should be accounted traytours vnto the Crowne. In which cause, although the posterity of this man had not committed any fault in themselves; yet were they to be reputed morally as traytours, and to haue committed high treason in their head and pregenitor.

After the same manner (as the Doctors of this opinion auerre) was the compact made betweene God, and our first father *Adam*; so that if hee had not transgressed the commandement of his Creator, eating of the forbidden fruit,

he and his, should haue beene translated out of the terrene Paradise, vnto the kingdome of heauen. But this compact being broken by our first father, both he, and wee lost our right vnto the blessednesse, for which wee were created; he in himfelfe, and we in him: Not that as he had inherent in him the spot and blemish of originall sin, wee also should haue it: but only by an externe denomination (as the Diuines terme it) because we had really the effects thereof, & our first father, in whom we were all contained, had really both the cause & effect, the sin (I meane) of disobedience and the priuation of originall iustice, together with all other effects therupon ensuing.

This opinion is gathered out of *Paul*, *Rom. 5. In whom (to wit) in Adam all haue sinned*, as who would say, wee had not sinned originally, but onely in *Adam*: wee haue not therefore originally sinned in our selues, & consequently if wee haue not sinned in our selues, but only in *Adam*, our sin only is in *Adam*, as it is only by *Adam*, not in our selues, as it was not committed by our selues: in
so

so m
ours
thers
selue
sent
said
clude
are th
origi
who
we w
the
the f
sinne
actu
ther
tion
seem
not
proc
and
caul
ding
the
T
S. A
trio

so much, that it may only bee tearmed ours by imputation from our fore-fathers, not by reall inhesion in our selues, seeing we neuer gaue any consent by our owne willes vnto the foresaid disobedience, but as wee were included in *Adam*, as in our head ; wee are therefore said to be spotted with originall sinne, in as much only, as hee who was our head, and in whose loines we were contained, did really commit the said sinne, and consequently (as the foresaid Doctors inferre) originall sinne in vs, neither consisteth in any actuall or habituall transgression, neither in concupiscence, or in the priuation of originall iustice: not in the first, seeing that was not ours, but *Adams*; not in the habit, because this should proceed only from the precedent act ; and finally, neither in the two last, because these are rather effects, proceeding from our originall iustice, then the crime and sinne it selfe.

This may also seeme the opinion of *S. Austine* in his 3. booke *de libero arbitrio* cap. 20. where he saith that we are all
inquinati

*Vide Augustinum li. 1.
retract. cap.
15. & in e-
pistola 3. ad
Hilarium
que est 80.
& in En-
chiridion.
cap. 36.*

inquinati peccato primi parentis, defiled with the sinne of our first father, the which sinne could neither bee inherent in vs as actually proceeding from him, neither as habitually inherent in his soule, or priuatiuely adherent to his forme. It was therefore in vs by an externe denomination, inwardly affecting him, but outwardly onely denominating vs.

But if it bee so as *Austine* saith, that *wee were all originally defiled with the sinne of our first father*, if wee had also besides this some other inherent originall sinne, wee should haue two kindes of originall sinnes, the one by imputation, the other by inhesion; the one inherent in *Adam* only, the other in vs deriued from *Adam*, which is to speake without ground of Scripture, which onely maketh mention of one originall sinne, by which all bee truly called sinners, according to that of the Apostle, *Omnes peccauerunt in Adam*, all haue sinned in *Adam*, in *Adam* hee saith, not in themselues, and consequently none such did truly possesse them.

By

By this wee may see what colour of truth may be giuen to fallitie, yea euen vnto heresie, such as this seemeth to be; for if originall sinne bee nothing else in our posteritie, but the punishment and sinne of our first father *Adam*, for which all his posteritie is punished, certainly after the same manner, the sonnes also of any other of his posteritie, who as the Scripture witnesseth, are iustly punished for their fathers offences, might rightly be said to haue contracted so many originall sinnes, as bee sinnes punishable in them by reason of their fathers transgressions: which without all question were most absurd, and yet the consequence seemeth most eident.

For if originall sinne (according to this last opinion) bee nothing else but the sinne of our first father *Adam*, as it is punishable in vs; no question, but by the same reason, as many sinnes of our fore-fathers as are punishable in vs, euen vnto the third or fourth generation, may as well bee called originall sinnes in vs, though they bee not really inherent in our soules, or powers thereof,

of, but onely are said to be in vs by an externe denomination, or name proceeding from our parents.

Moreouer, if our sinne bee nothing else but the sinne of our first parent, as it is imputed vnto vs from him as our head; certainly as that is blotted in him by his repentance, so it should also bee blotted in vs by the same repentance: for if his sinne could be sufficient for the condemnation of all, why should not his repentance be sufficient for all? especially it being nothing in vs but an externe denomination, or bare name taken from his sinne, which now being washed away in him. should of necessity be likewise blotted in vs, *nulla siquidem forma, siue interna siue externa, potest denominare, nisi eo modo quo est*: for questionlesse no forme, being taken away, can denominate as when it was present. This forme therefore being an externe forme, which neuer had any vnion in our soules, or powers thereof, could neuer, euen when it was present, denominate our soules inwardly sinful, much lesse now, when it is altogether blotted

blotted out of the first subiect, wherein it was really inherent, but rather now it should giue no denomination at all, and consequently none of the sons of *Adam* should truly be said to bee borne in originall sinne, seeing that forme, from which they were said to bee borne in sinne, is quite abolished and blotted out euen in the first subiect, from whence it should proceed vnto all.

Finally, as *David* witnesseth, wee are all borne in iniquitie, and our mother conceiued vs in sinne; and *S. Paul*, *All haue sinned in Adam*: but this could not be true, if so be that wee were onely to bee tearmed originally sinners, in that our first father *Adam* sinned; for his sinne being blotted out, the denomination also proceeding from it, should be taken away, seeing that no forme can any longer denominate, then whiles it is present, and after the manner that it is so. Therefore as it could not really and intrinsically denominate the posteritie of *Adam*, sinners, euen when it was present, according to the foresaid doctrine; so now when it is altogether taken away
in

in his root and first origine, it cannot in any wise denominate vs sinners, which is evidently against the Scriptures, which repeat so often, that *all mankinde was conceived in sinne, and to have sinned in Adam*, hee onely excepted, who as goodnesse it selfe, in no wise could bee subiect to this so great euill; and as man, was hypostatically vnited with the second person of the blessed Trinitie, and predestinated to bee the generall redemption of the world, from this generall deluge of sinne, and therefore could not be defiled with any sinne.

CHAP. LIIII.

Whether originall sinne consisteth in any priuation, or no.

MAny seeing the inconueniences of the former opinions, not finding in what positieue act or habit they might constitute the essence of our originall iniustice, at length haue beene driuen

driuen to say, that it was not essentially and formally in any positive act or habit, but that it consisted rather in some priuation.

The reason of this may bee, because the essence of sinne according to his nature, common to all finnes, both actually, habituall, and originall, is (as the Fathers doe often insinuate) *non natura aliqua, sed negatio*; not any nature, but a negation of nature, and consequently the same must be here in originall sinne.

So *Dionysius 4. cap. de diuinis nominibus*, speaking of the euill and malice of sinne, saith, *neither this euill of sinne is the appetite it selfe, but the declination of the appetite from good to euill*, and more plainly afterward calleth it a priuation, *atque ut summam dicam, malum quemadmodum saepe diximus, infirmitas imbecillitasque, ac priuatio est aut scientiae, aut fidei, aut appetitus, aut actionis bonae*: Euill or sinne, as I haue often said, is a certaine infirmitie, and imbecillitie, and a priuation either of knowledge, or of faith, or of the appetite, or of the doing of that which is good. *Iustine* also in his booke

Basil. hom. 9

Atha. oratione contra
idola.

Naz. oratione 9. n. 39.

booke of the questions which were proposed by the Gentiles vnto the Christians, amongst other things, resolueth this difficultie, 46. q. & 73. that *euill or sinne is nothing else but the corruption of goodnesse*: so that it is not any positiue entitie or being, but rather a priuation of entitie or being; or as Basil describeth it, *priuatio boni, the priuation of good*: and Athanasius more plainly saith, that *it is an ethnicall and hereticall opinion, to say, that sinne or euill hath any entitie or essence, seeing it is rather the priuation of entitie or essence.*

And this is the reason why Nazianzene compareth sinne vnto darknesse, not only because darknesse and obscuritie in matters of saluation, and the mysteries of our faith, is the effect of sin; but also, or rather, because as darknesse is opposite vnto light, and is nothing else but the priuation of light; so sinne is nothing else but the priuation of goodnesse: wherefore in his 40. oration in *sanctum baptisma*, he concludeth, that which Nisenus, Damascenus, and Nizetas tooke from him, *nullam esse mali*

mali essentiam, that euill or sinne hath no essence; to wit, no reall or positieue essence or being, or as S^c. *Austin* describeth it, *natura nulla, sed boni amissio*, no positieue nature, but the losse of goodnesse, which position *Fulgentius* in his booke of faith, the 21. chap. deemeth so certaine, that it ought, saith he, to be holden as a matter of faith, because all things that haue reall being or nature, are good: his words be these: *Quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est, sed quia & in ea bonum & augeri, & minui potest, in tantum mala dicitur, in quantum bonum eius minuitur: malum enim nihil aliud est, nisi boni priuatio; unde geminum constat esse rationalis creatura & malum; unum quo voluntarie ipsa defecit à summo bono creatore suo; alterum quo in vita punietur: Euill (saith this Father) is nothing else but the priuation of good, and hence it is manifest, that the creatures endued with reason are subiect to two kinds of euils: one, by which they voluntarily fall from their cheefest good, the other, by which they are punished in this life.*

*Augustin:
l. ii. de civ.
Dei.*

S

Like-

Likewise S'. *Austin* in his first Treatise vpon S'. *Iohn* giueth this reason, why God being the Creator of all things, may not bee sayd to bee the author of sinne, to wit, because sinne in his owne being, hath no entitie or being, but rather is a priuation of entitie and being. *Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est, ut manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, & nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant: Sinne* (saith he) *was not made by God, because sin of it selfe is no thing, but nothing, and men become nothing becomming sinners.*

Now then if the essence of sinne in common, or of all sinne whatsoever be nothing, but that nothing which is the priuation of good, hence it must needs follow, that the essence of originall sin must also consist in some particular priuation of some particular good, the which wee are now particularly to search out.

In which poynt *Turrian* and *Corduba* are of opinion, that this priuation is *subiectionis & coniunctionis cum Deo, in qua nati fuissetus, si primus parens non peccasset:*

Turrianus
in epistola
ad Iacobum
Amatum
episcopum
Antifiodo-
rensem.
Corduba lib.
1. q. 10. opi-
nione 6.
quos etiam
sequuntur
plures recen-
tiores.

casset : of the subiection and coniunction with God; in which we should haue been borne, if our first father *Adam* had not falne.

This they prooue by impugning of the other opinions; for that as hath beene already prooued, it cannot consist in any positieue and reall thing, because God otherwise might in some sort haue beene sayd to concurre vnto it, and consequently after that maner to be the cause of it, which were blasphemous : neither can it consist in any other priuation of any other supernaturall gift, because all such priuations or deprivations, are rather effects consequent, as punishment due vnto the sinne it selfe; therefore as the heat cannot be sayd to bee the cause of the fire, from whence it doth proceede, nor the light cause of the Sunne : so neither the priuation of originall iustice, or of any other vertue or supernaturall gift, can be said to be the essence of originall sin: for certainly if wee vnderstand aright, wee shall finde that all such priuations are rather consequent vnto sinne, and so

the effects, then the sinne it selfe, yea, rather the punishments inflicted by Almighty God vpon man for his transgression, then the transgression it selfe.

And heereby also wee may easily demonstrate the absurdities of that common opinion of the Papists, that the essence of originall sinne in vs consisteth formally in the depriuation of originall iustice, which had beene due vnto vs all, if wee had not transgressed in our first father; which is the common opinion of the schooles and Papists, of *Aquinas*, *Caietan*, *Conradus*, *Scotus*, *Taperus*, *Sotus*, *Marsilius*, *Ocamus*, *Buderius*, *Alexander*, *Bona-venture*, *Richardus de Medianilla*, *Maior: Vasquez*, *Zuarez*, *Sumel*, and almost all other Papists of this age.

*Anselm: lib.
de conceptu
virginali
cap. 26.*

Yea *Anselmus* saith that hee cannot conceiue that originall sin is any other, then that which was committed by the inobedience of *Adam*, to wit, the depriuation of the iustice in infants, which was otherwise due vnto them.

*Arafricanū
councilum 2.
Can. 2.*

Finally the Arafrican Councell 2. Can. 2. *defineth it to be the death of the soule*, wherefore if death (as is plaine out

out of Philosophy) be nothing else but the priuation of the life of the soule: seeing nothing else can be vnderstood to be the life of the soule, but onely the inward grace of God, by which onely the soule did liue that supernaturall life, which is possessed in Paradise: consequently the priuation of this originall grace, or iustice, wherewith the soule was adorned, and liued in Paradise, must needs be the priuation of the same gift.

As if our naturall life, here in this vale of misery doth consist in the presence of our soule, or vnion thereof with the body, consequently our death must necessarily consist in the absence of the same soule, which gaue it life, or in the disvnion or separation of these two comparts, the soule, and the body: after the same manner, if the supernaturall life of our soule, consist in the presence of God dwelling in our soules by his grace, then certainly our spirituall death, whether it be considered here after our expulsion out of Paradise, or in the fall from that first happinesse,

must necessarily consist in the departing of God from our soules, or (which is all one) in the absence or deprivation of his grace.

Neither can this want of originall iustice be rightly deemed a punishment of our originall sinne (as hath beene before objected) because no defect or want worthy of an other punishment, can be inflicted as a punishment: wherefore seeing that this maketh our soules worthy to be deprived of eternall blisse, which is the greatest punishment imaginable, that could be inflicted for originall sinne; it can in no wise be the punishment due vnto the fault, but rather it must be the sinne it selfe, because as the schoole Diuines well note, the fault as it is a fault deserueth punishment, so that the worthinesse or debt of the punishment doth follow the fault, as a proper passion thereof; as intense heate followeth the fire, and light necessarily proceedeth from the Sunne.

*Aquin. 2. 2.
q. 21e*

CHAP.

CHAP. LV.

In which the last opinion of the precedent Chapter is refuted, and the truth set downe in what consisted the sinne of our first father, and ours contracted from him.

WE may easily perceiue by the opinions refuted in the precedent Chapters, how easie it is, euen for the greatest witts to erre in supernaturall matters, without the assistance of Gods supernaturall grace, and illumination, seeing that those who were accounted the very mirrours of wisdom in their time, haue beene so hoodwinked and blinded in the cause and first fountaine of their felicitie, insomuch that though they knew, that they were conceiued, as *David* saith, in iniquitie and sinne, yet they were not able to declare sufficiently in what consisted that iniquitie, and originall sinne, much lesse to demonstrate with any certaintie, that which

S. Austine almost in one word doth declare so evidently, *libro 9^o: de nuptys, & concupiscentijs cap. 23, & 26.* where hee exprelly holdeth that our originall sin consisteth in *concupiscence*, which though it remaine in the regenerate, yet is it not imputed to them, *in ijs ergo qui regenerantur in Christo, in those therefore who are regenerated in Christ, when they receive the remission of all their sinnes, it is necessarie that the guiltinesse of this as yet remaining concupiscence, be remitted; So that (as I haue already said) it be not imputed to sin. for as the guiltinesse of those sinnes, which cannot remaine, because they passe, when they are committed, remaineth neuerthelesse; which if it be not remitted, will remaine for euer: so the guiltinesse of the foresaid concupiscence, when it is remitted, is quite taken away.*

*Calvin. lib.
2. Instit. c. 1.
Melanctb.
in colloquio
Normannen.
& apologia
confessionis
Augustane.*

So that here we see auerred and proved, that which many learned late writers doe auouch as a matter of faith, evidently deducing it out of the 6, 7, & 8. chap. of the Apostle to the Romanes, and the 11 to the Hebrues, to wit, that our originall iniustice consisteth in concupiscence,

cupiscence, the which though it doth remaine in the regenerate, yet is it not imputed vnto them ; so that as diuers learned men doe declare themselues in this matter, *tegitur, non tollitur ; raditur, non eradicatur* : it is couered, not rooted out ; it remaineth, but is not imputed.

For prooffe of which, I will only ponder the example of *Paul*, who no doubt was regenerate, at least after he was called an Apostle ; and yet he could finde this sinne of concupiscence within himselfe, striuing against the spirit, yea hee did acknowledge it to be his originall sinne, the fountaine of all actuall sinnes, and therefore hee addeth, *Wee know that the law is spirituall, but I am carnall, sold vnder sinne* : for I allow not that which I doe ; for what I would, that doe I not ; but what I hate, that doe I : now then it is no more I that doth it, but sinne that dwelleth in mee. Now what sinne is this the Apostle speaketh of, but originall, or concupiscence, remaining as yet euen after his regeneration, drawing him vnto that which he would not, and therefore afterward in the same chapter,

Rom. 7.
verse 14. 15
16. 17. 18.
19. 20. &
sequentibus.

chapter, opposing it to the right inclination of the minde, hee calleth it *another law in his members, rebelling against the law of his minde, and leading him captive vnto the law of sinne, which was in his members*: and hence he concludeth, *O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver mee from the body of this death?* that is, from originall sinne, the which as it is the death of the soule, so likewise it causeth the death of the body.

CHAP. LVI.

In which the matter of the precedent chapter is more largely discussed.

THe first heretickes, who after the preaching of the Gospell denied originall sinne, were *Pelagius* and *Cælestius*, as *S. Austine* writeth *lib. de peccatorum meritis & remissione, cap. 1. 2. 3. 9. & 19.* whom *Iulian* the Pelagian followed in his fourth booke which hee wrote against originall sinne; yea this is attributed

buted vnto the Armenians, to *Faber Stapulensis*, and others.

The first argument of this heresie is that which *Julian* the Pelagian vsed against *S. Austine*; because it is essentiall to all sinnes, to be voluntary; but nothing can be voluntary vnto infants, before the vse of reason, seeing that as the Philosophers say, and proue, *nihil concupitum quin præcognitum*, nothing is willed, desired, or sought after, which is not first knowne; infants therefore who haue no vse of reason, can haue no abuse of will by consent vnto a foreknowne euill; and where there can be no sufficient foreknowledge or distinction of good from euill, there questionlesse can be no sinne.

Yea this seemeth to be confirmed by *S. Austine* himselte, *lib. 3. de libero arbitrio, cap. 13.* where hee confesserh that sinne is so voluntary an euill, that nothing can be sinne, which is not voluntary; and in another place he auoucheth, that neither any of the small number of the learned, nor of the multitude of the vnlearned, doe hold that a man can sinne without

without his consent. Wherefore Doctor Bishop against *M. Perkins* out of those words doubteth not to vpbraid the Church of *Englands* doctrine about this point, saying, *What vnlearned learned men are start up in our miserable age, that make no bones to denie this, and greater matters too?*

To this argument of *Iulian* peradventure some will say, that originall sinne is voluntary in the infants, not by their owne proper actuall will, as who can haue none such, but by the will of their first father *Adam*, which after a sort may be said to be the will of all his posteritie, seeing he was the head of them all, and therefore that by his voluntary transgression all *Adams* posteritie may bee said to haue sinned in him.

But this seemeth not to satisfie for originall sinne, if wee will consider well the nature of it: and as all the aduerse part doth hold, *verè auertit à Deo parvuli voluntatem, & eam convertit ad bonum mutabile*; it doth truly auert the will of the infants from God, vnto an apparant and mutable good, yea euen

to

to the deuill ; therefore the will of our parent, and his sinne, is in no wise to cause originall sinne in vs. Secondly (as true Philosophie teacheth) no cause can produce that which it hath not in it selfe, either virtually, or formally, neither doth any cause produce any thing, but after the manner that it containeth the ~~thing~~ which is to bee produced, either formally, if so bee that it hath the same forme, species, or kinde, which the effect hath ; or virtually, if it containe it in a more perfect degree and measure. But certainly, neither our first parent *Adam*, neither our immediate parents now regenerated in Christ, haue in any wise the guiltinesse of originall sinne at the time of our generation ; how can it therefore possibly come to passe, that any such guilt of originall sinne should proceed from them vnto vs ? Certainly this could not proceed from any matrimoniall act, seeing that was and is lawfull in all lawes, both of nature, *Moses*, and grace : how therefore could that which is a sinne, and consequently vnlawfull, proceed from that which is altogether

together lawfull? Thirdly, the actions of our externall powers, as of seeing, smelling, tasting, and the like, are in no wise voluntary, or so tearmed, but outwardly only, or (as the Philosophers tearme is) by an extrinsecall denomination, or name deriued from our will; and this, because they haue no freedom or libertie in themselves inwardly, but only as they are directed from the inward facultie of the will: and therefore as they haue no libertie or free will, but only by an externe denomination; so neither haue they any sinne inwardly inherent, but onely as they are commanded, or proceed from the will. Therefore after the same manner, seeing the soules and willes of the infants haue no libertie, or freedome of choice, but only by an externe denomination, outwardly deriued from the will of *Adam*, now altogether past, and of his sinne, now forgiuen; it must needs follow, that they cannot in any wise bee said to haue contracted any sin, but only by an externe denomination, proceeding from the sin of *Adam*.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, that which in it selfe is according to Gods law, neither in any wise contradicting the same, cannot be the cause of that which is against the law of God: wherefore seeing that matrimonie, or the matrimoniall act, is according to Gods law, it cannot bee the cause or occasion of originall sinne in the infant, which is against Gods law.

Fiftly, originall sinne cannot proceed from *Adam* vnto his posteritie, neither as from the morall cause thereof, neither as from a physicall, naturall, or reall cause: not morally, because as death did proceed from sinne; so life, if he had perseuered, should haue proceeded from grace, and originall iustice, which was a gift giuen vnto all our nature in *Adam*, not *per modum meriti*, by way of merit, (as some haue dreamed) but gratis: otherwise (as the Apostle argueth, *Romans* the 11. chapter) grace should haue been no grace. Now therefore consequently, neither doth originall sinne passe vnto vs his posteritie by way of demerit, or as a morall effect of sinne, seeing that the same reason which
doth

doth vrge for the transfusion of this demerit or sinne vnto vs, doth also vrge for the transfusion of grace. Wherefore seeing he could not be the meritorious cause of our grace, because it doth im-
 plie contradiction, to be deserued, and yet to be grace, a free gift, and graciously giuen ; neither can he be consequently the morall cause of our originall sinne. Neither finally can the sinne of *Adam* bee the reall or physicall cause of our sinne, seeing that his sinne, whereof ours should proceed, is now neither actuall, nor virtuall ; not actuall, because it is forgiven ; not virtuall, for that then it should be latent in the generative power or seed ; which cannot possibly bee, because then it should be attributed to God, who is cause of the generative power ; seeing (as the Philosophers say) *causa causæ est causa effectus illius secundæ causæ*, the cause of any second cause is the cause of the effect proceeding from the second cause.

Lastly, there cannot bee assigned any time or moment, in which the sonnes of *Adam* doe or can contract this origi-
 nall

nall sinne : therefore both according to true Diuinitie and Philosophie, it cannot be that we doe really and inwardly in our soules contract any such sinne, but rather wee are called *sinners in Adam*, and are said by the Apostle to haue sinned in *Adam*, by reason onely of his fall, who was our head. The antecedent seemeth certaine, because this sinne can neither infect our soules in the first instant of their creation or infusion, otherwise the soule should haue it from her creation, and consequently it might bee attributed to Almighty God, as to the author thereof, seeing that as true Philosophie teacheth, *operatio quæ simul incipit cum esse rei, est illi ab agente, à quo habet esse* ; the action which beginneth iointly with the being of the effect, is from that cause, from which it hath being.

And hence *Aquinas* holdeth as impossible, *Angelum in primo instante creationis sue peccasse, quoniam peccatum illud tribueretur Deo* : that *Lucifer* sinned in the first instant of his creation, because that sinne should haue beene attributed

*Aquinas 1
parte q. 63.
art. 15 in
corpore.*

T

to

to God, which were blasphemous.

Neither could this sinne bee contracted by vs in the instant, in which our soules were infused into our bodies, seeing that the immediate subiect of sinne is not the body, but the soule, or some of the powers of the soule: seeing therefore no instant can be assigned, in which the sonnes of *Adam* are infected with this originall crime, it followeth necessarily, both according to the grounds of reason, and Scripture, that there is no such infection or corruption inherent in our soules.

For the better vnderstanding of this fundamentall point, so controuerted in all ages, we must note, first, that originall sinne is called *peccatum natura*, the sinne of nature, according to that of *Paul, Ephesians 2. Wee were by nature the sonnes of wrath*: because sinne did spot, defile, or rather corrupt the whole masse of humane nature in our first father *Adam*, from whom, as first head and fountaine, it hath beene and is deriued.

Secondly, this sinne is called the
sinne

sinne of the world, *Iohn* chap. i. Behold the Lambe of God, which taketh away the sinne of the world; because all men were defiled with this, one onely excepted, God and man, by whom al others were redeemed.

Thirdly, it is also tearmed *peccatum humane conditionis*, the sinne common to all humane nature; because there is not any (Christ only excepted) which doth not vndergoe this yoke. So *Ierome* explicating that of the 50. Psalme, Behold I am conceived in iniquities, saith, not in the iniquities of my mother, but in the iniquities of humane nature, which are generall to all humane nature, or which hath defiled all mankinde.

Hieron. super cap. 4. Ezechiel.

Fourthly, the sinne of *Adam* is called *peccatum radicale*, the radicall sinne, or root of sinne; because wee being now depriued by it of originall iustice, which as it was in *Adam*, so should it also haue beene in vs, an antidote against all inordinate desires: but now our inordinate appetite and concupiscence (which is the root of all euill) is let loose, to the ouerthrow of all true libertie.

T 2

Lastly,

Lastly, wee must note this difference betweene the originall and the actuall sinne of euery particular man besides *Adam*, that the actuall sinne is committed by the actuall will and consent of euery sinner, but the originall commeth only by *Adams* sinne and transgression, and thereby is transfused and passed into vs. Wherefore God speaking not of the former, but of the latter, *Ezechiel* chap. 18. saith, *The soule that hath sinned shall die : the sonne shall not beare the iniquitie of the father, neither the father the sonnes iniquitie : the rightcousnesse of the righteous shall be vpon him, and the impietie of the wicked vpon him.*

On the contrary side, originall sinne being the sinne of nature, requireth only the free libertie of the first and principall head of nature, because his will is reputed as the vniuersall will of all : whence it is, that wee must not thinke, that when the childe is first conceived, and the soule first infused into the body, that then (I say) it may bee deemed to sinne, but rather that then it is conceived in sinne : so *David* saith, that

that *he was conceived in sinne*, not that he sinned in his conception. For though both insinuate a true sinne in vs, yet the one, that is, originall sinne, is thereby signified to be deriued from *Adam* vnto vs, yea also to be inherent in vs : the other, that is, actuall sinne, is from our selues, and of our selues ; whence it is, that the person of *Adam* was first infected with this originall contagion, and then his nature : but in vs contrariwise, first the nature is infected, then the person depraued.

These things presupposed, my first conclusion is, that it is a point of catholike faith, that all those who descend of the seede of *Adam* by ordinary meanes, are infected with this generall maladie of originall sinne. Wherefore God threatneth, *Gen. 13. that he whose flesh is not circumcised, shall be blotted out of the booke of God, because hee hath made frustrate his couenant* : out of which testimonie *S. Austine* thus argueth against the Pelagians ; The infants did not frustrate this couenant made with God by any actuall sinne, seeing they could not

T 3

commit

*Aug. lib. 3
de peccato
originali,
cap. 30. &
35. & li. 2
de nuptijs et
concupiscen-
tijs, cap. 17*

commit any actually ; therefore they contracted originally by originall sinne deriued from *Adam*.

The second testimonie, which pro- ueth this point, is out of the 51. Psalm, where *Dauid* saith, *Behold I am conceiued in iniquities, and my mother concciued mee in sinne*. Out of which place almost all the Greeke and Latine Fathers doe in- ferre the foresaid conclusion, especially *Origenes*, *Basil*, and *Chrysostome*, who in his 3. booke in *Leuiticum* cap. 12. no- teth, that *Dauid* doth not by these words accuse any sinne of his mothers, but that he calleth nature his mother, signifying there- by, that the filth and impuritie of *Adams* sinne hath descended vpon all his posteritie. Yea this is also the exposition of *Euti- mius*, *Hilarius*, *Ruffinus*, *Innocentius ter- tius*, *Beda*, *Gregory*, *Ambrose*, and *Hie- rome*, who also alleage for the same con- clusion *Eccles. cap. 4. a heauie yoke vpon the sonnes of Adam from the day of their birth vnto the day of their death* : which place *S. Austine* thus explicateth ; *Quid est graue iugum, nisi peccatum ? What is this heauie yoke, but sinne ? And why is it called*

called a yoake, but because it proceedeth from two, the male and the female, of the good, and of the bad; and because it is a yoake in both the sexes, therefore it is said to bee a heauie yoake vpon the children of Adam: therefore in that he said vpon the sonnes of Adam, he made no difference of ages, no distinction of sexes, and by the comparing of sinne vnto a yoake, hee made all men equall, Christ only excepted, who was not borne as others were of corruption and sinne.

Many of the Fathers, and principally *S. Austine* doth deduce this our conclusion out of the 3. of *John*, where our Sauour saith, that vnlesse a man be borne againe of water and of the holy Ghost, hee cannot enter into the kingdome of heauen: out of which place, though *Bellarmino* with most of the Doctors of the church of *Rome*, doe inferre an absolute necessitie of baptisme, by reason of the generall exception made by our Sauour, that vnlesse a man be borne of water he cannot be saued; yet neuerthelesse this is not so to bee vnderstood of the materiall water, but of the grace of God pur-

August. lib.
6 *contra*
Donatistas,
cap. 12. &
lib. 1 de pec-
catorum me-
ritis & re-
missione,
cap. 17. &
20. 29. 30.
& lib. 2.
cap. 27.

*Atterfol in
his 2 book
of the sa-
crament of
baptisme,
chap. 5.*

ging and cleansing vs as water doth, as a reuerend Author of this age doth wel expound: which interpretation may be gathered by conference of a like place, *Matth. 3. vers. 11. hee shall baptise with the holy Ghost, and with fire*, that is, by the spirit of God, which is as it were fire, lightning our hearts with the knowledge of God, enflaming them with his loue, and purging them from all euill affections. So when wee are said to bee borne againe by water and the spirit, he meaneth by the spirit shewing forth in vs the force, power, and propertie of water; as if he should say, we are borne of water, which is the spirit, as *Iohn 7. 38. 39. and 4. 21.* Again, if it were meant of water in baptisme, it must bee vnderstood according to a like sentence *Iohn 6. 53. Vlesse you eat the flesh of the sonne of man, and drinke his bloud, you shall not haue life in you*: which must bee vnderstood of such as are of yeeres, according to the exposition of *Innocentius 3.* and *Peter Lumbard* the master of the sentences.

*Decret. Gre-
gor. lib. 3.
tit. 42. cap. 3
Lumbardus
lib 4. sent.
distinct. 4.*

But to leaue the confirmation of this point

point
fant
retu
cton
con
wh
entr
pass
red
the
of
Circ
Ale
Orig
sis,
and
G
A
sanct
Adan
Psal
lam
Psal
tentia
cap. 3
N
anf
mer
ing

point as touching the saluation of infants vn baptised, *S. Chrysostome, Theodoretus, S. Austine*, with many other Doctors doe evidently deduce the foresaid conclusion out of the 5. to the Romans, where *Paul* saith, that *by one man sinne entred into the world, and by sinne death passed vnto all men, in which all haue sinned*. Yea this is plainly the opinion of the *Milevitan* and *Arausican* Councels; of *Iustine Martyr, Ireneus, Athanasius, Cirillus, Nazianzen, Chrysostome, Cirillus Alexandrinus, Theodoretus, Damascenus, Origenes, Cyprianus, Hilarius Pictaviensis, Ambrose, Ierome, Fulgentius, Bernard*, and many others.

Rom. 5.

Ireneus l. 5. cap. 17. & 19. Athan. de incarnatione verbi. B. f. super Psalmos 32. & 50. Concilium Milevitanu

& *Arausicanum. Iustinus Martir. Greg Nazian. oratione 42. in sanctum Pascha, & oratione 38 in Christi nativitate. Chrysostomus de Adamo & Eva. Cyrillus Alexandrinus lib. 1 in Gen. Theodoretus in Psalmum 50. Damascenus lib 2 f. iei Orthodoxe. Origenes super epistolam ad Romanos c. 6. Cyprian. epistola 59. Hilarius Pictaviensis ad Psalmum 18. Ambros. l. de Tobia c. 9. & ad Psal. 48. & l. 1. de penitentia c. 2. Hierom. ad cap. 42. Zech: Fulgentius de gratia Iesu Christi, cap. 31. Bernard feria 4. hebdomada pænosa de passione Domini.*

Now it remained, that I should haue answered to all and euery of the arguments of the contrary opinion, but seeing they may be easily answered with
one

one and the same distinction, I will only expresse that, and so conclude this question, which hath so troubled the Church of God in former ages.

The distinction is this, that wee must vnderstand the difference, and distinction of a twofold sinne: the first is actual, the second originall: the first from our selues, the second from *Adam*, though in our selues: the first we grant could neuer be in the afore-said infants, as which neuer came to the vse of reason, and consequently neither could euer abuse it: the second, which is originall sinne, might be and was in them, as is manifest by the authorities and reasons aboue alleadged both of Scripture, and Fathers: and by this distinction we may vnderstand all those authorities which seeme in any sort to fauour the Pelagians in this point; which therefore I conclude with S. Austine serm: 7. de verbis Apostoli circa finem: *Ecce infantes in suis utiq; operibus innocentes sunt, nihil secum, nisi quod de primo homine traxerunt habentes, quibus propterea est Christi gratia necessaria, ut in Christo uiuificentur,*

uiscentur, qui in Adamo mortui sunt, ut quia inquinati sunt generatione, purgentur regeneratione: behold (saith he) the infants be innocent in their owne workes, hauing no sinne, but that which they haue by descent from their first father, to whom notwithstanding the grace of Christ is therefore necessarie, that they may be receiued in Christ, who died in Adam, to the end that being defiled by generation, they might be purged by regeneration, in his blood, who died for all.

CHAP. LVII.

Wherein are solued diuers difficulties against the former doctrine.

MAny obiections are wont to bee made against the doctrine of the precedent Chapters, of which these following are the principall, yea all may be reduced vnto them.

First, that if the concupiscence, or *fo-
mes*

mes peccati, which is left after our baptism in vs, were sinne, it would follow, that God were the author of sinne, seeing he is the author of our nature, and therefore hee must needs be the author of that, which necessarily followeth nature; as who is the cause of the fire, is also of the heat proceeding from the fire: wherefore seeing that God was the author of nature, hee must also be the author of this *fomes peccati*, and concupiscence, which necessarily floweth from the same nature, if therefore our originall sinne consist in this concupiscence, which floweth from nature, he who is the author and cause of nature, must also be of the sinne, which floweth from nature, which both seeme no lesse blasphemous then absurd.

I answer, that this *fomes peccati* or concupiscence (with which *Adam* was created, and wee all borne) was first in him, and should also haue beene in vs, though we had persisted in originall iustice, yet had it not beene any sinne in any of vs, if *Adam* had not sinned, and we in him: because this was as it were
extin-

exting
iustice
in vs
and i
dam, fl
to vs b
But

for vs
of gra
the co
son o
guilt
nerate
puted

But
furthe
the au
hath t
that h
that is
mes pe
cence
also is
that th
no her
that it
of it, a

extinguished and overcome by original iustice in *Adam*, and should haue beene in vs also, by reason that the like grace and iustice which was infused into *Adam*, should also haue beene deriued vnto vs by *Adam*.

But seeing *Adam* lost this grace both for vs, and himselfe: both this priuation of grace is attributed vnto vs, as also the concupiscence reuiued in vs by reason of *Adams* sinn: true it is that the guilt thereof is taken away in the regenerate by baptisme, and so it is not imputed by reason of our regeneration.

But hence peraduenture it may bee further vrged, that though God be not the author of this concupiscence, as it hath the force, and malice of sinne, yet that he is the author of the same thing, that is originall sinne, to wit, of that *formes peccati*, fewell of sinne, concupiscence or inclination vnto sinne, which also is no small absurditie. I answer that this is no absurditie, but necessarie, no heresie, but catholique doctrine; so that it be not granted that he is author of it, as it is sinne, but of that materiall,
or

or thing which by mans wickednesse is made sinne, yea which is good as proceeding from God; though euill and wicked, as flowing from man, Gods concourse being altogether good, mans determination euill, as detorting it to euill; as the light of the Sunne of it self pure and good, is oftentimes vsed and abused to euill, yea of this we haue infinite examples, in which our aduersaries are driuen to auerre the like.

For who doubteth, but that Almighty God, (*qui operatur omnia in omnibus*, who worketh all reall actions in all things whatsoeuer) is also the vniuersall cause of euery reall action, and habit of sinne? and yet neuerthelesse no man will be so blinde, and blasphemous, therefore to attribute to his infinite goodnes, that which hath infinite malice in it, as it is against that infinite goodnes.

The reason therefore, why it is rather to be attributed vnto man, as second cause of it, then vnto God, who is the vniuersall cause of all, is, because man hauing the vniuersall concourse of God vnto good, determineth it, according

ing

ing to his euill inclination vnto naught, and so committeth that nothing which in it selfe is sin, and priuation of good.

Secondly, it may be objected against originall sinne, that if that priuation of originall iustice which ought to haue beene in vs, and of which we were depriued by *Adams* fall, were in any wise to be tearmed originall sinne, it would follow, that there were not one onely originall sinne in euery one of vs, but many: for seeing that there is not one onely culpable priuation of that originall iustice, which *Adam* had in Paradise, but also of faith, hope, charitie, and of all other graces, consequent vnto the fore-said originall iustice, why should there not be by the like reason as many originall finnes, as there bee priuations of supernaturall gifts, and graces?

The answer is easie, for that all these depriuations of graces are deriued of one, which is of our originall iustice, which should haue beene the roote, and fountaine of them all.

The third obiection may be, that seeing that it is not in the power of any to
attaine

attaine to the grace of God, being in originall sinne, consequently the formall of originall sinne cannot be any priuation of grace, but rather a negation. I answer, that because once it was in the power of *Adam*, supposing the covenant made by Almighty God with him, that the said supernaturall forme of originall iustice should haue beene by his perseuerance passed vnto his posteritie; hence it is that this absence of originall iustice in *Adam* and his posteritie, is rather a priuation, then negation.

Fourthly, it may be objected, that as in the opinion of *Scotus*, whensoever the act of sinne is past, the sinner may truly be called a sinner only by reason of the relation of the act past, which is not as yet forgiven; so it seemeth, that the same might be said in originall sin, that though the act of *Adam* be past, yet that this might be imputed vnto vs his posteritie, onely by reason of the relation which we might haue from his act, and this without any other priuation, negation, or concupiscence remaining in vs.

I answer,

I answer, that although this be the opinion of *Albertus* and *Catharinus*, yet that in no wise it may be admitted, for so we are not really, and internally sinners in *Adam*, but onely by an externe denomination of his sinne, which (as wee haue already showne) is most erroneous.

CHAP. LVIII.

Of the manner how originall sinne doth descend from Adam to his posteritie.

T Here hath beene three distinct heresies about this point: the first, which making no difference betweene the soules of men, and other liuing creatures, held, that as the soules of all other creatures compounded of matter and forme are produced with dependencie of their subiect, and materiall substance: so likewise, the soules of men. And that therefore they were infected and polluted by the coniunction with the body.

The second opinion, no lesse absurd in Philosophy, then erroneous in Diuinitie, is that one soule doth concurre vnto the generation of another, as the whole man, wholly to the production of another.

The third, and worst opinion of all doth attribute the production of originall sinne in our soules vnto the absolute power of God, sporting thereby his infinite goodnesse by the too much extending of his omnipotence, euen vnto that, which rather argueth impotencie, then omnipotencie.

Now therefore the true cause of originall sinne in vs (as the Scripture often witnesseth) was our first father *Adam*, by reason of his transgression of the commandement of God, but this not by reall influx and concourse, but by morall: first because hee could not of himselfe, and by his owne nature passe vnto his posteritie any such effect, especially, seeing that, that sinne now is altogether past; yea, at least way according to the guiltinesse thereof, it is washed away by the blood of Christ, but according

According to the decree of Almighty God, he was the morall cause, in so much as the infusion of originall iustice into vs depended vpon his will, by not sinning, according to the compact made betweene him and God: hee therefore eating of the forbidden fruit, there followed necessarily priuation of originall iustice in our soules, and consequently originall sinne in it selfe.

CHAP. LIX.

Whether it was necessary that there should be made a couenant betweene God and man, that so originall sinne might descend to the posteritie of Adam.

C*Atharinus* aboue alleadged thinketh it altogether necessary, that there should bee such a pact betweene God and man, *vt in posteros peccatum deriuari possit*, that so *Adams* sinne might be deriued vnto his posteritie, and that the said pact was included in these

words, *in quacunq; hora comederis, morte morieris*, in what houre soeuer thou shalt eat, thou shalt die. *Gen. 2. & 3.*

Sotus, on the contrary side in his first booke *de natura & gratia cap. 10.* thinketh it friuolous to admit any such pact: which opinion many more moderne writers doe the rather follow, because the law of nature did oblige man to the preserving of iustice.

But certainly, no man can deny, but that originall grace and iustice should haue beene transfused to *Adams* posteritie, if hee who was our head, and had receiued it for vs all, had perseuered, and this by the sole will and ordinance of God; for certainly, this was not required by the nature of originall iustice, and consequently it onely required the decree of God about this matter, which might haue beene otherwise.

But that there was the said pact betweene God and Adam himselfe for himselfe, it seemeth euident, out of the aforesaid text of *Gen.* as *Athanasius* well noteth.

CHAP. LX.

*How the soule is said to be infected
by the flesh.*

I Answer, that this infection is not because the soule receiueth any reall influx from the body, for without question the body can in no wise as an efficient cause maculate or spot the soule, but this is because as soone as euer the soule is created, and in the very same instant that shee is infused into the body, shee wanteth that gift of originall iustice, which shee ought to haue had, and therefore concupiscence is imputed vnto her, as sinne, which should haue been healed, or not imputed by originall iustice, if *Adam* had not lost it for vs all; and this is the meaning of venerable *Bedc* tomo 8. in lib. *questionum* 4. 14, a little before the end, where he saith, *animā ex unione cum carne peccato maculatā esse*, that our soules are maculated by the union with the body.

CHAP. LXI.

Whether there should haue beene any originall sinne in vs, if either Adam, or Eue onely had eaten of the forbidden tree.

THe reason of this doubt, is because (as the preacher saith) *a muliere initium peccati*, sinne had his beginning from the woman, and through her all doe die, it seemeth therefore that though shee onely had sinned, the same sinne should haue beene imputed vnto vs all, yea all should haue contracted that sin in her and by hers.

Secondly, *S. Hierome & S. Ambrose* explicating these words ad Rom: 5. *per unum hominem &c.* through one man sinne entred into the world, in whom all haue sinned, doe vnderstand that one to be *Eue*, if therefore shee was the first cause of this sinne, it seemeth that though shee onely had sinned, neuerthelesse sinne should haue beene deriued

riued vnto her posteritie, though *Adam* had not sinned, seeing that these words, *in whom all haue sinned*, according to the interpretation of *S. Hierome*, and *S. Ambrose*, are to be applied vnto the woman, as who was the first cause of mans woe.

Although I can gather nothing altogether certaine about this point, either out of the holy Scriptures or Fathers, yet neuerthelesse it seemeth more probable, that the whole cause of originall sinne in vs ought to bee reduced vnto *Adam*, so that by *Adams* consent onely, and not by *Eues* we were to be borne in originall iniustice.

The reason is, for that all the Fathers (*S. Hierome*, and *S. Ambrose* only excepted) who doe interpret the aforesaid place, doe vnderstand it of *Adam*, and not of *Eue*; yea it seemeth that this may be gathered out of the words of *S. Paul* 1. Corinth. 15. *As in Adam all do die, so all shall be reuiued in Christ*, wherefore venerable *Bede* is plainely of this opinion in the 14 of his questions tomo 8, where he saith, *originale peccatum tra-*

here originem ex Adamo non ex diabolo, quia ex diabolo non propagamur, non ab Eva, quia vir, id est Adam, non est a muliere, sed mulier a viro; ex quo sequitur, Adamo non peccante, etiamsi Eva peccasset, non futurum in nobis peccatum. That originall sinne hath his beginning from Adam onely, not from the Deuill, because wee are not begot by the Deuill, neither of Eue, because the man, to wit, Adam is not of the woman, but the woman of the man; wherevpon it followeth, that though Eue had sinned, if Adam had not, we should not haue been borne in sinne.

Aquinas giueth another reason, quia mulier passive se habet ad generationem prolis, because the woman doth onely concurre passiuely vnto generation, but whether this be true or no, quod medicorum est curent medici, tractent fabrilis fabri; one thing seemeth most certaine that this dependeth more on the secret will of Almighty God, then of any naturall reason and consequence, which may be deduced out of the principles of nature.

CHAP. LXII.

What punishments be due vnto originall sinne in this life.

I Answer briefly, that the first punishment due vnto originall sinne, and which was first of all inflicted vpon man, was the priuation of originall iustice, as proceeding from God, and as it did subdue the inferiour portion of the soule vnto the superiour, and the superiour vnto God.

The second punishment proceeding from the first, was in the soule and her powers, both vnderstanding and will: not that any thing essentiall either to the soule or her powers, is taken away, but that they are not so able to exercise their functions, as they should haue beene being endued with originall iustice.

The third punishment of originall sinne, was, that both *Adam* and his posteritie became thereby subiect to all corporall

corporall infirmities, yea euen vnto death it selfe, and many other expressed in the third chapter of *Genesis*, vers. 16. *I will greatly increase thy sorrowes and thy conceptions: in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; thy desire shall bee to thy husband, and hee shall haue the rule ouer thee.* Verse 17. *Vnto Adam hee said, because thou hast hearkened vnto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, concerning the which I commanded, saying, thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the dayes of thy life.* Verse 18. *Thornes also and thistles shall it bring forth vnto thee, and thou shalt eat of the hearbes of the field* Verse 19. *In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou bee turned againe to the ground; for out of it was thou taken, for dust thou art, and into dust shalt thou be turned againe.*

Now seeing this naturall death could not naturally bee effectuated so long as *Adam* was in *Paradise*, because the tree of life retained his vertue, wherewith man might renew his age: therefore Almighty God addeth in the same chapter,

ter, v
perad
take a
for et
forth
groun
drown
gard
a flar
to ke

Wha
in

A
dep
tism
sin
take
wha
nish
sup

ter, verse 22. 23. and 24. *And now lest peradventure hee put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for euer, therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden to dresse the ground, whence he was taken. And so he droue out man, and at the East side of the garden of Eden he set the Cherubins, and a flaming sword, which turned euery way to keepe the way of the tree of life.*

CHAP. LXIII.

What punishment is due vnto originall sin in the other life.

AL the difficultie of this point is wholly as concerning those who depart out of this world without baptism, whereby the guilt of originall sinne (as many hold) should haue been taken away: wherefore the question is, what becommeth of these, or what punishment is due vnto them for this sin, supposing that it be not taken away, as certainly

certainly it is not, at leastway in those that are not comprehended in the covenant of grace.

The common opinion of the schoole-Diuines in this point, is, that the innocents vn baptised, either *baptismo sanguinis*, *fluminis*, or *flaminis*, either with the baptisme of bloud, to wit, of martyrdom; or of the holy Ghost, by some supernaturall act or habit, sufficient to iustification; or finally by the ordinary baptisme of water, that such (I say) are punished with the losse of their supernaturall blessednesse, though not with any other sensible punishment.

This is expresly the opinion of *S. Ambrose* vpon that of the 5. chapter to the *Romans*, as by one man, where thus hee declareth his minde in this point: *Death is the resolution of the body, when the soule is separated from the body: there is also another death, which is called the second death vnto hell; which wee doe not suffer through Adams sinne, but this is gotten by our owne proper actuall sinne, though by the occasion of the other.*

Yea if wee onely attend vnto the nature

ture of originall sinne, contracted by the aforesaid innocents ; we shall finde that they are altogether vncapable of the punishment of hell fire : for who will say that a man might iustly bee cast in prison, or beaten for his originall sin, seeing it was neuer in his power to auoid it ? much lesse therefore were it iust, that any man should suffer the eternall torments of hell fire, for that sinne which hee neuer committed, neither was euer in his power to auoid it. wherefore this is the most common opinion of the Schooles, that the infants, or others who die with originall sinne only, shall not suffer any sensible torment of hell fire, though they bee eternally excluded from the company of the blessed in heauen, and the glorious sight of Almighty God : and this in particular is the opinion of the master of the sentences, *Bonauenture*, *Richardus Durand*, *Scotus*, *Marsilius*, *Gabriel*, *Alexander*, *Sotus*, and lastly of the Councell of Florence in the last session, in *litteris unionis*.

The second opinion of other schoole-
Diuines

Lumbar. 2. dist. 33.
Bonau. ibid. ar. 3. q. 1.
Rich. ar. 3. q. 1. Dur.
q. 3. Scotus q. unica.
Gabr. q. 1. ar. 2. concla. 1. & seq.
Marsil. in 2 q. 19. ar. 5. post 2. conclusionem.
Alex. 1. par. q. 39. mem. 3 ar. 4.
Dem. Sotus l. 1. de natura & gratia, ar. 4. cap. 14.
Cath. in opusc. peculiari de hac re.

Diuines is, that the said vn baptised innocents are to bee punished in the other world, not only with the losse of the sight of God, their essentiall blisse, but also with other sensible torments, euen with hell fire it selfe.

This is plainly the opinion of S. *Austine*, l. 5. *hypognosticon post medium*, and in his booke *de fide ad Petrum*, c. 27. & 44. But if these be not so, certainly *Austines* workes, the second at least is of the learned Bishop *Fulgentius*, and the other of some learned Author : yea whosoever be the authors of those, it is most certaine that *Austine* was of this opinion in his 14. sermon of the words of the Apostle, where he saith, *infantes in peccato originali discedentes ex hac vita, deputandos esse ad sinistram, ad ignem eternum* : that the infants that depart out of this world in originall sinne, are to be deputed to the left hand vnto euerlasting fire.

Againe, in his fift booke against *Iulian*, the 8. chapter, a little after the midst, he auerreth, *hanc pœnam ignis seruata esse infantibus, quanta verò futura sit,*

fit, non audet definire : that this punishment of fire is reserved for infants, though (as he saith) hee dare not define how great this punishment of fire shall be, in regard of them who depart with the guilt onely of originall sinne. The like also is not improbably gathered out of Gregory the great, in his 9. booke of his morals, the 12. chapter, vpon those words, in turbine conteret me, where he seemeth plainly to insinuate the said sensible punishment of the infants by fire ; ac si aperte humani generis damna considerans dicat, as if considering the losses of mankinde he should plainly say, with what punishment will that most iust and rigorous Iudge punish those who are condemned for their owne fault, if he also eternally smite those whom the guiltinesse of their owne will doth not condemne ? by which word of smiting he seemeth to insinuate the punishment of sense, which is by fire.

Again he declareth his mind himself touching this sensible punishment, vpon those words of the same chap. multiplicabit vulnera mea, hee shall multiplie my wounds ; where speaking of the foresaid

said infants, he saith, that *perpetua tormenta percipiunt, qui nihil ex propria voluntate peccarunt*; that those who haue sinned in nothing by their owne proper will, receiue perpetuall torments: which words of perpetuall torments must needs import a sensible punishment.

Yea this was the opinion of the Bishops of *Africa* in *Fulgentius* his time, as is plainly out of him aboue alleaged, and more plainly in his booke of the incarnation, which booke hee wrote not onely by the approbation of all the Bishops of *Africa*, but also in their names, as may be euidently seene by the beginning of the first chapter of that booke.

Finally, this seemeth to be the sense of the Scripture, *Matth.* the third chapter, verse 12. and *Marke* also the third chapter, verse 14. where *S. Iohn Baptist* speaking of our Sauour, saith, that he will come with his fanne in his hand, and will make cleane the floore, and gather his wheat into his garner, but will burne up the chaffe with vnquenchable fire: where (as wee see) all mankinde is but onely of

oftwo sorts, the good and the bad, the wheat and the chaffe, wherof the wheat only is for the garner, that is, the good for heauen, the chaffe for the fire, the bad for those intolerable torments of hell : here is no meane ; all is either good, or bad ; all either for eternall blesse, both sensible and spirituall, or eternall curse and punishment, both sensible and spirituall; and consequently, there is no other place or manner of punishment, for those who die with originall sinne, innocent in their owne actions, though eternally sequestred from the sight of God, for *Adams* sinne and corruption.

Secondly, it is said in the same chapter, that *euery tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be hewen downe, and cast in the fire.* Wherefore seeing those that depart out of this world with the guilt only of originall sinne, are vnfruitfull trees, consequently they are to bee cast into euerlasting fire.

Thirdly, when our blessed Saviour shall come to giue euery man according to his deeds, hee will only separate

two sorts of people, one of the right hand, another of the left, the good of the right, the bad of the left, those for eternall blesse in the kingdome of heauen, these for an eternall curse in the vnquenchable fire of hell. *Matth. 25. chap. vers. 31. And when the sonne of man commeth in his glory, and all the holy Angels with him, then shall he sit vpon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations, and he shall separate one from another, as a shepheard separateth the sheepe from the goats, and hee shall set the sheepe on the right hand, and the goats on the left.* Loe here bee two sorts of people signified by those two kindes of beasts, the sheepe and the goats, the good and the bad, the sheepe on the right hand, the goats on the left, according vnto the two sorts of sentences pronounced, vers 34. and 41. *Then shall the King say to them on his right hand, come yee blessed of my Father, possesse the inheritance of the kingdome prepared for you from the foundation of the world. Againe to the cursed hee saith, vers. 41. Depart from me yee cursed vnto euerlasting*

*everlasting fire, which is prepared for the
Deuill and his angels.*

Hence therefore it must needs follow, that seeing those who died in originall sinne imputed vnto them, as who were not in any wise ingrafted in the body of Christ, that these (I say) must needs according vnto the opinion of the aforesaid Fathers bee condemned vnto vnquenchable fire, though certaine it is (as God willing shall bee demonstrated in another place) that those who are in any wise ingrafted in Christ, either by the baptisme of water, of bloud, or of the holy Ghost, by reason of originall sinne only, shall neuer taste of those eternall torments prepared for the deuill and his angels.

CHAP. LXIII.

*The obiections of Simon Magus against the
aforesaid doctrine of the creation of
man, and his placing in Paradise.*

AS there is nothing so manifest vnto reason, but hath beene oppugned by reason; so neither hath there beene any thing so euident in Scripture, but hath beene oppugned with Scripture. So the Pharisees resisted the Messias, and *Simon Magus* the doctrine of *Moses*, especially about the creation.

For either (saith hee) the God which created man was omnipotent, or not; if omnipotent, how is it that hee would that *Adam* should not fall, who neuertheless did fall? if he was not omnipotent, how can he be God?

To this wee answer, that though *Adam* sinned, and by his sinne did contrary

trary to the will of God ; neuerthelesse hee remained in some sort conformable to the will of God : for as hee created him, endued with vnderstanding, that thereby hee might discerne good from euill ; so was hee also created with free will, whereby hee might embrace the good, and eschew the euill, obey or disobey his Lord and maker : this was the perfection in which he excelled the beasts of the earth, *paulò minor factus Angelis*, in this he resembled the purest Angels, yea in this hee is said to bee made to the image of God himselfe.

But God (saith *Simon Magus*) would not that *Adam* should haue eaten of the forbidden fruit, who neuerthelesse did eat of that fruit ; it followeth therefore that hee remained not as his Creator would haue had him to haue remained ; how then can God be omnipotent, or his will alwayes fulfilled ?

It were necessary, if we should fully satisfie this argument, to intreat more largely of the will of God, then were conuenient for this place : wherefore, that wee may briefly answer this obie-

Aquinas 1.
 2. 2. te qua-
 stione 19.
 Ibidem
 Molina,
 Vasquez,
 Suarez,
 Sumel,
 Bannesius,
 & alij plu-
 res.

tion, wee must presuppose with the Schoole-Diuines a threetold distinction of the will of God, according to the diuersitie of their proper objects: the first they call his efficient, effectual, or working will, by which God doth so effectually intend any thing, that hee performeth it actually by some externall operation and worke, either actually produced, or to be produced.

The other kinde of will, which the Diuines distinguish in God, in regard of some objects which he doth not really produce, is called *inefficax voluntas*, a kinde of propension or inclination of his diuine will to the effectuating of any good effect, which might redound to the felicitie of man: yet for the attaining of the end, which out of his vnsearchable wisdom hee hath prefixed, hee oftentimes permitteth the contrary to this his diuine inclination and will; the which therefore is called *Gods permissive will*. As for example, God would that all men should bee saved, according to that of the Apostle,

Deus

Deus vult omnes homines saluos fieri ; to wit, in his vniuersall grace, calling, and inspirations, and other generall meanes, offered to all, so that out of his infinite goodnesse hee wisheth and wil- leth in this sort all to bee saued, and that hee might the more manifest his infinite mercy by the efficacie of his working will, he actually saue some, euen so to manifest his iustice by his other permissiue decree, he permitteth others to worke their owne ruine and eternall damnation.

So that according to this distinction, it may truly be said, that the transgres- sion of *Adam* was in some sort con- trary to the will of God, in some againe agreeable to the same : for first, in that it was permitted by God, it was for the further benefit vnto mankinde, and the greater glory of God, by which hee wrought that miraculous effect of the hypostaticall vnion betweene the se- cond person of the blessed Trinitie, and our nature, taking occasion of the grea- test euill to worke our greatest good : insomuch that it may well bee deemed

(as Gregory termeth it) *fœlix culpa, quæ talem & tantum habere meruit Redemptorem* ; a happy fall in regard of the issue, not as it was a sinne, but as an occasion of a more perfect abolishing of sinne ; neither as willed by God, but permitted ; foreseene by Gods wisdome, effected by mans wickednesse, yea in some sort effected by God, to wit, by Gods vniuersall course, but determined by mans depraued will, Gods action being indifferent, or rather of its owne nature, and as Gods, ordained to good, but by mans depraued will determined to euill ; which yet againe by the infinite goodnesse of God is made an occasion of our greatest good. So that, if it bee demanded, whether God would that *Adam* should eat of the forbidden tree, or no ? and if hee would, why did hee forbid it ? if he would not, why did he not hinder it ?

The answer is, that in some sort hee would it, and againe after some sort he would it not : hee would it not, as a sinne ; hee would it neuerthelesse as a
meane,

meane, or rather as an occasion of a greater good. Wherefore he forbad it as a sinne: he concurred with it, as vniuersall cause of all things being, not as a particular cause, or agent in sinne, as it was sinne, though in some sense hee would it (as hath beene said) as a meane of an infinite greater good: and as the greatest occasion of shewing his infinite wisdom, and goodnesse; of his wisdom, because he knew to produce such an excellent effect, of so infinite an euill; of his goodnesse likewise, in that being moued onely by it, and for it, he was pleased to effect our greatest good, of the greatest euill: a worke so excellent and admirable, as which could onely proceede and flow from that onely infinite ocean of goodnesse.

Yea Adams eating of the forbidden fruit was an euident argument, that hee remained free to sinne, euen after his sinne: according to the pleasure and will of God: for such was his diuine will, that Adam should be endued with free will, that it might be in his power
to

to chuse the good, and eschew the euill, not of himselfe, but by grace: so that thus sinning he shewed his power, and consequently by the same sinne hee shewed in some sort himself to remaine according to Gods diuine will and pleasure with freedome to sinne: for seeing that no sinne can be committed without some actuall exercise of free will, and that by the same exercise the precedent power is manifested, it followeth, that by this exercise, and action of Adams free will, I meane his transgression, it was made manifest, that hee was created, and alwaies preserued according to his diuine will, in that he was endued, and afterward remained with free will sufficient to sinne, though insufficient in it selfe to the actions of grace.

In this sense then wee see that although Adam sinned, yet remained he according to Gods will, because hee remained alwaies endued with free will.

Likewise, we may vnderstand in another sense, how Adam remained according

according to Gods will, yea and this euen in regard of his sinne; I meane, according to his permissiue will: for Almighty God (as we haue said before) out of his incomprehensible wisdom fore-seeing the infinite good, which might proceed from thence, to wit, the hypostaticall vnion, and being determined by his absolute and secret will, to effectuate the same, hee permitted this sinne of Adam, as a negatiue meanes, or rather occasion, of so excellent an end.

But God (saith this heretike) would haue had man to haue persisted in that blessed estate, from which neuerthelesse hee fell: how then was not Gods will more then his power, seeing hee obtained not, that which he would?

But here we may see both the malice and ignorance of this heretike, which both are the rootes and springs of all heresies: his malice, in that hee presumed against God himselfe; his ignorance, in that hee taxeth that hee vnderstandeth

standeth not : for if he had vnderstood either what belongeth to the free will of man, or rightly apprehended the power & wisdom of the omnipotent, he might easily haue perceiued, that the fall of our first father, did rather demonstrate the wisdom of God, then contradict his omnipotence, and will : for seeing it pleased his diuine maiestie to giue vs free will, and to place vs in such estate, in which by his grace we might persist, and which being rejected, we might fall of our selues : what can bee more euident, but as that our perseuerance should haue beene attributed to God, and to the right use of his grace, so our fall onely vnto our selues, and the want of our concurrence with his grace, the which in that estate was not onely sufficient, but very abundant. Seeing therefore it was once in the power of our first father, to haue withstood the temptation of Satan ; and not to haue cast off so easie a yoke, as was imposed him, with so abundant grace ; he deserued no doubt to bee deprived of that grace, thrust

thrust out of Paradise, yea finally to bee disrobed of the beautifull robe of immortallitie.

In the combination of which we may magnifie, and admire the omnipotent wisdom, and infinite wise power of God; in that hee knew and could so excellently combine iustice, with mercy; the which two attributes, as they are to be found in all his workes, so without all question most admirable in this: his iustice, in not leauing vnpunished so foule a fact as originall sinne; his mercy, in the mercifull manner of the punishment: his iustice againe, in that he depriued man of the vesture of immortallitie; his mercy, euen in the same penalty and deprivation of immortallitie, least as *Moyse Barsephas* doth most excellently answer in this point, *ne ipsius prauitas foret immortalis, qualis est diaboli*: least his wickednes should become immortall, such as the *Diuels* is; following the nature of the subiect, to which it is adherent.

Furthermore God therefore punisheth

eth man with this mercifull punishment of death, that thereby hee considering the effect, might eschew the cause: or lastly, because out of this mortalitie of man he would produce a more perfect immortalitie in the same man: for God fore-seeing that out of Adams posterity should come an infinite multitude of martyrs, the sentence of death was pronounced against Adam, to the end that many of his posteritie suffering death for the Redeemers sake, might supply the places of false spirits.

But that we may returne from whence we digressed, if God were therefore to be counted deficient in power, because he created Adam with such liberty, that he could contradict the commandment of his Creator: after the same manner might likewise be inferred, that now also he hath the like defect, or impotencie; seeing that now also man hath the like liberty to transgresse: because as hee commanded Adam, that he should not touch the tree of the knowledge of good and euill: so likewise hath hee comman-

commanded vs his posteritie, that wee should follow the good, and eschew the contrary euill: now therefore if we do transgresse this law, it must needs bee God either allowing or contradicting this transgression: if it be by Gods approbation, why doth hee prohibite it? if contrary to his will, why doth he permit it? or if hee permit that which is against his will, how can such a God bee called omnipotent? or lastly, if he can hinder that which is euill, and doth not; how is he good, who consenteth, and concurreth to euill?

To these I answer out of the former principles, that euen this permission of sinne doth most manifestly demonstrate the infinite wisdom, power, and goodnesse of God; his wisdom, in that out of this in a manner so infinite euill, hee did worke such an infinite good, as is the manifestation of his glory, and the incarnation of his Sonne; his power, in that he could, his goodnesse in that hee would.

But why (saith the aduersarie) did God prohibite Adam the eating of the tree

tree of the knowledge of good and euill? what else could bee his meaning, but least he should be able to iudge betweene good and euill, and consequently least hee should eschew the euill, and prosecute the good? how then is not God enuious, or how can hee be God, who enuieth and prohibiteth that which is good?

I answer, that God did neither absolutely decree that Adam should eat of this fruit, neither that he should not eat, though he did command him, that hee should not eat, but left him to his owne free will to eat, or not eat: hee did forbid him to eat, not because the fruit was morally, or of it selfe good or euill, but in the issue; good, if he had abstained; euill, if hee abstained not: good by obedience, euill by disobedience: wherefore God did intend in this prohibition to try his obedience, and that only was respected in this commandement: so that if Adam had obeyed God, accordingly as was in his power by the grace of God, hee should for a time haue enioyed that terrene Paradise, in which he
was

was created, and afterward haue beene partaker of the celestiaall eternally with his Creator.

Hence wee see how impiously God is accused of wickednesse, and enuie in the forbidding of our first fathers the eating of the tree of good and euill; seeing that the eating of this fruit was indifferent of its owne nature, as out of which neither good nor euill could proceed: but that which God did regard in this commandment, was our obedience or disobedience: in respect of which hee was after a manner indifferent, neither absolutely decreeing the one, neither effectually willing the other: onely this wee may adde, that God did desire and will our first fathers abstinence, and therein required his obedience: but as this his diuine will had not his efficacie, so did hee and might permit the contrary for other respects worthy his diuine prouidence and infinite wisdom, which haue been already touched. Not of enuie (as some haue blasphemously imagined) least Adam become immortall, for if this blasphemie,

Y mie,

mie, were consequent to the fore-said prohibition; certainly, God, who fore-saw all future euent, either would not haue created man, or hauing created him, would not haue placed him in Paradise so neere vnto the tree of life; or at least way, hee might either haue hidden, or not haue created the tree of life. Wherefore the true reason, why he forbade him the tree of life, was (as *Moyse Barsephas* well noteth) *ne perpetuo uiueret in peccato*, least he should liue in perpetuall death of sinne, as the Deuill doth, euer liuing, euer dying.

Lastly, the aduersarie obiekteth against the curse of the Serpent: for why (saith he) did God curse the Serpent? if hee cursed him as the author of the euill committed, why did he not hinder it, least it should be committed? but if he cursed him as author of that good, which was consequent vnto the euill, how is that God called good, and not rather enuious and wicked, who punisheth, yea enuieth the author of such an excellent effect? Again, if neither of these was the cause of the Serpents curse,

curse, how may God bee excused of wilfull maliciousnesse, or malicious foolishnes?

The answer to this blasphemy is patent out of that, which hath beene already said out of the former obiections, to wit, that God did therefore curse the Serpent as author of euill, neither did hinder him pretending the euill to the intent, that he might out of so infinite an euill, as was the transgression of the first Adam, worke that infinite good of the incarnation of his Sonne, and birth of the second Adam: for though it be an argument both of his power, and goodnesse; *ex bono efficere melius*, of good to make better: yet it seemeth much more excellent, and conuincing euen our naturall capacitie, that hee is infinitely potent, and good: who can *ex nihilo perfectissimum producere effectum: vel ex pessimo efficere optimum*; who can (I say) produce the most perfect, good, and most excellent effect, yea farre exceeding all other created perfection and excellencie, of nothing; yea euen of that nothing which is most remote

from any goodnesse, yea is the very priuation of all goodnesse and excellencie.

CHAP. LXV.

*In which the obiections of Manes are
assoiled.*

M*Anes* that wicked heretike, with the rest of his sect doe most blasphemously accuse the wisdom of God, as touching the fore-said commandment of abstaining from the tree of good and euill: for (saith he) doubtles when God did giue this law, vnto our first fathers, hee thought, that they would obey it; which seeing they did not, God (as *Manes* obiecteth) was deceiued.

Secondly, he accuseth God of vniust wrath and indignation: in that he condemned man for so small a matter, as
the

the eating of an apple. Finally, he accuseth him of ignorance, mutabilitie, and contradiction to himselfe; in that ignoring his future compassion towards man, hee did frustrate the law, which hee himselfe had made, yea and contradicted the sentence of death, as rashly pronounced by himselfe against Adam.

Here we may see, how (as *Tertullian* saith) God of his infinite goodnes and mercy suffereth himselfe to bee dishonoured in his other infinite attributes, and dierie: but that it may bee apparent, that these blasphemies haue not any ground, euen in naturall reason: we answer, that though all things, and consequently the disobedience of Adam was perfectly fore-knowne by God Almighty, yet neuerthelesse it was conformable to reason, that Adam being a reasonable creature should haue this law of obedience prescribed vnto him, so conformable to reason: first, for to manifest the absolute power, dominion, and authoritie of God the Creator ouer his creature; and the due

subiection of the creature towards his Creator.

Secondly, this law of obedience was most profitable vnto man (though fore-knowledge that it was to be violated by man), most profitable (I say) it was, both in regard of the manifestation of Gods iustice, and mercy: as also for the exercise and tryall of the good, and bad; righteous, and vnrighteous, a necessarie object of the afore-said attributes.

Now if this law should therefore haue beene omitted, because God fore-knew the transgression thereof; by the same reason, or rather no reason, no other law should haue beene prescribed vnto man; seeing there is no law, either of nature or grace, which God in his fore-knowledge did not foresee would be often-times violated by man.

Furthermore, as touching the blasphemie against the wrath of God, I answer, that it is not to be attributed to God, as signifying any passion, or mutation in the immutable or impassible God;

God; but that this shadow of change, or shew of mutabilitie, is attributed vnto him, who in his nature is altogether immutable, because hee seeing the wickednesse of man, he worketh those effects, which in vs bee euident tokens, and signes of mutabilitie and change.

Nay secondly, I adde, that after Adam had transgressed the commandment of God, God pronounced against him the afore-said sentence of death, more moued by mercy, then of any anger or wrath: which wee may euidently see in that hee did not die the same day of his transgression, according as the sentence, which God pronounced against him, seemed to threaten; so that whether wee respect the sentence giuen before Adams disobedience, or the execution of the same after his sinne, we may admire the infinite mercy of the Almighty in both, both in regard of Adam, and his posteritie; as also in regard of the sentence threatned to be inflicted so immediatly after their sinne: so that euen

in his iustice wee may magnifie his mercy, and say with the Psalmist, *miserericordia eius super omnia opera eius*, that his mercy aboundeth in all his workes, yea and is aboue all his works: because (as the Diuines say) *remunerat ultra condignum, punit citra condignum*, he rewardeth our workes farre beyond their worth, which is none at all, vnlesse it bee in Christ; and punisheth our sinnes much lesse, then they deserue.

To the other blasphemie, which *Manes* vseth against the Almighty God, in accusing him of repentance, and mutabilitie, I answer, that we must first suppose, what it is to repent, or to be sorry for any thing, which wee haue done: For repentance or sorrow supposeth ignorance in vs, of future euent, yea of such as are noxious or hurtfull to those who are affected with the afore-said passion; both which are farre vnfitting the all-seeing science, and omnipotent power of God: who did not remit the rigour of this sentence, moued by sorrow or repentance,

as

as it happeneth in vs, but rather, as we haue said before, by his infinite mercy and clemencie, to the end that his infinite goodnesse and mercy might bee the more manifest vnto vs.

In like manner wee may say, that when any sinner doth turne from his former being in sinne, God Almighty in some sort may bee said to remit the rigour of his sentence pronounced against him ; and this not by reason of any ignorance, or mutable repenting himselfe of the former fact, or threatening (as *Manes* blasphemously objecteth) but rather hee remitteth out of his infinite clemencie, the sentence of damnation, which conditionally hee had decreed, to wit, if the sinner had not repented himselfe of his sinne : an example of which wee finde in the commination of doome and vtter destruction threatned not absolutely, but conditionally against the *Niuiites*, that they should vtterly bee destroyed within forty dayes, likewise against *Ezechias*, that hee should die for his sinnes, whom neuerthelesse God pardoned vpon

Iona 3.

4. Reg. 20.

vpon their repentance: and the like also wee finde in others, most hainous offenders, against whom God hauing denounced his wrath, neuerthelesse pardoned vpon their sorrow, contrition, and humiliation.

Now as touching the lie, which this hereticke objecteth against God, in that hee threatned death vnto man in the day of his transgression, which neuerthelesse was not inflicted: I answer, that as man is composed of body and spirit, so likewise the death threatned against him was both corporall and spirituall; which both were in some sort inflicted euen in the very instant of his transgression: the spirituall in the separation of his spirit from God and his grace, wherein consisted his spirituall and supernaturall life: the corporall in the perturbation of his affections and powers both spirituall and corporall, which was a kinde of beginning of a neuer dying death, beginning in this life, and which according to the present iustice of God, if it had beene executed, was to haue beene consummated

ted in the other life, or rather eternall death, if so be that this first lapse and fall had not been remitted, not of mans merit, but by Gods mercy.

CHAP. LXVI.

The obiections of Theodorus and Nestorius.

Theodorus Bishop of *Laodicea*, and *Nestorius* Patriarke of *Constantinople*, with diuers others of the Greeke Church, were of opinion, that sinne was not the occasion of death, but that man should haue died though hee had not sinned: because mortalitie is consequent to nature, as immortalitie proceedeth only of grace. How then is it possible, vnlesse God can contradict and denie himselfe, or that one of the diuine decrees can be opposite to another, that God should first decree the
immor-

Immortalitie of man, then presently vpon his transgression, the object being changed, God also should be changed in his decree: for either God fore-knew mans fall, and his perseuerance in grace for so small a space, or hee fore-knew it not: if not, how was hee God? if hee fore-knew it, how is hee so presently changed, and consequently also no God?

Againe, if we were deprived of the gift of immortalitie bestowed vpon *Adam*, and in him vpon all his posteritie, how may it stand with the iustice of God, and much more with his infinite mercy, that wee should be punished for *Adams* iniustice, the innocent for the guiltie, the iust for the vniust? Yea how standeth this euen with the word of God, and his complaint by *Ezechiel*, chapter 18. verse 2. where God complaineth of this, as it seemeth, blasphemie of his people: *What meane you, that you vse this prouerbe concerning the land of Israel, saying, The fathers haue eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge?* which

is

is as much, as to say, our fore-fathers haue sinned, and wee are punished for their sinnes. How may this stand with the iustice of God, seeing God himselfe taxeth this as vniust, and as vniustly objected against him, in the third verse of the same chapter, where contesting against mans vnrighteousnesse, hee protesteth and proueth his owne righteousness and iust dealing, insinuating thereby, yea detesting the contrary as iniustice, verse 3. *As I liue, saith the Lord, yee shall not haue occasion any more to vse this prouerbe in Israel, to wit, that the fathers haue eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge*; that is, that their fathers haue sinned, and they were punished: against which hee contesteth, and that by an oath, euen by himselfe, in the latter end of the fourth verse, *The soule that sinneth, it shall die*, that is, all that sinne shall die, and none shall die but those which sinne: hee giueth the reason in the beginning of the verse, and that with an *ecce*, behold, because he would haue all to acknowledge his iustice with man,

man, and how hee vseth equalitie with all men ; the father as the sonne, and the sonne as the father, euery one according to his deeds in Christ, because all are equally his, who saith, *Behold, all soules are mine ; as the soule of the father, so also the soule of the sonne is mine ; the soule that sinneth, it shall die :* as who would say, and none else shall die, but who sinneth ; which may bee proued by the opposite iustice, and is exemplified euen by the Prophet, as that none shall bee rewarded for anothers righteousness, so none shall bee punished for anothers vnrighteousnesse : for so the Prophet prosecuteth in the fift verse : *But if a man bee iust, and doe that which is lawfull and right, and hath not eaten vpon the mountaines, neither lift vp his eyes vnto idols of the house of Israel, neither hath defiled his neighbours wife, neither hath comeneere a menstruous woman, and hath not oppressed any, but hath restored to the debter his pledge, hath spoiled none by violence, hath giuen his bread to the hungrie, and hath couered the naked with*

*a garment ; he that hath not giuen forth
vpon vsurie, neither hath taken any in-
crease, that hath withdrawne his hand
from iniquitie, hath executed true iudge-
ment betweene man and man, hath walked
in my statutes, and kept my iudgements to
deale truly, he is iust, he shall surely liue,
saith the Lord God.*

How then can it bee true that *Adams* posteritie should bee punished for his sinne, or deprived of immortalitie, which God had decreed vnto them for *Adams* transgression ? Or otherwise how can that bee true which the same Prophet prosecuteth in the twentieth verse ? *The soule that sinneth, it shall die : the sonne shall not beare the iniquitie of the father, neither shall the father beare the iniquitie of the sonne : the righteousness of the righteous shall be vpon him, and the wickednesse of the wicked shall bee vpon him.* Where hee prosecuteth throughout all the chapter, prouing and approuing the iustice of God, together with the reproofe of mans vnrighteousnesse and iniustice, especially from the 29. verse to the end,
where

where hee propoundeth and answereth the obiections of his people : *Yet (saith the house of Israel) the way of the Lord is not equall : O house of Israel, are not my wayes equall ? are not your wayes unequal ? Therefore I will iudge you, O house of Israel, every one according to his wayes, saith the Lord God : repent and turne your selues from all your transgression, so iniquitie shall not bee your ruine ; cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby you haue transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit : for why will you die, O house of Israel ? for I haue no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God : wherefore turne your selues, and liue.*

Now then if God haue no pleasure in the death of a sinner, how hath hee pleasure in his mortalitie, hauing created him immortall ? or how hath hee not pleasure in his death, whom for so small a matter as the eating of an apple, or some other such like fruit, hee deprieth of immortalitie, yea contradicteth his owne decree for the fulfilling of the aforesaid reuenge of sinne ?

Againe,

Againe, though wee grant that *Adam* died for his sinne and iniustice, why should wee not likewise say, that *Noe*, *Melchisedech*, *Abraham*, and others of the Patriarkes and Prophets were restored vnto immortalitie for their iustice and righteousnesse? Wee know that God is alwayes more prone to shew his mercy, then to execute his iustice: how then may it bee said, that here he so withdraweth his mercy, and extendeth his iustice? Hee often pardoneth the wicked for the godly mens sake, and neuer punisheth the iust for the wickeds sinne: from whence then is this his crueltie and vniust dealing against those which neuer committed any iniustice?

Moreouer, the sonne of God was incarnate for *Adams* sinne: we ought to bee thankfull euen to the deuill, to our selues, and to sinne it selfe, as occasion of so great good, as was the restoring of mankinde to a more blessed estate.

Lastly, if *Adams* sinne was cause of his death, why did not the deuils also

Z

die,

die, seeing they sinned much more grievously? If you say they died spiritually, in that they were deprived of the grace of God, why might not the like death suffice also for *Adams* sinne? the death (I meane) of the soule, his body remaining as it was created, not subiect to death? How did God iustly execute his iustice, inflicting a greater punishment vpon *Adam* for a smaller offence, then vpon the deuils for a greater, depriving them only of their spirituall life, but *Adam* both of spirituall and corporall?

These are the arguments of these heretickes, against the iust punishment which God did inflict vpon our first father for his first offence of disobedience; by which they would conclude, that whether *Adam* had sinned, or remained in his former righteousness, whether hee had eaten of the forbidden fruit, or abstained from it, hee had neuerthelessse beene subiect to death, because hee was created of his owne nature mortall, which nature neither the eating of the forbidden fruit could
make

make mortall, nor the abstinence from it immortall.

Hence therefore they are imboldned to affirme, that wheresoeuer the Scripture maketh mention of *Adams* sinne, as cause of his corporall death, that it is to bee vnderstood figuratiuely, not that *Adams* sinne was properly the cause or the occasion of his death, but that the Scripture vseth this phrase, to the end, that when *Adam* should heare of so seuerer a punishment, as the death of both body and soule, he might bee terrified thereby from the committing of sinne. The Scripture vseth the like manner of speech in diuers occasions, as in the 22. chapter of *Genesis*, God tempted or tried *Abraham*, which place must needs be vnderstood figuratiuely; for God who seeth all things, as well future, as present, or past, hath no need of any triall or experience. The like kinde of threatning wee haue in the fourth chapter of *Exodus*, where it is said, that God would haue slaine *Moses*, which places are not to bee interpreted literally as they sound, but

figuratiuely, as all other places of Scripture (according to the rule of *S. Augustine*) when otherwise they signifie any absurditie, as this of the death of *Adam* doth, because it contradicteth the decree of God concerning his immortallitie.

Neuerthelesse the contrary exposition is most firmly to bee holden as concerning the immortallitie of man before his fall, and mortallitie after and by his transgression : not that there was any mutation in God, but transgression in man : God predetermined according to his foresight, man sinned according to that foresight, not that the foresight was cause of mans fall, but rather mans fall was the object of Gods foresight : insomuch that God had not foreseene mans fall, if man had not beene to fall ; neither man had fallen, if God had not foreseene his fall : so that though it bee necessary that God foresee that which is future, yet that is not necessarily future, which God doth foresee ; for so seeth hee things future as they are future, not imposing

posing any necessitie in things not necessarily future by his foresight : which as it is necessary in regard of things necessary, so is it contingent in regard of things contingent : contingent (I say) in respect of the object, though necessary in respect of his owne entitie and being ; or as the Schoole-Diuines doe explicate it, *ad intra* necessary, *ad extra* contingent : insomuch that all the mutation is in the outward and created objects, nothing at all can reflect or redound vnto God.

Wherefore though Almighty God had eternally decreed the immortalitie of man in his first creation ; yet was there no mutation in God, because vpon his transgression he made him mortall, and subiect to death : for as both the degrees were eternall, so the foresight of the euent of both was likewise eternall ; the mutation issued onely from the object, and remained in the same : immutabilitie was alwayes, and remaineth in God, because as hee had foreseene, so he determined ; and as he determined, so likewise he foresaw.

Lege ad
Rom. cap.
5. & 7.

Hence it is, that seeing the Scripture so often witnesseth, that death was the effect of sinne, and that if sinne had not rained in our soules, neither should death haue destroyed our mortall bodies ; questionlesse, though man was created immortall by grace, yet is hee iustly depriued of that immortalitie, and become subiect to death through his transgression.

Now as touching the absurdities so ignorantly (if not blasphemously) inferred vpon the foresaid doctrine, I answer, that though God doe reprove that ancient prouerbe of the *Jewes*, and their comparison of the sowe grape, with other the like contestations of sillie wormes with their Creator, that these (I say) are principally to bee vnderstood in regard of actuell sinne, as is plaine out of the text it selfe, and not habituall or originall, of which the text speaketh not.

But if it bee referred (as some haue done) euen vnto originall sinne, yet neither can the iustice of God bee any whit impeached thereby : for though

wee

wee eat not the sowre grape, neither taste the forbidden fruit in our selues, yet did we both taste and eat in *Adam*, who was our head: yea though wee tasted not the fruit it selfe in our selues, yet we contracted the sowrenesse thereof, and the effect of the sinne, yea the sinne it selfe in our soules: for though the action was onely in our head, yet the passion, and effect was in all the members; as is more largely explicated aboue in the question of the manner, nature, and essence of this sinne, in which all the difficulties concerning this and the like points are answered.

Neither can it bee inferred hence, that God doth punish the iust for the vniust, or reuenge the fathers wickednesse in the sonnes: (which neuerthelesse were no iniustice, seeing the sonnes are in some sort deemed as parts of the fathers, and consequently may iustly be punished for their fathers offences) but rather that euery man is punished for his owne originall sinne; which though it bee contracted from

Adam, yet it is inherent in euery mans owne nature.

Againe, seeing *Adam* of his owne nature was created mortall, and by grace onely was to bee preserued immortal, there was no iniustice in God towards *Adams* posteritie in that they were depriued of originall iustice, but this proceeded from *Adams* demerit for himselfe, and his posteritie. Especially seeing that the couenant was so concluded betweene God and *Adam*, that *qua die comederet, moriretur*, that his eating should be his death; his abstinence, life: with this difference that death should be onely from himselfe, as sinne had beene onely from his will, but life should haue beene onely from God, and the preservation from sinne, from Gods grace onely.

Hence wee may vnderstand how there is no iniustice or vnrighteousnesse in God, that although *Adam* was created immortal, yet we should be borne of *Adam* mortall, and subiect to death: seeing hee was iustly depriued of immortalitie by his sin, and we by him.

Lastly,

Lastly, if we read the sacred text, we shall finde it neither to be iniustice, or any nouelty that the sonnes be punished for their fathers offences; for so it is in the 1. of *Samuel* the 15. *because I remember that which Amalech did vnto Israel, going out of Ægypt, goe thou Saul, and fight against Agag, and his people:* and the 2. of *Samuel* 18, it is said, *that the wiues of David should be defiled for Davids sinne.* againe in the 2 of *Samuel* the 21 it is written, how *David* hanged the sonnes of *Resphe* for the *Gabaonites* sake.

Moreouer, if it were true that which the Poet sang vnto his friend; *delicta maiorum immeritus lues:* thou shalt beare the offences of thy fore-fathers without thine owne deseruings, then certainly the question, as a reuerend and learned Prelate well noteth, were more difficult, but who is able to say, *my heart is cleane*, though I came from an vncleane seede? though I were borne of a Morian, I haue not his sinne: though an Amorite were my father, and my mother a Hittite, I haue not
their

B. King vp-
on *Ionas*,
cap. 1. v. 7.

their nature : though I haue touched pitch, I am not defiled : I can wash my hands in innocencie, and say with a cleare conscience, I haue not sinned ? but if this be the cause of all, that there is not a soule in the whole cluster of mankinde, that hath not offended, though not as principall as *Achan* in taking the cursed thing, *Choran* in rebelling, *David* in numbring the people, yet as accessarie in consenting and concealing ; if neither principall nor accessarie in that one sinne, yet culpable in a thousand others committed in our life time, (perhaps not open to the world, but in the eyes of God as bright as the Sunne in the firmament ; for the Scorpion hath a sting, though hee hath not thrust it out to wound vs, and man hath malice, though hee hath not outwardly shewed it) it may be some sinnes to come which God fore-seeth ; and some past, which he recounteth, shall we stand in argument with God, as man would plead with man, and charge the iudge of the quicke and the dead with iniurious exactions ? *I haue paied the things,*
that

that I neuer tooke, I haue borne the price of sinne, which I neuer committed ? You see already the ground of mine answere.

We haue all sinned father and sonne, rush and branch, and deseruedly are to expect that wages from the hands of God, which to our sinne appertaineth. Besides it cannot be denied, but those things, which we part in our conceipts, by reason that distance of time and place haue sundered them, some being done of old, some of late, some in one quarter of the world, some in another ; those doth the God of knowledge vnite, and view them at once, as if they were done together ; out of all which conceiued together (as the all-vnderstanding wisdome of God doth conceiue and vnite them) we may well inferre that the iudgements of God bee as iust, and his waies as right as his mercy, and goodnesse, and prouidence extended to all, that as there is no worke of man, not fully recompenced, or rewarded with ouerplus ; so there is no sinne, whether actuall, or originall, not iustly

iustly punished, *citra*, as the Diuines hold, but neuer *ultra condignum*, lesse, I meane, then the sinne doth deserue, neuer more then the fact doth require, Gods mercy being (as the Scripture witnesseth) ouer all his workes; and alwaies in some sort more extended then his iustice: for though it be true, that as his iustice is included in his mercy, euen formally (as most Diuines hold) so likewise his mercy is included in his iustice, and so both equall in nature and being: yet such is the goodnes of our infinite good God, that in the execution, & *ad extra*, (as the Diuines tearme it) his mercy should alwaies be extended further then his iustice, and his iust iudgements alwaies in somewhat at least, detained, or after a sort restrained by his mercy. Wherefore as we are wont to say, of famous, worthy, and excellent men, *in ceteris vicit omnes, in hoc seipsum*, in other things hee exceeded all men; in this, hee ouercame himselfe; The like wee may affirme of God; that hee is incomparable, in all attributes, and workes, but in this hee exceedeth

exceedeth himselfe. To him therefore, as infinite, mercifull, and ever-living God, three persons and one indivisible deitie, bee ascribed all honor, power, maiestie, and dominion, now and for evermore. A M E N.

FINIS.